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Abstract
This thesis looks at the definition and diffusion within the E U  o f  a new model o f  policy-making 
and implementation based on regions acting within a multilevel system o f  governance. The 
focus o f  the empirical research is on INTERREG, an experimental Community Initiative that 
has promoted interregional cooperation across national borders. This thesis argues that 
INTERREG represents a particularly coherent case o f  the E U ’s approach to regional planning  
and territorial development: in fact, it extends multilevel governance to interregional 
partnerships defined beyond national borders and adds a territorial dimension to the goal o f  
socio-economic cohesion. Since 1990, when INTERREG was firs t launched, territorial 
cooperation has become increasingly relevant to E U  Regional Policy (and in the accession o f  
new Member States) until when, in 2007, it was mainstreamed as one o f  the three new priority 
objectives o f  the policy. Drawing evidence from  the implementation o f  INTERREG in the 
‘islands ' programme between the regions o f  Corsica (FR) and Sardinia (I) from  1990 until 
2005, this thesis shows how the process o f  administrative capacity and institution building 
promoted by the European Commission at the subnational level has gradually empowered 
regional actors to take responsibility fo r  the planning and management o f  strategies fo r  
sustainable development o f  their territories. Although lacking the traditions o f  interregional 
cooperation and sharing a past o f  dependency on their respective central governments in 
development planning, regional actors have gradually adopted and learned to incorporate the 
cooperative logic o f  the EU  model proposed by the programme and extended it to other policy 
domains. However, the potential o f  interregional cross-border cooperation in terms o f  
enhancing territorial cohesion appears to be limited by the persistent peripherality o f  the 
islands and their wider territorial setting (the Western-Mediterranean), prompting the need fo r  
a wide-ranging spatial strategy capable o f  coordinating EU  policies.
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Introduction
At large, this thesis engages in the ongoing debate on the gradual emergence of post­
national institutional frameworks for the organization of contemporary societies. One of 
the main tenets of modernity has been the political organization of societies in nation­
states, formally defined as territorial units externally separated by fixed borders and 
internally organized according to a centralized and hierarchical regulative structure. 
Over the last decades this tenet has been challenged by several processes, streaming 
under the label of globalization, showing an increased interconnectedness of economic, 
social and political processes beyond the national level, challenging the exclusiveness 
of state regulative powers, and asking for an internal reorganization of its institutions, in 
order to meet the requirements and face the challenges of a new era.
Several authors have associated with these changes the process of integration of 
the European Union (EU)1, considered as “an extraordinary political experiment” 
(Pierson 1998: 27) to test mechanisms and strategies for the reorganization of 
contemporary societies facing this epochal transformation. Particularly since the last 
three decades, they have identified an emergent European framework (often referred to 
as multilevel governance) where territory is organized according to flexible structures 
designing variable geometries and decision-making is shared beyond national borders 
across various levels of government and socio-economic actors (Marks, Hooghe et al. 
1996: 342). One of the primary fields where this occurrence has been detected is in the 
EU’s Regional Policy2, aimed at promoting the harmonious development of the 
European territory through the reduction of disparities between different regions . At a 
lower level of analysis, this thesis considers the ongoing shift, proposed by EU Regional 
Policy, from the consideration of regions as part of centralized nation-states, to one as
1 For the sake of simplicity, I shall use throughout the thesis the acronym ‘EU’ for ‘European Union’ 
(officially agreed since 1993 in the Maastricht Treaty) also to to refer to the names previously assumed 
from its establishment in 1957 with the Rome Treaty (European Economic Community, European 
Community), remaining aware of the fact that, in the strictest sense, when looking into issues related to 
the ‘first pillar’ of the EU, the more accurate term would be ‘European Community’.
2 After the 1988 reform of the Structural Funds ‘EU Regional Policy’ has also been called ‘Cohesion 
Policy’. Some authors prefer to use exclusively the latter expression to indicate the relevance of the 
cohesion objective in the policy (see Leonardi 2005). While sharing this consideration, I found it 
preferable for the aim of this thesis (comparing the shift in regional policies’ paradigm from the ‘national 
model’ to the ‘EU model’) to use the expression ‘EU Regional Policy’, which (if not otherwise stated) is 
thus used as synonymous with ‘Cohesion policy’.
3 “In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall develop and pursue its 
actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In particular, the Community 
shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least-favoured regions, including rural areas” (SEA, title V: Economic and social 
cohesion, article 130a).
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active territorial subjects of networked societies in Europe within the reality of a Single 
European market that has eliminated borders as impediments to the free flow of goods, 
services, people, and capital.
Since the end of the Second World War most Western European states have 
identified regions4 as the proper territorial level for policy analysis and implementation 
within the national territory, both to solve specific restructuring and developmental 
problems and redress the situation in disadvantaged and peripheral areas on the basis of 
the principle of national solidarity. The economic rationale inspiring many of those 
policies was linked to the Fordist industrialisation paradigm and to modernization 
theories. This was the case of the ‘poles of development theory’, providing for the 
setting of industrial poles in peripheral areas in the belief that the way to their economic 
take-off proceeded through an industrial stage of development (Perroux 1955). 
Regionalisation was mainly considered (when not in formal terms, in practice) as 
functional to national economic development: ‘top-down’ planning was passed to 
central government bureaucrats, in the belief that they possessed the information and 
technical expertise necessary to select areas and interventions and to coordinate policy 
implementation in the periphery.
During the 1970s, following economic recession and ‘stagflation’, the need on the 
part of central governments to cut back on public expenditure in order to control the rise 
of inflation brought about a retrenchment of policies for backward areas, as well as 
other welfare measures. In the 1980s, under the influence of New Right prescriptions of 
‘rolling back the state’, governments started to undertake policies of economic 
liberalisation, deregulation, and privatization. The dynamism of some subnational areas 
caught the attention of scholars, who identified the key to their economic success in the 
adaptation of endogenous resources to technological changes and the organization of 
production through flexible cooperative networks among local SMEs (Bagnasco 1977; 
Piore and Sabel 1984; Becattini 1987; Brusco 1982; Pyke et al. 1990). This led to the 
definition of a new developmental model, largely in contrast to the previous one: 
promoting a ‘bottom-up’ cooperative approach between networked actors, putting 
emphasis on the role of local actors and immaterial resources (such as knowledge,
4 Early theories of European integration (Haas 1970) used the term ‘region’ to refer to a supranational 
area made of several states (for example Western Europe or the Middle East). However, in European 
studies today the term is almost exclusively associated with “territorial entities below the level of the 
nation-state” and, as we shall see, “sometimes crossing nation-state boundaries” (Keating and Loughlin 
1997, p. 2). The shift to the second interpretation of the term is mainly attributable to the to the growing 
relevance of EU Regional Policy in the process of European integration (Bachtler 1997, p. 83).
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learning, innovation, social capital) set in an increasingly competitive international 
context, rather than within national borders.
The new developmental paradigm inspired the 1988 reform of EU Regional 
Policy, which before was limited in size and scope in the development of backward 
areas chosen and administrated by national govenments’ management. Before 1989, for 
interventions aimed to regional development “[ejssentially, the European Commission 
wrote a cheque and the individual state executives cashed it. How the money was spent, 
and who was involved, was basically left to the state executive’s discretion” (Hooghe 
1996: 2). On the heels of the ratification of the Single European Act, ‘socio-economic 
cohesion’ became the overall objective of the new Regional Policy (or, since then, 
referred to as the Cohesion Policy), which established itself as one of the most relevant 
European policies in terms of budget, territorial pervasiveness, and as a paradigmatic 
case of EU governance (Kohler-Koch 2002: 5). In the new policy the language of 
subsidies is abandoned for one of incentives focused on the goals of equal opportunity - 
i.e., providing equal access to public resources and socio-economic opportunity - and 
the efficient use of public resources to achieve development and growth, while regional 
and local authorities are recognised as crucial actors in the partnership structure 
managing the policy as a cooperative collective endeavour (as required by the multilevel 
governance approach) and responsible for implementation at regional level (following 
the principle of subsidiarity). This leads to a focus on the quality of the regional socio- 
institutional context where policies are implemented as & crucial ingredient to their 
success.
However, the positive view on the possibilities for institutional change and 
territorial development of backward regions posited by EU Regional Policy is not 
unanimously shared. Some scholars have argued that the effectiveness of institutional 
reforms is interrelated to the ‘goodness of fit’ between the new formal rules and the 
informal norms and values prevailing in a given context (Risse et al. 2001). In fact, the 
benefits presented by the adoption of the/ new institutional setting may not outweigh the 
transactions costs necessary for the actors to shift from their status quo. Resistance to 
change seems particularly strong in those areas that share a long-lasting tradition of 
peripherality and backwardness. A seminal research investigating the reasons behind 
persistent underdevelopment of regions in Southern Italy has pointed to the lack of 
cooperative culture in the area, explaining the low institutional performance of its 
regional administrations (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993). Within the debate on 
European integration, arguments on the so-called ‘Mediterranean Syndrome’ or
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‘Southern Problem’ have been used to explain the deficiencies of political and 
administrative performance of Southern European MS in complying with EU 
regulations, ascribed to a civic culture inclined to individualism, clientelism, and 
corruption (LaSpina and Sciortino 1993: 219).
A different view is held by other scholars, also investigating on the links between 
cooperative behaviour and institutional performance, arguing that cooperative behaviour 
does not only derive from ‘shadow of the past’ mechanisms (as in the case of civic 
traditions), but can also be promoted through the establishment of specific social 
frameworks used as mechanisms of coordination of individual actors’ beliefs and from 
the shedding of a ‘shadow of the future’ over their interaction (Ostrom 1990; Trigilia 
1995; Cersosimo and Donzelli 2000). As a consequence, policies which make use of 
frameworks designed in order to promote cooperation among actors involved in policy 
implementation may offer a way toward cooperation for actors embedded in socio- 
institutional systems locking them into paths of backwardness and peripherality.
It is the aim of this thesis to verily this second hypothesis, both at the theoretical 
and empirical level, as embodied in EU Regional Policy. Public policies can in fact be 
considered as social institutions, i.e. codes of conduct that include rules, structures and 
social practices, which both constrain and empower actors’ behaviour by defining 
paradigms and networks of meaning within which they can operate (Gualmini 1998: 
173; Regonini 1998). The focus will be on one of EU’s Community Initiatives (CIs), i.e. 
innovative regional policies experimenting with new approaches to development, 
mainstreamed when successful. Launched in the early 1990s, INTERREG has always 
been given a high priority by receiving the largest share of resources allocated for 
Community Initiatives. From the beginning, it represented an attempt to introduce an 
‘innovation within an innovation’, in that regions were encouraged to define their own 
geographic socio-economic space as if they were a single European actor managing the 
development of their combined territory, irrespective of what national boundaries had 
done in the carving up of the European territory. This vision had the goal of 
‘denationalising’ the European territory: in that it challenges the concept of national 
boundaries, INTERREG strengthens the relevance of an area-based approach, rejects 
the imposition of a ‘top-down’ central national strategy and places responsibility for 
programme development and management with regional and local actors acting in a 
cooperative manner. In so doing, it attempts to go beyond the confines of national 
boundaries and reorganize regional economies according to coherent socio-economic 
areas reflecting the morphological character of the European geographic space rather
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than the reiteration of national divides. The initiative was reiterated three times during 
the three planning periods between 1990 and 2006 and its growing relevance within EU 
Regional Policy culminated in the mainstreaming of the approach as one of the three 
priority objectives for the 2007-2013 planning period, thereby representing the attempt 
to go beyond national boundaries in the search of a rational reorganization of European 
territorial and economic space.
The empirical research focuses on the way two regional actors - i.e., Sardinia and 
Corsica - conceptualised and implemented this new approach in breaking out of the 
confines of a centralized national policy paradigm and seeking new opportunities within 
the ever-expanding European Union. Two main innovations introduced by the EU 
model, and particularly underlined by INTERREG, will be considered: the ‘bottom-up’ 
definition of interregional strategies within a territorial European context, and the 
structuring of power relations according to an extended multilevel partnership, 
enhancing the regional level in respect of subsidiarity. The focus on these two 
dimensions is justified by the fact that territory and power can be considered as ‘trans- 
historical’ social constructs, always present in the organization of societies, but varying 
over time and space in combinations that assume a specific shape and content during 
particular historical phases (Sassen 2006: 4). Social life, in fact, takes place within 
territories defined at the material and symbolic level according to a complex system of 
formal and informal norms, representational and ideational discourses structuring power 
relations at different territorial levels. However, the way in which territories and power 
are defined and represented shapes in turn the subjectivities of the actors and the spatial 
horizons within which their lives are set.
Have the regional actors administering the policy learned to act according to the 
‘EU model’ of territorial relations and decision-making proposed by INTERREG, or do 
they continue to define their behaviour and strategies in terms of the nationalised 
pattern? What are the main reasons behind their response? The answers to these 
research questions will build upon a conceptual framework based on theories studying 
the impact of European integration in terms of processes of institutionalisation and 
legitimisation. As the first chapters of the thesis will clarify, these theories offer a 
multifaceted and dynamic approach to the study of European integration, moving away 
from early interpretations positing the EU as either prisoner or executioner of the 
nation-states regime. In fact, they allow the consideration of European integration not 
only as a formal process proceeding via ‘grand bargains’ between governments 
affecting the institutional frameworks of the Member States (MSs), but also at an
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informal level, through the implementation of public policies defining rules, procedures, 
ideas and values that influence the practice of actors involved in the process. However, 
from the view of the thesis, Europeanisation has to be seen bi-directionally, in that it 
comprehends both the ways in which organizational fields are framed and progressively 
established at the EU level, and the ways in which those organizational fields are 
gradually incorporated into social contexts, traditionally autonomously regulating their 
political, economic, and cultural spheres. Europeanisation is thus not considered here as 
a linear process proceeding for inevitable stages of development explainable by simple 
models of causation: it is a complex and multidimensional process which involves 
several variables (Radaelli and Franchino 2004; Featherstone and Kazamias 2001). 
Thus the extent of its impact remains a matter to be investigated and evaluated through 
empirical analysis and in-depth research conducted in the different socio-institutional 
contexts engaged in the process, rather than to be assumed or deduced from abstract 
theoretical constructs.
Empirical studies on Europeanisation processes have looked extensively at the 
impact of EU Regional Policy in the reorganization of territorial relations, but mainly 
through the analysis of the implementation of mainstream programmes within a 
framework considering variations occurring within bilateral EU-MSs relations (Ladrech 
1994; Boerzel 2001; Giuliani 2001; Gualini 2005). In these studies research on 
subnational units is mainly considered as a case study of the wider national context, 
often aiming for a comparison with other subnational units considered as representative 
of their respective national case. This approach, taking the nation state as the main 
research unit, makes it harder to appreciate the specificity of regional responses to EU 
policy, especially in the case of Member States territorially diversified internally. In 
fact, this underestimates the role played by other contextual factors specific to 
subnational territories, such as their geographical setting, cultural traditions, socio­
economic conditions, in shaping regional response to EU action. This is particularly 
detrimental in the study of the impact of experimental EU regional programmes 
explicitly aiming to ‘de-nationalise’ regions in order to adopt novel approaches to 
territorial development.
As thoroughly explained in the methodological chapter, the present research has 
been specifically designed to contribute to filling this gap in the debate on 
Europeanisation. In fact the analysis of over ten years of implementation of 
INTERREG, a new EU policy for the development of regions belonging to different 
Member States, in Corsica and Sardinia will focus on the specificity of the response of
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regional partners to the innovation. This perspective does not aim to posit an ‘end of the 
State’ scenario leading to a ‘Europe of the Regions’. Rather, it builds on a historical - 
institutionalist approach considering the process of redefinition of present territorial 
structures and power relations as tied to the past institutional settings. The deliberate 
focus of the research on regional response to the European policy (starting with the 
oversight of any reference to the national level in the title) is here better interpreted as 
an analytical exercise directed to understanding the territories beyond that ‘national 
paradigm’ normalized throughout our cognitive experiences and within the conceptual 
frameworks of the social sciences.
Because, as acknowledged in the theoretical chapters, the ‘new’ is deeply 
imbricated with the ‘old’ (Sassen 2006: 4), the evaluation of regional response to the 
EU’s policy is preceded by an analytical history of the main development policies 
implemented in the regions within the national paradigm since the end of World War 
Two. Our aim in adopting a historical approach to the study of institutions is not to use 
history to trace evolutionary paths of dependency, but to develop a deeper 
understanding of present openings and lockings in front of periods of change.
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Plan o f  the thesis
The thesis is divided into three sections, which can be broadly differentiated for being 
respectively theoretical, historical and empirical in character.
The first section frames -  through a critical review of the pertinent literature -  the
theoretical and methodological background supporting the research. Chapter one argues
in favour of a historical approach to the study of institutions. Recognising that ‘history
matters’ in processes of institutional change does not lead us to a deterministic account
of social causation. Conversely, it will allow us to identify those moments of substantial
change allowing actors to orient their strategies according a logic considered as more
appropriate or convenient. Deterministic explanations are also rejected when exploring
the role of social networks in promoting cooperative behaviour: social capital resources,
it is argued, are not only the result of the ‘shadow of past’ mechanisms (as in the case of
civic traditions) and their creation can be also enhanced by the establishment of specific
social frameworks used as mechanisms of coordination. Chapter two adopts the
historical approach to consider the evolution of European integration and the definition
of EU Regional Policy. Early studies on European integration were set within an
analytical framework based on ‘state-centric’ models, interpreting the process as a sign
of the demise or resilience of the nation-state system. From the same perspective the
breadth of regionalisation processes promoted by EU Regional Policy was either read as
a sign of the advent of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ or the confirmation of a ‘Europe of the
States’. Building on the historical institutionalist approach, the evolution of EU
integration and the definition of EU Regional Policy is here set within a picture of
transformation of the organization of power and territorial relations in Western societies
considered over time. From this view, European integration is seen as proceeding not
only via periodic intergovernmental ‘grand bargains’, but also creeping through the
implementation of policies, defining rules, procedures, and ideas influencing the
practice of the actors involved. Likewise EU Regional Policy is seen as an
organizational field gradually framed and defined at the EU level and progressively
transferred to different social contexts at the subnational level. Crucial for this transfer
in diffusing the ‘EU model’, it will be argued, is the use of structures of multilevel
governance functioning as ‘transmission belts’ for institutional change. Based on the
involvement in cooperative practices of multi-actor constellations, those structures
allow a better coordination of collective action at different territorial levels and, in
showing the partners the long term advantages of cooperation, prompt the launching of
new learning processes that are produced by their previous interactions. Chapter three
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discusses the methodological choices of the research in light of the theoretical 
assumptions justifying the research design: the case study, the units of analysis, and the 
research design.
The second section traces the evolution, from the end of WW2, of the 
regionalisation processes through the implementation in Corsica (chapter four) and 
Sardinia (chapter five) of regional policies defined by the respective national 
governments in France and Italy. The main focus will be on the organization of 
territorial and power relations between the regions and their central states, as traced 
from the analysis of the evolution of regional development policies. The policies were 
mainly influenced by contemporary economic theories on exogenous growth, 
prescribing the location in backward areas of industrial firms capable of allowing the 
regions to integrate themselves into the national economy, and permit their firms to 
compete with other firms in the country’s more core areas. Although since the end of 
the 1950s alternative approaches to the islands’ development have emerged (defined 
through integrated and spatially balanced territorial policies), at that time they were not 
supported by the normative and organizational logic prevalent in the definition of state- 
society relations. In fact the ‘national model’ prevalently organized Western societies 
according to a centralized and hierarchical regulative structure, which also contributed 
to the shaping of the organization of economic processes, political and administrative 
life, and territorial relations. Thus also in the definition of regional policies, central 
governments’ role as gatekeepers of state power, as well as their mistrust of the 
potential for differentiation of the socio-cultural and institutional potential of the two 
island regions, amounted to the fact that -  even when formally authorised -  they were 
practically denied the role of autonomous actors responsible for the development of 
their own territories. Rather, they were force-fed state subsidies, as a sort of side 
payment to compensate for their peripheral and disadvantaged role within the national 
political and economic structure. However, since the 1980s and 1990s signs of a 
transition to a different model organizing state-society relations started to emerge, as 
was also reflected in the definition of regional policies and regionalisation processes 
within member states, as well as within the European Union context.
The third section is dedicated to the definition of regional policy and 
regionalisation in Corsica and Sardinia according to the ‘European model’. Chapter six 
considers, at length, the history of the ten years of implementation of INTERREG, an 
EU policy promoting territorial cooperation between the two island regions according to 
an extended version of multilevel governance. The main focus of the analysis
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concentrates on the specificity of the response offered by regional actors to the model 
proposed by the policy, considering Corsica and Sardinia as distinctive territorial actors 
rather than agents of their respective nation state. From the theoretical perspective 
offered by historical institutionalism, the analysis will consider changes occurring in the 
role played by the partners involved in the definition of their territorial strategies and in 
the methods and criteria used to manage the programme, by tracing the evolution of the 
three editions (1990-93, 1994-99 and 2000-2006) of the Sardinia-Corsica ‘islands’ 
INTERREG programme. The findings show that processes of institutional change (such 
as building interregional cooperation, learning more effective policy management, 
shifting to a consideration of integrated development) for regional actors that were 
embedded in a very different model (based on territorial isolation, dependency relations 
with centralised state structures, bureaucratic practices, sectoral development policies) 
does take time to emerge, but when it finally appears it becomes a practicable path to 
pursue in the harmonious development of regional development policies between the 
two regions. In this respect, the contribution of policies adopting specific social 
frameworks to enhance processes of administrative capacity and institution building is 
gauged as a necessary -  although not sufficient -  means to promote self-sustaining 
development processes in backward areas.
The seventh chapter concludes the thesis by summarising and briefly discussing the 
contribution of the research findings at both the theoretical and operational level and 
suggests points that deserve further investigation.
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SECTION I 
Global change and Europeanisation: 
redefining power and territorial relations via EU Regional Policy
Territory and power can be considered as permanent features defining the organization 
of societies; however, as social constructs, they vary over time and space. One of the 
main tenets of modem Western societies is the political organization in nation states, 
territorial units separated by external borders and, traditionally, internally organized 
according to centralised regulative and hierarchical structures. During the last decades 
this organization of territorial and power relations was challenged by the increasing 
relevance of processes related to globalisation, showing an increased interconnection of 
economic, social and political processes beyond the national level and asking for a 
reorganization of social institutions in order to face those changes. This thesis sets EU 
integration within the wider context of the transformation of contemporary Western 
societies, and considers its contribution to the definition of alternative post-national 
institutional frameworks. In fact, since the end of the 1980s, a new model for organizing 
territorial actors according to networks of cooperative relations emerged in different 
fields relating to European integration, and especially in the definition and 
implementation of a renewed EU Regional Policy.
However, before empirically investigating the influence of the ‘EU model’ on 
previously nationally defined territorial settings, we need to assert our theoretical 
position on one of the basic concerns of the social sciences, namely that of the 
relationship between actors and institutions, and see how it applies to the study of 
Europeanisation processes. Therefore, in this section the first chapter, after having 
considered the main theoretical perspectives on the study of institutional change, will 
argue in favour of a historical approach; the second chapter will use this approach to 
interpret the evolution of European integration and EU Regional Policy and define the 
features of the ‘EU model’ of organizing territorial and power relations; while the third 
chapter will explain the methodological choices made in the light of theoretical 
assumptions, in order to operationalise the research.
Chapter 1: Between path dependency and institutional change
How do we interpret institutional development: as a result of a deliberate design of the 
actors or as a process shaped by the institutional settings adopted in the past? Is the
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actors’ participation in institutional life and social interaction a voluntary act derived 
from the calculation of self-interest or an obligatory form of behaviour dictated by 
social control and in line with role-expectations?
The answers to these questions vary according to the different definitions of 
institutions and social actors adopted by scholars. In this chapter I will first discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of the main theoretical approaches to this issue, explain why 
the approach I have chosen seems to be the most suitable for the research task, and 
indicate in what ways it contributes to the framing of empirical expectations concerning 
my research.
Institutions from opposite standpoints: the neo-institutionalist debate
The revival of institutional studies in social sciences emerged in the late 1970s as a 
reaction to the supremacy of the behavioural approach during the 1960s and 70s 
(especially in the US) to explain political behaviour and outputs. In its attempt to apply 
to social sciences quantitative research methods of scientific disciplines, behavioralism 
managed to draw more attention to intellectual precision, quantification, and the 
development of empirically grounded generalisations. However, following a well- 
known ‘iron cage’ destiny (Weber 1958), the means often became an end in itself. In 
this way the systemic approach to the study of societies and political systems, which 
had been developed to improve the quantitative and comparative potentials of analysis 
(Parsons 1951, Easton 1953), resulted in the tendency to view institutional features as 
fixed and neutral, and reduced collective action to the sum of individual choices.
What unites authors of the neo-institutionalist approach is their “common 
scepticism toward atomistic accounts of social processes” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 
3). However, common scepticism has been expressed quite differently, in terms of 
theoretical assumptions and empirical applications. Hall and Taylor distinguish two 
main analytical approaches, interpreting the relationship between institutions and social 
agency as a ‘calculus’ and a ‘cultural’ one:
Central to any institutional analysis is the question: how do institutions affect the behaviour o f  
individuals? (...) In broad terms, new institutionalists provide two kinds o f  responses to this 
question, which might be termed the ‘calculus approach’ and the ‘cultural approach’ 
respectively. Each gives slightly different answers to three seminal questions: how do actors 
behave, what do institutions do, and why do institutions persist over time?
(Hall and Taylor 1996: 7)
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Both approaches “observe that institutions affect action by structuring 
expectations about what others will do” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 7). However, while 
expectations for the calculus approach are shaped by what seems ‘instrumentally 
rational’ on the part of the actor, for the cultural approach they are shaped by what 
should seem ‘socially appropriate’ to the acton The calculus approach can be related to 
Rational Choice Theory (RCT),5 maintaining that our every-day problems can be 
reduced in their essential components to an abstract decision game, solved when the 
player chooses the best option within a given set of alternatives. The analogy requires 
some assumptions: game theoretic models posit that players are wealth-maximising 
actors, in possession of sufficient information to evaluate correctly the alternative 
choices and follow the logic of instrumental rationality (looking for the best means to 
achieve desired ends). Early RCT studies showed that a non-cooperative behaviour is 
the most rational for the individual players, even when they would have been better off 
cooperating (as exemplified in a well-known series of dilemmas, such as the tragedy of 
the commons, the battle of the sexes, the chicken game, or the prisoner’s dilemma).
The detection of the irreconcilability of a wealth-maximising behaviour with 
social co-operative outcomes suggested a “discouraging perspective on the problems of 
human co-operation and co-ordination” (North 1990: 13). However, since the 
publication of Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution o f Cooperation in 1984, the interest of 
game theorists has shifted from the static analysis of a two-person/zero-sum game, to 
the definition of the situations in which cooperation is easier to achieve, and those in 
which it is difficult to sustain. Cooperation was easier to achieve when “the play is 
repeated, when they [the wealth-maximising actors] possess complete information about 
the other players’ past performance, and when there are a small numbers of players”.6
Following those developments, the calculus approach to the study of institutions 
suggests that “what prevents the actor from taking a collectively-superior course of 
action is the absence of institutional arrangements that would guarantee complementary 
behaviour by others” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 7).7 Institutions provide the individual with 
mechanisms (such as information, enforcement mechanisms, penalties for defection) in
5 In The Theory o f Games and Economic Behaviour (1944) Von Neumann and Morgenstem suggested the 
application of mathematical game theory to explain economic behaviour. Since then, RCT has been 
applied to different fields of social sciences, but especially to economics and political science (see Moe 
1984; Brennan and Buchanan 1985; Schepsle 1989).
6 In his book Axelrod found that “the winning strategy under these conditions of continuously repeated 
plays is a strategy of tit-for-tat, one in which a player responds in kind to the action of the other player”, 
Axelrod (1984), p.13.
7 A course of action is said to be collectively-superior -  or collectively optimal -  when no other action 
whose outcome would make at least one of the actors better off -  without making the others worse off -  
can be found.
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a context of repeated interactions that allow that person to have a certain level of 
certainty about others’ behaviour and to take this into account in their own calculations. 
The instrumental consideration of collective action, in which the individual participates 
because they are moved by self-interest, is linked to the utilitarian assumptions of the 
approach that tries to avoid any normative prejudice: what explains the choice between 
alternative institutional equilibria is a ‘logic of effectiveness’. The survival of inefficient 
institutions is thus explained in terms of second-best convenience: “individuals adhere 
to these patterns of behaviour because deviation will make the individual worse off than 
will adherence” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 8).
Opposite to RCI's position is the so-called ‘cultural’ approach -  identifiable with
o
Sociological Institutionalism (SI). In contrast with the calculus approach, the cultural 
one maintains that actors’ behaviour cannot be seen only in strategic terms, but rather as 
“deeply imbricated in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and 
routines” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 8). The individual’s choice is dictated by his world 
view, his rationality is ‘context-bound’, and thus his behaviour is more a matter of 
interpretation than an instrumental calculation (Nee 1998: 8). The stress on the 
cognitive and cultural embeddedness of social action brings most SI authors to adopt a 
very broad definition of institutions, breaking down the conceptual divide between 
institutions and culture: institutions are not just “formal rules, procedures or norms, but 
the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of 
meaning’ guiding human action” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 14). As a result, they are not 
neutral frameworks, but rather moral or cognitive templates that structure actors’ 
identities, self-image and preferences. Under the cover of rationality and technical 
requirements, their formal structures and activities represent the myths and ceremonies 
of post-industrial societies, asking actors to follow a ‘logic of social appropriateness’ 
(Meyer and Rowan: 1983).
These arguments also provide an alternative explanation to that offered by RCT to 
the permanence of dysfunctional institutions: besides the fact that institutions “cannot 
readily be transformed by the actions of any one individual”, there is the consideration 
that they have shaped the behaviour of individuals, who thus tend to take them for 
granted (Hall and Taylor 1996: 8). Moreover, institutions are created after a limited set 
of ideas and options borrowed from the existing world, selected according to the
8 This branch is sometimes also referred to as Organizational Institutionalism because it arose within the 
sub-field of organization theory, investigating why a specific set of institutional forms and procedures is 
adopted by organizations, and what explains their similarities through organizational fields or across 
nations.
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prevailing cultural myths and moral values, rather than following abstract efficiency 
considerations apt to devise the technically better institutional solution (Powell and 
DiMaggio 1983). However, in asserting the relevance played by cultural factors and the 
diffusion of ideas in processes of institutionalisation, SI approaches the slippery slope of 
cultural determinism or relativism and its aporetic position over the critical assessment 
of cultures and the conditions to promote social change. How can we keep the best 
contributions offered by the two approaches to the study of institutions, while avoiding 
their main flaws?
Historical institutionalism and the embeddedness of social agency
The contrast between the calculus and cultural approaches to the study of institutions 
can be reconciled within a third theoretical position stressing the historical 
embeddedness of social processes: for Historical Institutionalism (HI) many of the 
implications of contemporary institutional arrangements are imbricated in past choices 
and thus institutions have to be studied as the result of a process which unfolds over 
time (Pierson 1998: 34, 29). Within the debate over agency set up by the two 
approaches, HI presents a kind of ‘third way’, searching to take into consideration 
important elements of both approaches (Hall and Taylor 1996: 10). On the one hand it 
acknowledges the importance given by the calculus approach to the role of human 
intentionality in the determination of institutional assets and the relevance of strategic 
considerations in social and political interaction. Although not entirely realistic, 
situations exemplified by RCT offer useful models for the analysis of decision-making 
processes and the impact they have in terms of institutional outcomes9. On the other 
hand HI is critical, along with the cultural approach, about an image of institutions as 
exclusively purposive and efficient mechanisms, and stresses the role played by 
irrationality and culture in institutional life:
It is necessary to dismantle the rationality assumption underlying economic theory in order to 
approach constructively the nature o f  human learning. History demonstrates that ideas, 
ideologies, myths, dogmas, and prejudices matter; and an understanding o f  the way they evolve 
is necessary fo r  further progress in developing a framework to understand societal change. The 
rational choice framework assumes that individuals know what is in their self-interest and act 
accordingly. That may be correct fo r  individuals making choices in the highly developed 
markets o f  modem economies, but it is patently fa lse  in making choices under conditions o f
9 “The best of these [historical institutionalist] analyses already effect something of integration (...) by 
showing how historical actors select new institutions for instrumental purposes from a menu of 
alternatives that is made historically available through the mechanisms specified by sociological 
institutionalism”, Hall and Taylor (1996), p.24.
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uncertainty - the conditions that have characterised the political and economic choices that 
shaped (and continue to shape) historical change.
(North 1998: 250)
From this perspective, institutions can be defined as “the rules of the game in a society 
or (...) the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. As a consequence 
they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic” 
(North 1990: 3). Institutions “specify the limits of legitimate action in the way that rules 
of a game specify the structure within which players are free to pursue their strategic 
moves using pieces that have specific roles and positions” (Nee and Brinton 1998: 8). 
However, just as in games, they do not only include formal regulations, but also 
informal codes of conduct (North 1990: 3).10
In trying to identify what limits to individual action are determined by historical or 
culturally-specific features, HI looks for the “asymmetries of power associated with the 
operation and development of institutions” that give some actors more power than 
others over their operation (Hall and Taylor 1996: 21). In fact, to see which power 
relations caused those asymmetries (also using the tools of RCT) can help in explaining 
why societal forces were organized according to certain norms rather than others 
(contrasting a ‘calculus’ idea of institutions as the result of a voluntary agreement 
among actors). The state, in particular, is not considered as “a neutral broker among 
competing interests, but as a complex of institutions capable of structuring the character 
and outcomes of group conflict” and thus channelling institutional life within distinctive 
national trajectories (Hall and Taylor 1996: 5-6; Evans etal. 1985).
Besides contextual limits, time factors linked to decision-making also undermine 
the rationality of individual action: HI reminds us that the short-term horizon of actors 
does not coincide with the long-term perspective needed to analyse the evolution of 
institutional processes: actors cannot foresee unintended consequences or shifts in 
policy preferences due to changing historical conditions (Pierson 1998: 33). The 
recognition of the influence of history in the development of institutions leads HI 
authors to adopt a ‘path-dependent’ model of social causation, which emphasises the 
fact that, once embraced, institutional paths are difficult and costly to leave, and this 
explains the persistence of ineffective institutions. However, pressure to change 
inefficient institutions also increases with time (Pierson 1998: 47). Thus, periods of 
continuity within a given institutional path are “punctuated by ‘critical junctures’, i.e. 
moments when substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a ‘branching
10 For its inclusiveness, North’s definition is one of the most quoted in contemporary literature as a useful 
basis for common discussion across the social sciences; see Putzel (1997), p.940.
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point’ from which historical development moves into a new path” (Hall and Taylor 
1996: 10). As further argued in the second chapter, one of the main4critical junctures’ 
within the process of European integration was the introduction of the objective of 
socio-economic cohesion (later extended to include a territorial dimension) and the 
ensuing redefinition of EU Regional Policy.
Social networks and collective action
The concept of embeddedness allows us to adopt a view of social agency that rejects the 
alternatives posited by the cultural and the calculus approach: thus it admits the 
possibility for institutional change, whilst not denying the dependency of institutions on 
previous paths. The concept was first used by Karl Polanyi with reference to the fact 
that the economy, uprooted (or disembedded) from society in the capitalist era, 
represented an integral feature of (was embedded in) pre-capitalist societies (Polanyi 
1944). The sociologist Mark Granovetter widened the concept in its critique to the 
‘hyposocialised’ self adopted by neoclassic economics and the Parsonian 
‘hypersocialised’ trapped in the social system:11 “the embeddedness argument stresses 
instead the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or ‘networks' ) of such 
relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance” (Granovetter 1985: 490).
This position permits a multifaceted view of the social actor, engaging with 
different groups and through different strategies. The representation of social interaction 
from actors embedded in a plurality of social networks (rather than influenced by the 
social system) strengthens the relevance of micro-foundation of social processes in a 
time when, within national societies, role expectations become less predictable and 
culture more fragmented (Bagnasco 2003: 68). At large, the network can be defined as a 
set of interconnected nodes creating a logic of inclusion/exclusion: “the distance (or the 
intensity and frequency of interaction) between two points (or social positions) is 
shorter (or more frequent, more intense) when both the points are nodes of the same 
network than when they belong to different networks” (Castells 2002: 536).
Understood as a semi-permanent, flexible structure, the image of the network is 
increasingly used to represent the prevalent organizational logic of contemporary 
societies. Information technologies and communication are increasingly interlinked at a
11 The structure of those contemporary debates on the relations between the individual and society are 
very similar within different disciplines: the debate between the calculus and cultural approach in neo­
institutionalist studies, between the hyposocialised and hypersocialised actor in new economic sociology, 
or between liberals and communitarians in political theory. It is therefore disappointing that there has 
been relatively little dialogue among them.
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global level, post-Fordism asks for a reticular organization of production, and network 
structures are also used to depict extended family ties or new social movements: 
“[njetworks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of 
networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of 
production, experience, power, and culture” (Castells 1996: 469). Although all networks 
present a similar morphology and logic, their nature clearly changes according to the 
different goals and objectives driving their concrete functioning:
They are stock exchange markets, and their ancillary advanced services centres, in the network 
o f  global financial flows. They are national councils o f  ministers and European Commissioners 
in the political network that governs the European Union. They are coca fields and poppy fields, 
clandestine laboratories, secret landing strips, street gangs and money-laundering financial 
institutions, in the network o f  drug traffic that penetrates economies, societies, and states 
throughout the world.
(Castells 1996: 470)
The embeddedness argument points to the long-term structural characteristics of 
network relationships as some kind of “general conditions that are capable of reducing 
the transactions costs of negotiated agreement” (Sharpf 1997: 137). What explains the 
fact that social networks permit the reconciliation of individual actor interests with 
social co-operative outcomes is that they guarantee, more or less reliably, that there will 
be repeated interaction among its members:
The fac t that two actors have memory o f  past encounters as well as an expectation o ffu ture  
dealings with each other is assumed to have an effect on the individual interaction (...) Such 
relationships arise and are maintained because o f  the benefits that they provide in comparison 
to ‘single-shot ’ interaction.
(Sharpf 1997: 137)
Thus participation in networks is based on certain rules and expectations which tend to
avoid defection; after repeated interactions “[t]he reputation of the parties for
cooperation rather than for competition becomes expected and ‘socially embedded’ as a
result” (Thompson, 2003: 164). Therefore repeated interactions allow actors to look at
the advantages of cooperation in a longer term perspective, setting up a virtuous
learning cycle: “[t]he overall system involves ‘learning by doing’ in which collaborative
problem solving predominates, and a process of mutual capacitation between the parties
unfolds” (Thompson 2003: 184). The cooperative potential deriving from actors’
interaction in the social networks where they are embedded presents advantages at the
individual level as well as at the systemic level: it produces “socially appropriable
resources” or “social capital” (Coleman 1990). At this second level its role has been
investigated, among other fields, also in relation to processes of territorial development
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at the subnational level, as part of a recent debate that attracted the interest of a varied 
public (from different academic fields, policy-making areas, civil society sectors).
Before concluding this first chapter I will consider in more detail the concept of 
social capital in order to show in what ways the detection of a relationship between a 
cooperative culture and a good institutional performance may lead to divergent 
conclusions when applied to regional policies, according to the theoretical approach 
used in the analysis of institutions, and to specify the interpretation offered by the 
theoretical position adopted in this thesis.
fig. 1.1- Different approaches to the study of collective action and institutions
CALCULUS CULTURAL HISTORICAL
INSTITUTIONALISM
Actor hypo-socialised se lf:  
actors as free and rational 
contracting individuals
hyper-socialised self. 
individual’s action and choice 
bound to its social context
embedded self.
limited rationality o f the actor 
inserted in a net o f social relations
Logic o f
collective
action
result o f the sum of 
independent strategic calculus 
(‘efficiency logic’ and 
individual rationality)
result of context-bound 
‘appropriateness logic’ based 
on shared cognitive templates 
(role o f ideas and culture)
result o f the interaction of actors’ 
strategies within social networks 
discouraging defection
Institutions formal rules, procedures or 
norms; instruments in 
individuals’ hands
formal and informal rules, 
cognitive and moral templates, 
symbols shaping individuals’ 
life and sources of meaning for 
their action
formal and informal rules; humanly 
devised constraints that shape and 
enable human interaction
Institutional
change
change is possible for the 
individual whenever a more 
efficient solution is available; 
the only exception is when 
deviation is more costly than 
adherence
difficult because institutions 
tend to be ‘taken for granted’ 
by actors and are unlikely to be 
changed by individual action 
(social legitimisation)
when institutions are inadequate 
pressure to change increases with 
time and becomes feasible in front 
of critical junctures
The productivity of social networks: introducing social capital 
The odds of cooperation are objectively increased for actors (regardless of their original 
orientations) when they are faced with frequent multipurpose interactions that increase 
the costs of defection. This productive character of social networks has been particularly 
investigated within the debate on ‘social capital’. The concept was defined by analogy 
with that of physical and human capital :
Like other form s o f  capital, social capital is productive, making possible the attainment o f  
certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence (...) Unlike other form s o f  capital, social 
capital inheres in the structure o f  relations between persons and among persons.
(Coleman 1990: 302)
Having gained a great deal of attention in the literature over the last few decades, the 
social capital approach has been applied to many different fields, with often diverging
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purposes: this fact has initially created doubts as to its analytical effectiveness and 
usefulness. After years of debate, theorists today generally agree on some of the 
common features which should characterise the concept and its use. Like other types of 
capital, social capital implies an investment (the spending of time and effort in activities 
to build tools or assets today in order to increase welfare in the future) and the risk that 
it might fail; the imposition of some constraints for the creation of new opportunities; 
and a potential dark side where it is used to harm others (Ostrom and Ahn 2001: 5). 
Unlike other kinds of capital, social capital does not wear out with use, but rather with 
disuse, and it is difficult to observe and measure and hard to build through external 
intervention, although institutions strongly influence its effectiveness in pursuing long­
term development efforts (Ostrom and Ahn 2001: 5).
Authors have used more or less inclusive definitions of the concept of social 
capital or, better, of its use, according to the aim of their research. Considering a 
distinction drawn by Ostrom,12 we can differentiate three main types of social capital, 
according to the scale at which it is applied: individual, organizational, or institutional. 
A lower level of application of the concept considers the use made by single individuals 
of the social resources within the network of their connections in order to maximise 
their financial and human capital (Ostrom and Ahn 2001: 6). This type of social capital 
has been analysed by Pierre Bourdieu in relation to the other forms of capital (economic 
and cultural) that explain the structure and dynamics of differentiated societies 
(Bourdieu 1992: 119). The backing of this collectively-owned capital, allows the 
individual to ‘credit’ resources from other spheres as well. In this sense the concept has 
been used, for instance, to study the impact of social capital present in family or 
neighbourhood connections in receiving a certain education or finding a job 
(Granovetter 1973).
The second level of application of the concept refers to social capital as a means of 
achieving collective goods, and thus to the idea (commonly expressed as ‘strength in 
unity’) that certain ends are unachievable for the individual without the cooperation of 
others. The embeddedness of actors in social networks increases the costs of defection, 
leading them to orient their behaviour towards cooperation with other group members; 
in the long run this might lead “to the creation of a community within which the gains 
of those with whom one identifies are considered in a light similar to one’s personal 
gains” (Bukowski et al. 2003: 10). This type of social capital is particularly relevant in
12 However, following a frequent tendency of the debate, even Ostrom sometimes seems to confuse social 
capital and the networks allowing its production (i.e. social structures). See Bertolini (2001).
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exploring the functioning of various groups and organizations (neighbourhoods, sport 
clubs, mafia networks).
A third, wider level of application looks at the role of social capital in promoting 
participation in civic life and thus improving the functioning of public institutions and 
collective action. Intended as those “features of social organization, such as trust, norms 
and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated 
action” (Putnam et al. 1993: 167), the concept of social capital has had a wide diffusion 
-  both among academics and policy-makers — especially through the works of Robert 
Putnam (Fukuyama 1995; Portes 1998; World Bank 1998).
It is this at this third level, as applied to the issue of territorial development of 
subnational areas, that the concept will be considered in this research according to the 
theoretical approach of historical institutionalism as presented in the previous 
paragraphs. I shall further specify in the following paragraph the role played by the 
adopted theoretical approach in evaluating the concept of social capital and its potential, 
using as an example the seminal research of Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti on Italian 
regions and the following contributions to the debate.
Social capital and institutions
The work of Putnam and his co-authors on Italian regions analyzes “how the 
overlapping networks of small-scale civic engagements create the foundations for 
democratic governance at a higher, regional level” (Ostrom and Ahn 2001: 9-10). 
Making Democracy Work (1993) evaluates the institutional performance of Italian 
regional governments almost twenty years after their establishment in 1970, when the 
fifteen ‘ordinary regions’ were “endowed with essentially identical constitutional 
structures and mandates” (Putnam et al. 1993: 6). The data cited by the study confirm 
the well-known picture of ‘two Italies’ with opposite levels of regional performance, 
high in the North and low in the South. Putnam believes that this duality cannot be 
attributed to the institutional framework (common to the regions considered) nor 
explained exclusively in terms of different levels of socio-economic development. 
Rather, he points to the different degrees of ‘civic culture’ (that is, the social web made 
by ties of solidarity and engagement among citizens) possessed by the regions. 
Association indicators show an attitude toward cooperation in the Northern regions, and 
an ‘always-exit’ rule led by a logic of individualistic (or, better, familistic) mentality in 
the Southern regions (Banfield 1956). Territorial differences in social capital assets are
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traced back by Putnam to the late Middle Ages, when communes in the North created a 
system of horizontal bonds characterised by mutual trust, while in the South vertical ties 
imposed by centuries of tyranny created a culture of distrust and lack of cooperation.
The many critiques which followed the enormous success of the book have
1 ^highlighted several problems in Putnam’s use of the social capital concept. Here I 
want to dwell on two of them, which have a direct link with the formulation of my 
research hypothesis. The first critique deals with the nature of the concept: social capital 
as a resource that can be used in many different ways, and thus is not necessarily 
‘good’, as implied by Putnam’s adoption of a normative definition that identifies ‘social 
capital’ with ‘civic culture’ and thus considers it as an indicator of democracy.14 Like 
other types of capital, social capital is a means whose value is relative to the goal to 
which it is addressed.15 A ‘dark side’ of social capital is identifiable at all three levels 
(see table 1.2): the strength of family ties, for instance, can be expressed in practices 
that range from ‘immoral familism’16 to caring support; members’ solidarity serves both 
charitable associations and racist movements; while political networks can be used both 
to reinforce clientelistic links or promote wider participation and democratic exchange 
(Edwards and Foley 1997; Trigilia 2001).
The second critique is related to the origin of social capital. Putnam sees social 
capital resources as plants stemming spontaneously, ‘bottom-up’, from a fertile soil, 
which could not grow in a sterile setting: “[w]here the regional soil is fertile, the regions 
draw sustenance from regional traditions, but where the soil is poor, the new institutions 
are stunted” (Putnam 1993: 182). However, if soils have not been ploughed before the 
sowing, it is unlikely that they will produce a healthy plant. Following on from the 
previous example: “[t]he new Italian regions were certainly installed in different soils in 
northern and southern Italy. But an important part of that difference was a public culture
13 For a review of some of them, see Goldberg (1996), Levi (1996), Sabetti (1996), Tarrow (1996), Foley 
and Edwards (1997,1999), Harris and DeRienzo (1997), Putzel (1997), Bagnasco (2001).
14 In Putnam’s works the social capital concept is linked with the older argument which, from Tocqueville 
(1856) to Almond and Verba (1963, 1980), considers civic culture as a key element in the success or 
failure of a democracy, and associationism as the main indicator of ‘civicness’. As for those arguments, 
here the thesis rests on the unproven assumption that political attitudes and values shape behaviour and 
not the other way around.
15 It was Coleman in particular who stressed the functional connotation of the concept, for which social 
capital “is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: 
they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of the individuals 
who are within the structure”, Coleman (1990), p.302.
16 The expression became famous after Banfield’s book (1956), in which it is used to define a close and 
exclusive individualism of Southern Italian society, where the individual only pursues what is in his and 
his family’s interest. This non-cooperative behaviour is considered to be the origin of the lack of 
development in the Mezzogiomo (for similar conclusions, see Nuzzo and Righi 2005, and Sabatini 2005).
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shaped by more than a century of political and administrative dependency” (Tarrow 
1996: 395).
fig. 1.2 - Different uses of social capital resources: some examples
Use/ends ‘Dark side*: vicious circles ‘Bright side’: virtuous circles
Individual
Use of family ties to press for obtaining 
access to an exclusive education or 
position (closed networks)
Use of neighbours networks, rotating 
babysitting or sharing cars to gain time or 
save money (open networks)
Communitarian
Use of bonding trust and loyalty ties by 
organizations directed to criminal action 
(mafia connections; terrorist movements)
Use of ‘bridging’ solidarity among actors 
sharing the same values by organizations 
aiming at their defence (environmental 
lobbies; human rights movements)
Systemic
Use of territorial solidarity networks to 
define regional/national strategies 
against other territorial actors operating 
in the area (reactive nationalism or 
regional secessionism)
Use of territorial solidarity networks to 
define regional/national strategies in 
coordination with other territorial actors 
operating in the area (communes 
consortium, interregional cooperation)
Putnam’s recognition, following new institutionalism’s lesson, that ‘history 
matters’ (Putnam 1993: 7) adopts a ‘culturalist approach’ to institutional change, which 
excludes the fact that institutions can ‘artificially’ create (‘top-down’) social capital 
resources. However this approach indirectly discourages the adoption of policies for the 
development of backward territories.17 I believe that this limit in Putnam’s approach can 
be traced to his conception of institutional performance, resting on what he himself calls 
a “simple model of governance: societal demands -> political interaction -> government 
-> policy choice -> implementation” (Putnam 1993: 9). This model can be read as a sort 
of ‘theoretical reaction’ to early modernisation paradigms, superimposing institutional 
change through hierarchical relations that gave no incentive, and sometimes even 
destroyed the virtuous action of social bonds of solidarity and cooperation among 
citizens.
Later research on social capital (and partly Putnam himself) has helped to 
distinguish between a systemic (or culturalist) version of the concept and a relational 
(or interactive) one (Bagnasco 2003: 24). The first version, more restricted, sees social 
capital as the disposition to cooperate, deriving from a shared cooperative culture: it is 
thus based on a ‘shadow of the past’ mechanism, which “produces a certain disposition 
in the present amongst the players, based upon their experiences of past interactions” 
(Thompson 2003: 180). The second version considers social capital as including all
17 In Italy the book was enthusiastically welcomed by Lega North members, using it in an instrumental 
and decontextualised way to form part of its arguments. See Tarrow (1996), p. 389, n.4.
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those resources for individual or collective action deriving from the cooperative social 
networks within which an actor is ‘embedded’. In fact, as already seen, frequent 
multipurpose interactions among actors increase the cost of defection while casting a 
shadow over their future cooperation (Thompson 2003: 180).
From this second view, that I share, social capital is considered as a feature of 
social organizations (Bagnasco 2003: 24), which can be reproduced and accumulated or 
depleted according to yet scarcely investigated factors. Several authors have stressed the 
relevance of institutions in enhancing social capital resources. In a wider sense, this 
refers to the positive role played by a democratic environment, well-functioning 
institutions, low levels of social unrest, in inducing or reinforcing participative 
practices, levels of trust and cooperative behaviour among citizens (March and Olsen 
1989: 164). On a more specific level, it refers to the possibility of public policies 
promoting cooperative practices among the stakeholders involved in a decisional 
process of setting in motion learning processes having as a by-product the production of 
social capital (Ostrom and Ahn 2001: 25). Other authors stress the role of specific 
policies in ‘converting’ primary social capital resources (growing out of thicker, 
traditional relations) into the relational extended type of social capital needed by
♦ 1 ftcontemporary society and oriented to more universal principles.
All those cases share, as does this thesis, a conception of institutional performance 
which rests on a more complex model of governance, constituted by bilateral relations 
that -  for analytical purposes -  can be analysed from both directions: ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ (policy implementation societal demands). We shall see in the next 
chapter how this applies to the study of institutional change within the EU.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have considered some of the questions relating to the study of 
institutional change and the implications deriving from the adoption of different 
theoretical approaches to answer them. The theoretical perspective I have chosen to 
adopt is that offered by historical institutionalism, recognising the influence of past
18 In the Sardinian case:“The inadequacy [of social capital in Sardinia] would seem to reside in the fact 
that, even assuming that a form of social capital is present in the Sardinian society, this is not suitable, at 
least not folly, to support ‘modem’ developmental processes, that are self-sustaining and can expand”, 
Bottazzi (1999), p.93, n.66. The same argument, at a general level, is made by Trigilia (2001), pp. 15-16. 
Following the publication of Putnam’s book extensive research developed to identify in the Mezzogiomo 
significant traditions o f cooperative practices, solidarity networks, high levels of cultural associationism 
or local initiatives making a virtuous use of endogenous resources (Mutti 1992; Trigilia 1995; Bodo and 
Viesti 1997; DeVivo 1997; Cersosimo and Donzelli 2000).
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institutional settings in present institutional life, but also allowing for the occurrence of 
‘critical junctures’ when historical development moves onto a new path. A similar 
perspective is adopted in conceiving social actors as able to define their own strategies, 
although chosen among the limited range of possibilities offered by the organizing logic 
and the relational systems in which they are embedded. The link between this logic and 
actors’ cooperative/uncooperative social behaviour is here maintained, but interpreted as 
a two-way relationship.
From these theoretical arguments we can derive a first set of indications that will 
serve to orient the research hypotheses and design, as better discussed in the 
methodological chapter. First, from the fact that the ‘time factor’ is recognised as an 
essential component in the analysis of institutional change, the research design will have 
to adopt an adequate time-frame in order to be able to appreciate eventual change. 
Second, the historical analysis of institutional development asks to identity what 
moments can be considered as ‘critical junctures’ in order to test empirically if the new 
institutional path has been embraced by actors: the empirical test becomes crucial 
because in the adopted definition of institutions we have also included informal, or not 
yet formalised, institutional arrangements and practices. Thus, third, also shifts in the 
discursive logic, values and principles orienting action that, although not yet formalised 
may indicate the increasing legitimisation of an alternative organizational model of 
society not yet prevalent. Fourth, the adoption of an ‘extended and bidirectional view’ 
of the relationship between the organizing logic of relational systems and the strategies 
adopted by the actors allows to posit the possibility of institutional change towards 
cooperative systems, also in the case of actors opting for non-cooperative strategies in 
the old setting.
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Chapter 2  -  European integration and Regional Policy 
from a historical-institutionalist perspective
In the previous chapter I argued that the theoretical perspective offered by historical 
institutionalism (HI) seems to be well-suited to meeting the aims of the research that 
underpins the thesis. In fact, as I will now show, it offers a view to the process of 
European integration which -  going beyond traditional state-centric models -  is able to 
account for the growing complexity of EU-related processes of institutional change, as 
increasingly registered by empirical research since the mid-1980s. From the longer-term 
perspective offered by HI, in fact, European integration is considered not only through 
the analysis of formal intergovernmental ‘grand bargains’, but also through looking at 
the increasing definition at the EU level of policies defining rules, procedures and ideas, 
gradually influencing the practices and horizons of the actors involved in the process. 
One of the most relevant outcomes of European integration identified through the new 
perspective is the emergence of patterns of ‘multilevel governance’ (MLG), organizing 
territorial and power relations within the European territory through cooperative 
networks created by a multiplicity of partners acting at different levels. I will maintain 
that the reformed EU Regional Policy after 1988 represents one of the most significant 
cases of institutional change undertaken by the process of European integration based 
on the translation of the MLG model into specific principles for the interaction of 
different institutional levels and the mobilisation of different territorial levels and socio­
economic actors. Finally, I will consider which are the main mechanisms used to 
identify both the ways in which the ‘EU model’ has been defined and implemented 
throughout its territory and the responses provided by the domestic (national and 
subnational) actors to the institutional changes.
Explaining European integration with ‘state-centric’ theories
The main theoretical approaches studying the first decades of the process of European
integration were derived from the discipline of International Relations (IR), where the
nation state was assumed to be the fundamental political unit organizing national
activities vis-a-vis the supranational level. Because of the influence of the Westfalian
paradigm in structuring the political organization of modem societies, European
integration was initially studied “[stretching] established concepts over the new
phenomena” (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 234), and thus the debate was mainly stranded
on variations on the demise or resilience of the nation-state paradigm. The EU case was
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located within the category of international regimes, i.e. “institutionalised forms of 
collective actions among nation-states” (Pierson 1998: 31) that allowed countries to 
benefit from collective goods unachievable without coordinated inter-state action. 
Starting from this ‘inter-state perspective’, the main issue was to explain the reasons 
leading nation states voluntarily gave up part of their sovereign powers and to define the 
implications of this delegation of authority.
Scholars drawing on aspects of the functionalist tradition in IR explained this 
feature of integration as led by a mechanism of incremental steps towards cooperation 
only in selected areas of policy-making, where the benefits derived by co-ordinated 
action appeared to be greater than those derived from individual nation states’ action 
(Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963). Most of the continuation of the process would be 
explained not as a consequence of ‘grand bargains’ between states, but rather as ‘spill­
over effects’ following pressure for integration of functional or political nature, from 
one successful field to the other. Some authors have later argued that the neo- 
functionalist position could be interpreted as a kind of ‘cautious’ or incremental 
interpretation of the process of European integration responding to the federalist project 
(Bache 1998: 18). In fact spill-over could also be seen at work in EU institutions that 
cultivated contacts with lobbies and subnational actors in order to have them allied 
against MSs: ‘cultivated spill-over’ could explain why EU institutions (especially the 
European Court and the Commission) had gained through time an increasingly 
important role in many domains, and started using it for ‘their’ purposes (Bache 1998: 
18).
The neofunctionalist model was also gradually discarded following the assertion 
of the ‘Luxembourg compromise’, which seemed to confirm a model of European 
integration led by the domestic concerns of effective gatekeepers of national sovereignty 
(Bache 1998: 19). The most influential explanation of European integration became that 
of intergovemmentalism (IG), which adopted a realist position seeing governments as 
effective gatekeepers of state powers and responsibilities by acting in the national 
interest. Domestic concerns would also explain the powers partly devolved to European 
institutions, only after a stringent cost and benefits analysis (Hoffmann 1964). In the 
same manner as neofunctionalism, IG ignored and explicitly discounted the role of 
subnational actors or organized interests in shaping the agenda of national governments 
or in participating in either the decision-making or implementation process with regard 
to regional or any other policy that had been Europeanised. According to the 
intergovemmentalists the Member States continued to operate as the ultimate arbiters of
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key decisions that were discussed at Council meetings, and assumed exclusive 
competence for the implementation of European decisions.
However, since the end of the 1980s, critiques were developed of the IG approach 
by scholars from different research fields -  such as juridical, economic, regional, social, 
or environmental studies -  who felt that they could “no longer understand the domestic 
process and outcomes that interest[ed] them without addressing the role of the E[U]” 
(Pierson 1998: 28). The concern which informed their sectoral, empirically grounded 
research was not to advance grand theories of integration, but rather to concentrate “on 
the detailed investigation of day-to-day policy development in areas where the E[U]’s 
role is prominent (...) content to reveal the density and pluralism of actual policy­
making while simply observing that the focus of international relations theory on grand 
diplomacy among sovereign member-states does not square with what is actually 
occurring ‘on the ground’” (Pierson 1998: 28).
From a theoretical point of view, the critiques of intergovemmentalism followed 
similar lines to those more generally moved against a ‘calculus approach’ in 
institutional studies (as reported in chapter one): its tendency to consider as the only real 
authors of European integration nation states discrete units led by merely individualistic 
considerations, did not allow for the consideration of the impact of contingencies and 
change.19 What seemed to be the main interest informing national strategies of the 
‘grand bargains’ defining the rules of European integration was the preservation of 
domestic power and interest against that of other territorial actors. From this win/lose 
approach to collective action, for the intergovemmentalists European institutions are 
neutral tools used as interstate forums to provide heads of governments with a set of 
common rules and a vocabulary to express their preferences and exchange information, 
so as to allow the “lowering of bargaining costs and the reduction of uncertainty” 
(Pierson 1998: 33).
As seen in the previous chapter, such an instrumental conception of institutions 
overestimates the room for manoeuvre of decision-makers, and their effective 
possibility of subjecting the evolution of institutions to tight control. Conversely, it 
leads to an underestimation of the fact that, over time, policy activity of the 
Community’s institutions has expanded, increasing the number of interactions between 
actors involved and the density of issues considered. Faced with this overload of 
decisions to be taken under conditions of time constraints and scarcity of information
19 This theoretical problem has been discussed by Moravcsik (1991), who in his theory o f ‘liberal 
intergorvemmentalism’ agrees that governments’ preferences can shift over time.
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(especially in new fields of regulation), MSs delegate their decisional power to those 
new actors (both at the supranational or subnational level) that may be ready to seize 
this opportunity. Those processes allow the formation of gaps in government control in 
the evolution of European policies and regulations that are later difficult to close 
because -  as explained by a historical approach to institutional processes -  with time 
there is a growing resistance to change from the new actors and increasing costs of exit 
from the institutional path embraced (Pierson 1998). New theoretical frameworks were 
needed to better study the complexity and novelty of processes of institutional change 
related to European integration increasingly revealed by the empirical evidence.
The emergence of multileveled patterns of governance
The empirical research carried out, especially since the mid-1980s, in different fields 
affected by EU policy and politics brought researchers to search for new definitions and 
theoretical tools more apt, compared to established concepts, to describe the nature of 
the ongoing change. This sometimes brought an overload of neologisms and 
approaches. However, a certain agreement among authors studying different fields of 
European integration was found in the description of the emerging EU polity as “an 
elaborate set of networks, closely linked in some ways, particularly decomposed in 
others” (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991: 5; Kohler-Koch 1999; Castells 2000).
As indicated in chapter one, the image of a network, often' used today to describe 
the logic of several processes of structural change, becomes particularly appropriate in 
defining a new concept of power distribution that is decentralised and shared among 
groups and movements in continuous transformation and interaction (Mutti 1998: 62). 
Faced with the decline in legitimacy of modem nation-states (Van Creveld 1999; 
Cassese 2001), preventing citizens’ defection on the basis of a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
mechanisms, contemporary societies find in the network structures an alternative means 
to overcoming collective action problems through the involvement of multi-actor 
constellations at different territorial levels in coordinated cooperative social relations.
With reference to the changes affecting the distribution of power in territorial 
relations, the adoption of the network as the prevailing organizational structure in the 
EU is related to the emergence of a new and distinct model of “power sharing across 
multiple jurisdictions” (Thompson 2003: 160). This model contrasts analytically with 
that of government, organizing power in the modem nation-state, defining its action 
following a ‘top-down’ logic legitimized by virtue of a centralistic hierarchy (Mayntz
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1999: 7; Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1996). The expression that -  among many others -  has 
established itself to denote this novel concept is that of ‘multilevel governance’ 
(MLG).20 Hooghe and Marks have analytically distinguished two types of networks 
according to their prevalence in structuring patterns of MLG:
■ vertical networks: authority and competence are redistributed according to 
hierarchical levels sharing a series of tasks, and are linked to mutually exclusive 
territorial borders (building on the previous nation-states model) and in limited 
number. Those types of networks would tend to stabilise in a definite and stable 
order, to confine the dispersal of authority;
■ horizontal networks: the number of actors is high and not limited, their relations 
are horizontal (of reciprocity); they are generally created around a specific goal, 
sometimes lack a clear distinction between internal and external questions and 
operate at different territorial levels which cross cut in a flexible and unstable way 
(Hooghe and Marks 2001: 6-7).21
When introduced in the mid-1980s, the concept of MLG mainly referred to 
empirical studies on structural policies of the EU. Those studies were influenced by the 
success in those years of ‘new regionalism’ theories within the debate on the European 
integration.22 The focus of MLG authors in describing the emergence of European 
governance was mainly on the study of the vertical dimension of governance (Marks, 
Hooghe et a l 1996: 342), linked with the implementation of Structural Funds. From this 
perspective, EU Regional Policy was sometimes interpreted as part of the gradual 
process of the erosion of the exclusive authority of national governments, always “less 
able to govern the activities of other domestic actors on the international stage” (Bache 
1998: 22). Among authors and activists there was also a sort of optimism and high
20 The concept seems to have established itself over a number of alternative novel terms proposed to 
define a similar concept, although each with different shades of meaning: ‘quasi-federal’ or ‘multitiered’ 
political system, ‘polycentric governance’, ‘condominio’, ‘network governance’.
21 The first type of governance would picture a semi-federalist option that “lends itself easily to 
intergovernmental relations” and can be illustrated by the image of a layer cake, while the second one 
(also called polycentric governance), corresponds to a ‘marble cake’ model, which “pictures governance 
as a complex fluid patchwork of innumerable overlapping jurisdictions (...) overlapping geographical 
territories and functional domains (...)”, that can “respond to changing citizens’ expectations and 
preferences, and be sensitive to functional requirements as they evolve”, Thompson (2003), pp. 160-161; 
Marks and Hooghes (2001; 2003), Kohler-Koch (1999).
22 Gary Marks, among others, developed the concept of multilevel governance in the late 1980s as a new 
formulation of the pluralist approach earlier expressed by neo-functionalist interpretations of European 
integration (Bache 1998, p.21). The revival of regional movements in the 1980s, claiming the right of 
regional and local actors to have a greater say in decisions concerning their territories, tended to read 
European integration in the context of a general weakening of the national level. See Keating (2000). The 
introduction of the role of the regions was engineered by President of the Commission J. Delors as a way 
of mobilizing additional forces behind the project of the establishment of the Single Market: see Leonardi 
(1993, 1995).
40
expectations of the demise of state-centred models, favouring the emergence of a 
variety of new supra- and subnational territorial actors: “[t]he term multilevel 
governance, when used in the context of the policy-making process associated with 
Structural Funds, and in particular when related to the notion of ‘partnership’ introduced 
by the 1988 reforms, was as much an aspiration as an accurate analytical description” 
(Allen 1998: 216).
Those aspirations were partly frustrated by the later downsizing of the political 
leverage of the decentralisation processes sweeping across most EU states (Hooghe 
1996: 111; Nanetti 1996: 70). While the role of nation states as exclusive providers of 
collective goods for their citizens had certainly “increasingly been eroded due to the 
multiple involvement of supranational and/or subnational players” (Conzelman 1998: 
8), it had not faded away but only changed to become the crucial level of a wider model 
of power-sharing and coordination within the EU arena (Mayntz 1999: 10). From this 
new perspective European integration and regionalism were to be viewed “not merely in 
negative terms, as forces undermining the state, but also as attempts to create new 
political arenas at the supranational and subnational level” (Keating and Hooghe 1998: 
218).
This gradual shift in the conceptualisation of multi-level systems of governance 
from a ‘layer cake’ to a ‘marble cake’ image, i.e. “a representation of a penetrated 
system of governance” (Kohler-Koch 2002: 5), brought MLG scholars to a 
reassessment of their theories and to extend their empirical investigations on the 
reorganization of governance powers ‘on the side’ through the consideration of 
horizontal (transnational, trans-regional, public-private, economic and social) and other 
mixed forms of network governance. Increasingly, this ‘extended view’ of multilevel 
governance could be traced across different EU policy domains and decisional arenas as 
the privileged decision-making framework (from ‘comitology’ to the ‘open method of 
coordination’, or the growing recourse to electronic consultation of civil society on 
thematic issues), both for its effectiveness in coordinating different actors as well as for 
its reference to a normative ideal of participatory democracy. However, EU Regional 
Policy remained one of the most prominent fields in which the phenomenon could be 
studied.23
23 “Cohesion Policy is not the only area where the partnership principle has gained ground -  one can find 
traces in policies as diverse as research and development, social policy, or environmental policy -  but the 
partnership arrangements in Cohesion Policy represent by far the most sustained and most comprehensive 
effort to bring together policy actors at different levels of governance” Hooghe (1996), p. 7.
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The following figure gives a visual representation of three ways of organizing 
territorial and power relations. In the first structure (corresponding to the old ‘national 
modeF) territorial relations have a hierarchical nature based on state sovereignty: 
regions are only considered as subunits of Member States. The second structure depicts 
a model of multilevel governance (corresponding to the new ‘EU model’ as expressed 
by EU Cohesion Policy): regions are now recognised as territorial units, and have direct 
relations also with the EU level. The third structure is a variation of multilevel 
governance: the network is more polycentric in that it also includes direct relations 
among the regions and allows the creation of transnational and trans-regional actors. It 
will be in this extended version that we will consider MLG in this thesis, by looking at 
the implementation of an initiative within EU Regional Policy called INTERREG, 
which aims to promote interregional partnerships for the development of territories 
defined beyond national borders.
2
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fig. 2.1. — Different structures of territorial and power relations: (1) the intergovernmental 
model; (2) the multilevel governance model, restricted version; (3) the multilevel governance 
model, extended version.
Regionalisation via national regional policies
In order to understand the nature of the changes proposed by EU Regional Policy we 
have to briefly consider, as already argued in chapter one, the main features of the 
Regional Policy defined according to the ‘national model’ hitherto prevailing in the 
organization of territorial and power relations before 1988.
Intended as a “meso level between the national and the local” (Keating 1998: 17), 
the region had been identified by most Western European states since the end of the 
Second World War as the appropriate territorial dimension for policy analysis and 
implementation to solve large-scale restructuring and developmental problems. The 
commitment of central governments to equalising living standards through the
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regionalisation24 of the national territory was particularly felt in those states where there 
had been a history of separatist forces and ethnic minorities located in areas which 
usually, although not exclusively, were also the most backward and peripheral. During 
the 1960s several of those areas experienced a wave of revival of ethnic and regionalist 
movements, reacting against the threats of cultural homogenisation following the 
centralising tendencies of welfare states, but also increasingly questioning central 
governments over the origin of the divide between them and the wealthiest areas of the 
country.
Later other kinds of developmental problems also started to arise, such as those 
related to the excessive growth of urban areas and unemployment in declining industrial 
areas (Viesti and Prota 2004: 85). In both cases regional policy was seen by 
governments as the best instrument to tackle developmental problems throughout the 
national territory. At the socio-institutional level the adoption of regional policies was 
legitimised by the philosophy underlying contemporary Keynesian planning, for which 
market imperfections should have been rectified following a principle of national 
solidarity, as well as by diffused social-democratic and christian-democratic traditions, 
both favourable to measures redressing citizens living in peripheral or disadvantaged 
areas on the basis of their membership to the same political community (Keating 1997: 
17, 19). The goal of interregional equity through the equalisation of salaries, education 
and job opportunities, was mainly pursued through measures aimed at reducing the 
costs of localisation of economic activities in backward areas, where funds were 
invested to create public infrastructure and settle public enterprises, and financial aids 
were given to private investors choosing to locate their businesses there (Keating 1996: 
32; Viesti and Prota 2004: 85).
At the economic level, the main inspirer was the ‘poles of development theory’ 
developed by Francois Perroux (1955), arguing that “growth can be planned and 
concentrated by geographic area into development poles, such as those that have been 
identified in urbanised, metropolitan areas” (Leonardi 2005: 37). Growth pole theory 
“accepted to a great extent the Fordist industrialisation paradigm” in that it devised 
large industrial poles to be located in the least developed areas, in the belief that
24 The term regionalisation usually refers to ‘top-down’ processes, while the term regionalism refers to 
‘bottom-up’ movements emphasising the role of the region as a political unit, in demanding greater 
control over the affairs of the regional territory by its inhabitants. The main element of regionalism which 
entered into EU Regional Policy since the 1988 reforms was the introduction of the principle of 
partnership involving regions which already existed as institutional realities, or leading to the creation of 
regions on an administrative basis where directly elected bodies did not yet exist. See Keating and 
Loughlin (1997), pp. 4-5.
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“peripheral areas are underdeveloped because they lack the necessary industrial base 
that would allow them to compete with core areas” (Leonardi 2005: 35). However, “in 
contrast with classical models of economic growth it introduced into the development 
equation a significant role for national economic planning and political decision 
making” (Leonardi 2005: 37). Thus ‘top-down’ planning and administration were 
handed over to central government bureaucrats, in the belief that they possessed the 
information and technical expertise necessary to select areas and interventions and to 
coordinate policy implementation.
Although the policies usually started with technocratic character and as temporary 
measures, aimed at the reintegration of underdeveloped regions in the national 
economy, they gradually tended to become more and more interventionist and act in a 
rather centralised fashion (Keating 1996: 20). In fact, the investments of the 
development poles located in backward territories never had a spill-over effect on 
surrounding areas in terms of stimulating the growth of supporting firms, or developing 
a skilled local workforce, hence gaining the nickname of ‘cathedrals in the desert’ 
(Keating 1996: 20). Their implementation was never followed by monitoring and 
evaluations: the interventions were undertaken with the hope that in time their impact 
would be noticed, but no specific provision was ever made to monitor and evaluate the 
effects of the projects undertaken. Thus regional aid often became a powerful 
instrument used in exchange for the electoral support of local elites (Regini 1991).
During the 1970s, following a period of sustained inflation and economic 
recession (stagflation), the need of central governments to cut down on public 
expenditure in order to control the rise in inflation brought about a retrenchment of 
regional policies, as well as other welfare measures. In the 1980s, under the influence of 
New Right thinking and its prescriptions about “rolling back the state” (Loughlin and 
Peters 1997: 42), governments started to undertake policies of economic liberalisation, 
deregulation, and privatisation. As a consequence financial resources for national 
regional policies -  whose effectiveness was increasingly questioned -  were reduced and 
their objective downsized, especially in Northern Europe. The European 
Commission’s control of state aid to watch over MSs’ adherence to the requirements set 
by EU Competition policy -  asking them to eliminate barriers to growth and 
monopolies and disqualify assisted players in order to prepare for a European liberal 
market space -  grew more strict (Hooghe 1996b: 115), reducing significantly the room
25 This was the case in Belgium, Denmark, France, Holland, and the UK. On the contrary, as we shall 
better see in the Italian case, the expenditure increased or remained constant in Southern Europe and 
Ireland. See Viesti and Prota (2004), pp. 87-88.
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for manoeuvre of national governments in the planning and implementation of regional 
policies within their territories.
Meanwhile, the dynamism of some subnational areas (such as the Central and 
North-Eastern Italian regions), caught the attention of scholars searching for alternative 
models of production after the crisis of the Fordist model, based on capital-intensive, 
vertically organized firms designed to exploit economies of scale (Piore and Sabel 
1984). The key to the economic success of those ‘industrial districts’ was identified in 
the adaptation of the endogenous resources of a specific area to technological 
innovation and to the requirements of an increasingly competitive international context, 
and on the organization of the productive process according to cooperative networks 
among small firms led by local entrepreneurs (Bagnasco 1977; Becattini 1987). After 
those cases a new developmental paradigm was defined, mainly in contrast to the 
previous one, given that past policy failure is one of the main factors influencing policy 
learning (Hall 1993: 278). It is by this new policy paradigm that the 1988 reform of 
European Regional Policy was inspired.
A historical view of EU Regional Policy
It was since the establishment of the EU in 1957 that MSs had declared themselves to 
be “anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious 
development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the 
backwardness of the less favoured regions” (Preamble, TR). However, the Treaty made 
no specific reference to the development of a European Regional Policy, in the belief 
that the gradual reduction of territorial imbalances would have been the natural result of 
the “establishment of a common market and by the progressive approximation of the
n / -
economic policies of the member states” (article 2, TR).
The decision of leaving positive action in territorial policy as a competence for 
national governments had to do with the already mentioned strength of the linkage 
between territory and national sovereignty, but also with the fact that among the six EU 
founding MSs -  a group quite homogenous from an economic point of view -  only Italy
26 More positive dispositions pertained to the establishment of the European Social Fund (ESF) and die 
European Investment Bank (EIB) in 1957, directed to obviate for labour mobility problems favoured by 
European integration (as in the case of migration of Italian labour to West Germany, Belgium and France) 
and finance developmental projects with low-interest loans. In 1962 a European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) was also devised as part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
package, to encourage price stabilisation and contribute to public financing for the improvement of 
production, transformation, and selling of agricultural products.
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and France had serious regional problems, and the latter “during the period of Gaullist 
grandeur, was reluctant to admit this” (Keating and Loughlin 1997: 6). It was only with 
the 1973 enlargement -  which saw the accession of Denmark, the UK, and the Republic 
o f Ireland27 -  that the increase in economic disparities among regions of the EU 
justified the adoption of common action through the coordination of European and 
national regional policies. The Commission’s demands for a more positive approach to 
Regional Policy turned more insistent, backed by arguments suggesting that the 
persistence of regional disparities could endanger the EU’s process of economic 
integration and that the shock of market integration in peripheral areas needed to be 
compensated (Nanetti 1996: 63).28
OQThus in 1975 the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created, 
mainly to aid less competitive sectors and territories, such as agricultural or declining 
industrial areas, via subsidies sustaining local production and employment: “the primary 
focus in the E[U]’s Regional Policy was the support of uncompetitive producers and 
non-mobile labour in the peripheral areas (...) Regional Policy was conceived primarily 
as a social policy designed to absorb the negative consequences of market integration in 
non-productive sectors” (Nanetti 1996: 63). The limited resources of the ERDF were 
allocated on a national quota basis and implemented through development programmes 
in support of regions designated by MS, and thus could not hope to have a significant 
impact on regional disparities within the EU territory (Bachtler 1997: 17; Viesti and 
Prota 2004: 18; Martin 1998). No active role was foreseen either for the Commission -  
which merely transferred the funds to national governments -  or for regional and local 
actors (Nanetti 1996: 63) and it remained unclear where the funds went or who were the 
final beneficiaries of the transfers.
This started to change at the end of the 1970s, again after pressure from the 
Commission who proposed “to take a systematic approach to analysing regional 
problems and the development of regional policies in Member States” (Bachtler 1997: 
17). A five per cent ‘non-quota’ section of the ERDF was created which, integrated with 
other financial instruments was destined to support the development of rural areas or
27 Unemployment rates were high in England and Northern Ireland, while Ireland’s GDP was nearly half 
the European average. Martin (1998), p. 8.
28 This was also following the diffusion by the Commission of the Wemer Report (1970), the Thomson 
Report (1973) and the MacDougall Report (1977). See Bache (1998) and Leonardi (1995).
29 Given the fact that the Treaty of Rome did not foresee its creation, legitimacy for the creation of the 
ERDF in 1975 was derived from article 235, allowing the Council to take appropriate measures at 
Community level when necessary for the completion of the Common Market. Conversely the creation of 
EU Cohesion Policy in 1988 was part of the Single European Market programme foreseen by the Single 
European Act, which explicitly provided for the creation of a European Regional Policy (article 130).
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areas touched by reconversion crisis. However, it was another enlargement that gave the 
decisive drive in the path towards the building of a common European Regional Policy. 
The close accessions of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986), nearly doubled the 
population of the least favoured regions in the EU, and “finally established Regional 
Policy at the top of the European agenda” (Martin 1998: 7).
In those years the acceleration given to the completion of the Single European 
Market project was accompanied by a wider reappraisal of the EU’s aims and 
objectives, in which the position of those arguing that further integration among MSs’ 
economies might not automatically lead to a decrease in territorial disparities but could 
even risk increasing them, started to gain ground. The potential risks of increasing 
regional imbalances due to the ‘backwash effects’ of market liberalisation discouraged 
MSs from considering economic integration as the solution for the development of 
backward areas and allowed the Commission to present EU Regional Policy as the 
social counterpart to “the dominant economic European project of the creation of a 
frontier-free market” (Hooghe 1996b: 99-100, 1996a: 5).
In the Single European Act (1986) -  designed to prepare for the setting up of the 
Single Market in 1993 -  a new title was dedicated to the Community’s objective of 
promoting economic and social cohesion by reducing “disparities between the various 
regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions” (SEA, title V, art. 130a). 
This moment represented a crucial turn in the process leading to the adoption of a 
distinctive European Regional Policy as well in the wider process of European 
integration. In the Treaty of the EU signed in Maastricht (1993) the objective of 
economic and social cohesion became in fact one of the three pillars supporting the 
Community’s structure (art.2, TEU). Additionally, EU Regional Policy (or Cohesion
-5 I
Policy) was endowed with two new financial instruments and dispositions were given 
for the creation of an assembly of elected regional and local representatives with a 
consultative role (the Committee of the Regions).
The 1995 enlargement, which saw the entry of ‘northern countries’ (Finland, 
Sweden and Austria) with a GDP per capita in line with the EU average and minor 
regional imbalances, was less influential in the evolution of cohesion policy.
30 This argument was present both in the Padoa Schioppa Report (1987), the Cecchini Report (1988), the 
Delor’s Report (1989) and was adopted by the Commission (1990). See Viesti and Prota (2004), p. 20 and 
Bachtler (1997), p. 18.
31 The first instrument is the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance, for the diversification of the 
fisheries sector; the second is the Cohesion Fund, established to finance projects in environmental 
protection and transport infrastructures in MSs whose GDP was less than 90% of the EU average.
32 Nevertheless the Commission added a new priority objective to tackle problems of low population 
density in Finland and Sweden (Objective 6) and included the Austrian Burgenland region, suffering
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However, in the late 1990s the fears of possible negative effects for economically 
backward areas of the imminent adoption of a single European currency and the 
opening of negotiations for annexation with several candidate countries, called again 
for a wider reflection on the EU’s objectives and on the potential of EU Regional Policy 
(cohesion policy) to face those future challenges, also in the light of its recent 
achievements. In the document ‘Agenda 2000’, the Commission presented the proposals 
for the following reform of Regional Policy, reiterating the need for a stout engagement 
of the EU towards the objective of socio-economic cohesion.
The policy was supported by an ambitious financial allocation covering the first 
five year period (1989-93) to the tune of 71.36 billion ECU, which over the years, with 
the combination of national, private and EIB loans, mushroomed to 211.8 billion ECU 
(Leonardi 2005: 51-55). During the second financial cycle, 1994-99, the financial 
commitments were doubled in terms of both initial EU allocations (162.1 billion ECU) 
and overall expenditure (421 billion ECU). The growing share of the EU’s budget 
destined for Regional Policy confirmed its increasingly important role within the 
process of European integration: from 18% of the total allocation in 1987, to 29% in 
1993, and 36% in 1999 (Viesti and Prota 2004: 24, 27). In this way Regional Policy 
became “the only redistributive policy of importance in an almost exclusively 
regulatory project of European integration”, second only to the CAP for the allocation 
of financial resources (Hooghe 1996b: 115).
Regionalisation via EU Regional Policy
Having considered the process bringing the institutionalisation of a truly European 
Regional Policy, I shall now look at the main innovative features organizing its 
approach to territorial development. The main points of reference in framing this ‘quasi- 
experiment’ (Leonardi 2005) were contemporary endogenous growth theories in 
regional development, partly experimented in minor innovative programmes launched 
in the previous years (such as innovative actions under art. 10 of the ERDF or the 
IMPs),34 and principles of ‘new public management’ reforms.35
industrial decline, in Objective 1 (promoting the development of the least developed EU regions). Those 
cases show the bargaining logic based on political consideration also often operating behind Structural 
Funds allocations. Viesti and Prota (2004), p.31.
33 Negotiations were widened at the European Council held in Nice in December 2001, and in May 2004 
ten of those countries became MSs of the EU: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta.
34 The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) were projects launched in 1985 for the development 
of regions in Greece, Southern France and all of Italy following an innovative planning approach
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Funds were no longer assigned to individual projects, but to programs covering a 
defined period of time according to a limited number of principles, in order to increase 
the policy’s impact and to avoid the dispersion of available resources: there should have 
been concentration of resources in areas defined by priority objectives (i.e. 
disadvantaged areas designated by common EU criteria), complementarity and 
additionality of EU measures vis a vis national regional policies, and both planning and 
implementation had to be undertaken within a partnership structure following the
' i n
programming of the interventions, after prearranged phases. Of those principles the 
one most relevant for our investigation is that of partnership, because it translates into 
practice the MLG idea of shared authority between actors at different territorial levels. 
According to the partnership principle, in fact, competent territorial authorities (chosen 
by the MS at national and regional levels, in agreement with the principle of 
subsidiarity) are asked to present to the Commission a multiyear plan in which 
development objectives for their territories were clearly stated. Following the 
submission of these plans, and in partnership with the interested territorial authorities, 
the Commission then drafted the Community Support Framework (CSF), which defined 
the priority axes of action, the financial means, and the forms of intervention. On the 
basis of the CSFs, the national and regional levels prepared their operational
anticipating the following reform, to compensate the economies of those Southern MSs for the entry of 
Portugal and Spain (Bianchi 1993). The logic behind their adoption further confirms the tendency of MSs 
to adopt a nationalistic logic in bargainingover Structural Funds distribution (Viesti and Prota, 2004).
35 The ‘New Public Management’ is an approach characterised by the introduction of organizational 
criteria of private companies (such as effectiveness, efficiency, quantification of results, customers’ 
satisfaction, etc.) within public administrations, in order to improve their services to the citizens and 
lower their costs for governments. The approach builds upon a wider redefinition of state functions 
towards a reduction of public intervention and the opening to competition, the promotion of public- 
private partnerships, and a decentralisation of responsibilities. It has been mostly tested in Australia, the 
U.K. and the U.S. See Osborne and Gaebler (1992).
36 There were five priority objectives for the 1989-93 planning period: Obj.l: promoting the development 
of the least developed regions; Obj.2: converting the regions seriously affected by industrial decline; 
Obj.3: combating long-term unemployment; Obj.4: facilitating the occupational integration of young 
people; Obj.5: a) accelerating the adjustment of agricultural structures, b) promoting the development of 
rural areas. The 1994-99 planning period added a sixth objective and slightly modified the others: Obj.l 
and 2 were not changed, Obj.3 was dedicated to combating long-term unemployment and promoting the 
entry into the labour market of young and disadvantaged people; Obj.4: to facilitate the adaptation of 
workers to industrial changes; Obj.5: a) to speed up the adjustment of agricultural and fisheries structures, 
b) to facilitate rural developmental and structural adjustment of rural areas; Obj.6: to enhance the 
development of sparsely populated Nordic areas. For the 2000-2006 period priority objectives were 
halved in order to respect the principles of simplification and concentration: Obj.l remained for the less 
developed regions, strictly limited to those whose per capita GDP was less than 75% of the EU average; 
Obj.2 was to assist regions confronted with major economic and social restructuring needs (industrial, 
services or fisheries sectors, rural and urban areas); Obj.3 would cover remaining regions, helping them to 
adapt their systems of education, training and employment. Bache (1998), pp.84, 124.
37 For the 2000-2006 period objectives were reduced to three: simplification (reduction of programs, 
regulations and objectives); concentration (more resources distributed in smaller areas); enhanced 
partnership (a greater role of the local partners in the administration of resources); and efficiency in fund 
spending (directly rewarded with a reserve premium).
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programmes (OPs) indicating in greater detail the measures to be financed. Once the 
operational programmes were presented and accepted by the Commission the first 
transfer of EU funds could take place.
Over the different editions of the policy the Commission’s requirements became 
more demanding, asking for increasingly accurate assessments in terms of planning, 
time scheduling in programming and spending, regular monitoring and especially of the 
different phases of the evaluation process (ex-ante, interim and ex-post) as a 
fundamental instrument to test and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
policies.
At a wider level a crucial innovation of the policy was the definition of its main 
objective. Although ‘socio-economic cohesion’ was said simply to translate the old 
wish of achieving a ‘harmonious development’ of the Union, its choice had not been 
fortuitous. The Commission’s preference for cohesion among a variety of alternatives
<>o
considered during the drafting of the SEA had taken into account the “double-edged 
purposes of the policy” (Hooghe 1996b: 123): on the one hand EU Regional Policy had 
to respond to the value of solidarity, helping territorially disadvantaged or socio­
economically deprived areas to enjoy equally the benefits of EU membership; on the 
other hand it had to promote competitiveness, stimulating local growth to make also 
backward regions able to compete in the global market and contribute to increasing the 
potential of the EU’s economy. The choice of the term, however, also indicated the 
political will to give to the social component of the objective priority over the economic 
one. In fact the declared plan of President Jacques Delors when launching the reform 
was “to make cohesion the social counterpart to the dominant economic European 
project of the creation of a frontier-free market” (Hooghe 1996a: 5). From this 
perspective, the process of negative integration necessary for the establishment of the 
principle of free competition in view of the single market had to be flanked by one of 
positive integration actively supporting less advantaged areas and groups: “the ‘espace 
libre’ needed to be complemented by an ‘espace organise’” (Hooghe 1996a: 5-6).
The new policy regulations extended to virtually the whole EU territory a common 
vocabulary representing new organizational procedures as well as core principles and 
values. In this way, EU cohesion policy gradually became recognised as an 
organizational field, that is to say a “recognised area of institutional life which carries
38 Among the other possibilities considered (‘structural policy’, ‘redistribution’, ‘solidarity/equity 
mechanism’, ‘convergence’, ‘regional and social development’, ‘social dimension’, etc.) ‘cohesion’ -  a 
term of French derivation -  resulted in the most ‘politically imaginative’. See Hooghe (1996b), p. 123, 
n.9.
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on an interrupted action of issuing of norms and regulations and control on the activity 
of other bodies” (Bonazzi 2000: 456), such as MSs, regions and local authorities. This 
mechanism was steered by the Commission, gradually taking on the role of an 
‘ideational entrepreneur’, administering and disseminating ideas of appropriateness on 
regional development (Kohler-Koch 2002; H.Wallace 1998).39 The extension of the 
Commission’s fields of jurisdiction from the mere rule-making function officially 
attributed by the Treaties was actively sustained by a dense network of relations 
cultivated with experts (<comitology) and clients (regional and local actors), giving birth 
to ‘epistemic communities’ around selected policy ideas (H.Wallace 1998: 57; Pierson
1998).
The following figure identifies the shift of the Regional Policy’s paradigm 
promoted by the EU’s Cohesion Policy following four main dimensions of proposed 
change: the organization of territorial relations and of decision-making procedures in 
planning, the means and the objectives of the policy). As previously argued, this shift 
mirrors the one from the previous ‘national model’ to the new ‘European model’.
fig. 2.2 - Paradigm shift in the evolution of regional policies
Regional
Policy
The ‘national model* 
(1950s-1980s)
The ‘EU model’ 
(1990s-present)
Territorial
relations
vertical relations based on state hierarchy, 
territory divided in centre and peripheries;
multilevel governance (EU, MS, 
regions) based on subsidiarity and 
cooperation, policentrism and territorial 
cohesion;
Planning ‘top-down’ planning; regional authorities as agents of the central government (principal);
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ planning, 
cooperative competition, regional 
authorities as actors responsible for 
their territories
Means
exogenous growth theories, sectoral actions, 
development of big industrial poles, 
bureaucratic management, indiscriminate 
distribution of economic subsidies in exchange 
of political consensus (short term);
endogenous growth theories, integrated 
actions, development of SMEs, new 
public management, selected incentives 
directed to institutional building (long 
term);
Objectives
state intervention to accommodate market 
requirements and equalise living standards 
within the national territory.
socio-economic and territorial 
cohesion: promoting economic growth 
and the reduction of inequalities in the 
European territory as a collective 
endeavour.
39 “Attributing to the Commission the role of an ideational entrepreneur does not imply that it creates new 
concepts, rather that it takes up what has been developed elsewhere and gives it a new drive. The power 
of such an entrepreneur, the relevance of EU framing and the importance of policy networks is an 
empirical question”, Kohler-Koch (2002) p. 7.
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The Europeanisation approach
The development of new theories acknowledging the emergence of multi-tiered 
structures of governance at the European level allowed a shift in the debate on European 
integration from the ‘either-or’ position of intergovemmentalists and supranationalists 
over the ‘resilience-demise of the nation-state’ thesis. On the other hand, however, 
“empirical research focusing on multilevel interactions tends either to emphasize the 
uniqueness of its objects, or to create novel concepts -  which are likely to remain 
contested even among Europeanists” (Scharpf 2002: 11).
An adjustment to this flaw is offered by those approaches that, like historical 
institutionalism (HI), insert the study of European integration within a wider time­
frame, not only registering change but also testing its range and questioning its 
direction: “jj]ust as a film often reveals meanings that cannot be discerned from a single 
photograph, a view of Europe’s development over time gives us a richer sense of the 
nature of the emerging European polity” (Pierson 1998: 30). The assessment of 
emerging distinct EU policies and polity as a result of the gradual process of European 
integration brings HI near to neofunctionalist theories. However, HI diverges from 
neofunctionalism in two important aspects. First, it does not consider redistribution of 
power as a one-way transfer to supranational actors (as in a zero-sum game) but rather 
emphasises “how the evolution of rules and policies along with social adaptations create 
an increasingly structured polity”, which offers political actors new opportunities while 
gradually limiting the range of possible options (Pierson 1998: 48). Second, it adopts a 
‘ladder model’ of social change that also includes the possibility for backtracking: “[i]f 
interpreted in a dynamic, non-deterministic way, the path of institutional change is not 
seen as necessarily irreversible. Thus, the course and progression of the changes brought 
about are unclear and uncertain” (Featherstone 2001: 6).
As a consequence, the theoretical perspective of HI extends its field of observation 
over the process of European integration considering not only the emergence of distinct 
patterns of multilevel governance, but also their different degree of interpenetration and 
adaptation in the organizational logic of domestic politics and policy-making of actors 
(Ladrech 1994: 69). This kind of overarching approach has recently gained ground 
within the stream of ‘Europeanisation’ studies, considering institutionalisation related 
to EU integration as a combination of processes of “a) construction, b) diffusion and c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic
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(national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli 
2004: 3).
The influence of HI in Europeanisation studies is evident in the appreciation that 
institutions are embedded in specific historical paths and thus convergence towards a 
common European model will differ according to the features of the various socio- 
institutional settings: “[t]he effects of Europeanisation are generally asymmetrical: 
varying between sectors and location affected by distinct institutional settings” and 
therefore “[convergence as a result of EU participation is far from being inevitable” 
(Featherstone 2001: 11, 3). As already seen in the case of HI, this means first, that an 
empirical investigation becomes crucial to assess the nature and extent of 
Europeanisation processes. Second, that like all processes of institutional change 
Europeanisation will have to be analysed in its two directions: ‘top-down ’ and 4bottom- 
up \ The first direction is concerned with the mechanisms by which EU law, policies, 
principles and ideas influence the structural organization of society at various territorial levels; 
the second direction considers the ways in which EU institutions are influenced by the 
actors involved in the process of institutional change through their adaptation, imitation, 
use, translation or refusal of this change, giving input to the feed-back loop of the 
process of institutional change or blocking it (Czamiawska and Joerges 1995).
A distinction widely appreciated within the Europeanisation debate {illustrated in 
table 2.2) identifies three foremost mechanisms through which European integration 
proceeds ‘top-down’. A positive kind of integration introduces binding prescriptions 
which replace national ones, although the level of adaptation required is partly left to 
national discretion and mainly depends on the institutional compatibility between the 
old and new institutional pattern (‘goodness o f f i t ’ between domestic and European 
arrangements). Negative integration proceeds by removing those regulations which are 
considered as incompatible with the requirements of EU integration, and in so doing it 
alters the domestic opportunity structures organizing the distribution of power and 
resources among the actors, putting pressure for change on previous established 
equilibriums (Scharpf 1996). Finally, framing integration refers to a looser mechanism, 
which -  following a cognitive logic -  proceeds towards spreading common values and 
ideas, preparing the ground for future moves or policies that will probably need greater 
support to be implemented because of the underlying conflicts of interests between the 
different MSs, and that has to be oriented into a longer time-frame (Knill and Lehmkuhl
1999). It is especially this third type of European integration that we will see at work in 
the case study presented in the empirical part of this thesis.
Table 23  - ‘Top-down’ mechanisms of European integration
_________[after Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999)]___________
Types o f European 
integration
Description o f mechanisms used
NEGATIVE
removes regulations considered as incompatible with the requirements of EU 
integration; alters domestic opportunity structures, putting pressure for change on 
previously established equilibriums
POSITIVE
introduces binding prescriptions replacing national ones; adaptation varies 
according to institutional compatibility (‘goodness o f  fit')  between old-domestic and 
new-EU arrangements
FRAMING
spreads EU values and ideas, preparing -  in a long time-frame -  ground for policies 
that need greater support to be implemented because of their innovative potentials or 
of conflicting interests between MSs
A second distinction (illustrated in table 2.3), looks at the ‘bottom-up’ direction of 
Europeanisation, identifying three main kinds of responses given by domestic actors to 
the institutional change proposed by the EU: negation, adaptation and learning 
(Leonardi 2005: 80). In the case of negation, actors adopt a ‘resistance to change’ 
behaviour, which may represent a rational strategy when “the costs to the internal 
equilibrium within the political institutions and administrative structures are immediate 
and therefore considered to be greater than the external benefits to be accrued by civil 
society and the economy in the medium to long term” (Leonardi 2005: 80). The strategy 
followed by the adaptation response is that of a non-maximizing behaviour trying to 
innovate as little as necessary in order to accept the formal adoption of changes: “the 
maintenance of the administrative status quo is considered to be a higher good than the 
full implementation of the policy. Therefore, the extent of internal changes is reduced to 
a minimum, and what change is introduced has to be carried out in an incremental and 
gradual fashion” (Leonardi 2005: 82). Finally, the learning response typifies a strategy 
of compliance with the new rules and regulations in the attempt to maximize the 
benefits of the implemented policy, as perceived in a medium-long term perspective 
(Leonardi 2005: 82).
Table 2.4 - ‘Bottom-up’ responses to European integration
______________ [after Leonardi (2005)]______________
Types o f  responses to 
Europeanisation Actors ’ behaviour
Actors' time­
frame perspective
Negation non compliance with the new rules and procedures that administer the implementation of the policy Short term
Adaptation
non-maximizing behaviour trying to innovate as little as 
necessary in order to accept the formal adoption of 
changes
Medium term
Learning
full compliance with the new rules and regulations in the 
attempt to maximize the benefits of the implemented 
policy
Long term
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Crucial to the definition of the ‘bottom-up’ response is the presence or absence of 
‘mediating factors’ (i.e. “the institutional and cultural conditions that facilitate or 
prohibit flexible responses to adaptational pressures”) and actors able to exploit the 
opportunities offered by the institutions to produce structural change (Risse, Green 
Cowles, Caporaso 2001: 9, ll) .40
Clearly those distinctions represent ideal-types: in reality the ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ directions of change are intertwined; there may be different kinds of 
motivations influencing the integration mechanisms or adaptation strategies, and the 
shift over time from one type to the other is not necessary or linear in nature. These 
distinctions only represent useful analytical tools for the study of institutions and the 
comparison of variations through time and between the units analysed in empirical 
research, as will be better specified in the next chapter.
Conclusion
As seen in the first chapter, the theoretical perspective adopted here -  that of Historical 
Institutionalism -  recognises the influence of past institutional settings in present and 
future institutional life, but also allows for the existence of ‘critical junctures’ when 
historical development moves onto a new path. In this chapter I have argued that one of 
those moments is represented by the introduction of socio-economic cohesion as one of 
the main objectives of the EU, and a new regional policy as one of the means to realise 
it. The institutional change in the organization of territory proposed by the reformed EU 
Regional Policy offers regional actors the opportunity to shift from the centralistic 
model of hierarchical relations organizing nation states to a polycentric one, consisting 
of intertwining cooperative networks of governance throughout the EU territory, here 
seen as the application of a wider ‘European model’ in the organization of power 
relations.
This consideration does not posit a ‘Europe of the Regions’ vs. a ‘Europe of States’ 
scenario. Regionalisation is here interpreted as part of a wider shift of structural 
organization, diffused throughout the EU territory, towards a model based on multi­
tiered and cooperative decision-making and power-sharing. However, the response of 
national and subnational actors within the EU to the regionalisation promoted by the
40 Among those factors, the authors suggest the presence/absence of: multiple veto points (given that the 
more power dispersed across the political system the more difficult it is to foster the domestic consensus 
to introduce change); mediating formal institutions (improve actors’ capacity to induce change); political 
and organizational cultures (since cooperative decision-making culture facilitates policy learning); see 
Risse, Green Cowles, Caporaso (2001), p. 10.
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‘EU model’ will vary according to the different socio-institutional contexts and thus 
convergence remains a matter of empirical investigation. It is thus the aim of our 
research to focus on the case of the regional response, to consider in what ways the 
regionalisation model proposed by the EU through its Regional Policy since 1988 has 
influenced the organization of subnational territories previously defined according to the 
‘ centre-periphery’ logic typically distinguishing the organization of modem nation 
states. Before doing that, I need to acknowledge the methodological choices made to 
operationalise my theoretical assumptions into a research design that frames the 
empirical work.
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Chapter 3: Linking theory and evidence 
in the study o f  institutional change: some methodological reflections
The previous chapters have set out the theoretical assumptions underpinning this 
research, while the next ones will consider the empirical evidence deriving from the 
research analysis that, in turn, will inform the theoretical assumptions and lead us to the 
thesis conclusions. This twofold movement from theory to evidence is a basic feature of 
social research: “[a]s researchers our primary goal is to link the empirical and the 
theoretical -  to use theory to make sense of evidence and to use evidence to sharpen and 
refine theory. This interplay helps us to produce theoretically structured descriptions of 
the empirical world that are both meaningful and useful” (Ragin 1992: 225).
What establishes the link between theory and evidence, allowing for this circular 
movement, is the research methods. In this chapter I shall clarify the main 
methodological issues that emerge in the main steps undertaken to build the link 
between the theoretical assumptions and the empirical evidence in this thesis.
Qualitative analysis and research on institutions
The different theoretical approaches to the study of institutions considered in chapter 
one (and in chapter two when applied to the EU case) are adopted by scholars according 
to the empirical task in hand, but they also indirectly reveal something of their 
epistemological beliefs. In the case of the author of this thesis, the recognition of the 
embeddedness of the actors as well as their limited rational behaviour, the 
acknowledgement of existing paths of dependency but also of the possibility for social 
change, the adoption of a definition of institutions including informal norms and 
discursive logic, all show a preference for a ‘middle-range theory’ (Merton 1957).
The ‘weaker’ theoretical assumptions of this approach require research methods 
that proceed to the framing of evidence according to a flexible research design, allowing 
for a multifaceted consideration of the variables. This does not amount to developing 
theoretical concepts only after immersion in the details and specifics of the data 
observed. The ‘selective attention’ adopted by theoretical premises limiting the cases 
studied, in fact, is crucial in helping the researcher to restrict the field of inquiry, which 
would otherwise become boundless and entangled.
As said, this choice also has to do with the empirical task of the research, which in
our case (exploring the promotion of institutional change in two path-dependent
regions) requires design flexibility in order to allow the researcher “to [adapt] inquiry as
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understanding deepens and/or situations change; avoids getting locked into rigid designs 
that eliminate responsiveness” (Patton 1990: 41). In this way the researcher will be able 
to register also unexpected patterns or events if  they emerge. For these reasons, a 
research method flexible and particularly oriented towards exploration, discovery and 
inductive logic was identified as better suited for the purposes of this thesis: (Patton 
1990: 45): the ‘case study’, investigated through detailed historical and empirical 
analysis.
Choosing the case study
In a very broad sense a case can be defined as “a whole circumscribed in time and 
space” (Wieviorka 1992: 166). However there are different ways of looking at and using 
the case study as a research method. In line with what has just been said with regard to 
this author’s methodological position, this thesis adopts a view looking at the case study 
as a theoretically motivated narrowing of the empirical focus (Ragin 1992). From this 
view case studies are considered as theoretical constructs which allow researchers to 
carry out empirical investigation, while case categories are conceived as constructs that 
are built in the course of the research itself. Thus what the research is really ‘a case o f  
may not be known until after part of the empirical investigation has been carried out 
(Ragin 1992: 6; Wieviorka 1992; Becker 1992).
This was so also for this research, whose very first cue came from the reading of 
Putnam’s work on Italian regions and his challenging thesis linking the poor 
performance of the Mezzogiomo regions, at both the institutional and economic level, to 
its socio-cultural traditions (Putnam 1993). Besides the more specific theoretical 
problems of Putnam’s book (largely investigated by the literature and partly discussed 
in chapter one), what as a ‘Sardinian reader’ I found problematic in his argument was 
the inclusion of Sardinia within the wider category of Southern Italy not only because of 
shared developmental problems (linked to the dual economy of the of the Country) but 
also because of socio-cultural and historical similarities. However, for historical and 
cultural reasons, Sardinia sharply differs from other Southern Italian regions (which, in 
their turn, are internally differentiated) and holds among its most established ‘political 
myths’ a past of self-government and rebellion against foreign rule. Moreover, official 
statistics show significant differences between Sardinia and other Southern Italian 
regions in terms of social indicators (because of its relatively lower rates for births, 
population density, diffused criminality) also with reference to those indicators linked to
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the ‘social capital’ dimension (such as a relatively higher number of voluntary 
associations and political participation rates in the island) (Istat 2001, Nuzzo 2006). 
Cultural and social specificity are partly linked to another feature differentiating 
Sardinia from other Southern regions also often neglected, namely its territorial 
remoteness from the rest of the South, as well as from the rest of the ‘continent’. 
Therefore the reasons behind the developmental problems and the poor institutional 
performance approximating the Sardinian case to that of Southern Italian regions 
seemed to deserve further investigation.
Those considerations confirm the fact that in social research it is not only 
methodological issues but also practical and contextual considerations that lead to the 
choice of a research design (Gerring 2004: 352-353). In my case the fact of being 
Sardinian played a crucial role in fostering the initial motivation behind this thesis. 
However, the decision to delve into the study of the Sardinian case was gauged as an 
opportunity to reflect on wider theoretical issues, namely over the reasons behind the 
persistent backwardness and institutional failures of territories which have noteworthy 
potentials in terms of socio-economic development but share the heavy weight of a 
history of peripherality, backwardness and dependency, and over their possibilities for 
change.
As we shall see in chapter five, mainly after the Second World War the question of 
Sardinian backward development was included, together with the wider Mezzogiomo 
issue, within governmental plans for reconstruction and industrial development in post­
war Italy. As seen in chapter two, those national regional policies, defined ‘top-down’ 
according to exogenous theories of growth privileging large industries, were related to a 
model organizing territorial and power relations within nation states according to a 
centralised and hierarchical logic. The historical analysis of development policies in 
Sardinia from the 1960s considered in chapter five will show that alternative models of 
development were also introduced, but that the prevailing ‘national model’ organizing 
society at the time did not allow them to take root. Conversely, as argued in chapter 
two, the reference to theories of endogenous development made by EU Regional Policy 
since 1988 was supported by a European model of multilevel governance respective of 
subsidiarity and a ‘bottom-up’ definition of territory.
As already said, scholars of Europeanisation processes have looked at the impact of 
EU Regional Policy in the reorganization of power and territorial relations 
predominately through the analysis of mainstream programmes considered within a 
framework gauging variations occurring within the EU-MSs’ relationship. Accordingly,
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subnational units are mainly considered as a case study of their respective nation state 
and compared with other subnational units considered as representative of their 
respective national cases (Ladrech 1994; Boerzel 2001; Giuliani 2001; Gualini 2005).
This thesis, in order to better emphasise the specificity of the regional response to 
the ‘EU model’, will consider an innovative experimental case of EU Regional Policy 
(Community Initiative INTERREG) rather than mainstream Structural Funds. In fact, 
first, the experimental character of the initiative extended the innovative approach 
introduced by EU Regional Policy to territorial partnerships defined beyond the national 
logic (according to what later became defined as ‘territorial cohesion’) making it a 
particularly coherent case of what I termed the ‘European model’; second, its relatively 
low budget (if compared with that of mainstream Structural Funds) allowed me to focus 
on the institutional rather than on the socio-economic impact of the policy; third, the 
policy was among the most relevant of Community Initiatives, and thus it was 
reconfirmed during three planning periods, allowing a sufficient time to evaluate its 
impact in the regions; fourth, the fact that the policy was directly addressed to 
interregional cooperation (as well as its lower budget) generally allowed a limited 
intervention in the programme of the MSs, concentrated on the management of 
mainstream fimds.
When this research was begun in 1998, INTERREG was not as well-known as it 
later became within EU Regional Policy. Over time, the initiative has grown in 
relevance in terms of its coherence, importance, financing, and visibility in extending its 
logic and influence through the strengthening and proliferation of the policy networks. 
The growing role attributed to the initiative within EU Regional Policy culminated in 
the mainstreaming of the approach as one of its three priority objectives for the actual 
2007-13 planning period. This outcome can also be read as a confirmation of the 
significant contribution given by INTERREG to the evolution of EU Regional Policy: 
by promoting the ‘European model’ among regions and other subnational actors 
cooperating beyond national borders, the initiative has contributed to legitimise 
territorial development as an European rather than an inter-state matter and to add a 
spatial perspective to the cohesion objective.
The INTERREG programme identified for the aims of the present research was the 
“France-Italy ‘islands’ programme”, promoting cooperation between the island regions 
of Corsica and Sardinia, no longer seen as peripheries of two bordering nation states but 
as European territories defining a common strategy for their development.
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Defining the units of analysis
While the choice of the first unit of analysis (the Sardinian region) was, as previously 
mentioned, motivated by both practical and theoretical concerns, the choice of the 
second unit of analysis in a sense ‘imposed itself, because of the existence of the 
INTERREG programme between Sardinia and the French island region of Corsica. As I 
shall explain in chapter six, the initial idea of the European Commission in launching 
the initiative between the islands was that the creation of a Corso-Sardinian pole would 
have helped the regions to overcome their peripherality and better integrate with the 
activities of the EU’s economic core, within the picture of the Single European Market. 
However, gradually the INTERREG initiative was inserted within an increasingly 
coherent innovative approach to territorial development defined by the Commission’s 
services for Regional Policy, considering institutional capacity building and 
interregional cooperative planning as a fundamental aspect enhancing socio-economic 
and territorial cohesion.
The case of Corsica was functional to the comparative aims of the thesis: in fact 
“[a] comparison may have at least two main functions. It may help deconstruct what 
common sense takes to be unique or unifies. On the contrary, it may construct the unity 
of what seems to be broken up into practical categories. It is never so useful as when it 
combines these two functions and thus justifies both the deconstruction of a 
preconception and the construction of a scientific category” (Wieviorka 1992: 170).
Analysing the implementation of the same regional policy in two regions belonging 
to different states could help, on the one hand, in the task of ‘deterritorialising’ the 
regions from their previous national model (i.e., ‘denationalising’ them): thus Sardinia 
could be seen not (mainly) as a case of Italy, or of the Mezzogiomo, and Corsica not 
(exclusively) as a case of France, but rather as territorial actors with specific features 
seen from a ‘bottom-up’ perspective. On the other hand, the INTERREG programme 
also provided the regions with an existing policy framework, recontextualising their 
territories as ‘islands of Western-Mediterranean Europe’.
Several similarities can be found between Corsica and Sardinia {see also the figures 
in the annexes). First, the insular condition and their geographical setting in the 
Western-Mediterranean, only 15km of distance from one another. Second, the long- 
lasting condition of socio-economic backwardness and peripherality that characterises
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them within their respective states and the EU.41 Third, a similar past history, diverging 
from that of what later became their nation states, characterised by the notion of a local 
‘people’ and experiences of self-government and local heroes, regularly mythically 
revived by separatist movements. Related to the previous point is a fourth similarity, 
namely the presence on the islands of distinctive cultural and linguistic traditions, 
traditionally dismissed or banished in social life by national culture and language, thus 
nurturing the feeling of -  material and cultural -  distance of islanders from their fellow 
citizens (who they used to call ‘continentals') and, fifth, a stereotypical image of the 
islanders difrused within their respective national contexts -  more often than not 
expressed in negative but also romantic terms -  as being individualistic people linked to 
strong family ties, archaic and violent social values, typical of traditional pastoral and 
agricultural societies.
The main differences between the two regions, besides the smaller dimension and 
lower population density of Corsica, are to be related -  in the opinion of this author -  to 
their relationship with their respective nation states, which will largely be considered in 
the second section. The formal structure of France and Italy is quite similar (as it will be 
said, the newborn Italian state used the older French one as its main model): they both 
can be classified as Western nation-states having a centralised bureaucracy, a multi­
party system, a capitalist economy allowing extensive state intervention in the market 
(Tarrow 1977: 6). Also relations between centre and periphery are organized in both 
states according to a decentralised system of political and administrative territorial 
authorities. However, at an informal level, while Italian territorial authorities always 
benefited from a large degree of independence from state control, the presence of the 
state (in the person of the prefect) has always played a strong ‘tutorship’ role (7a 
tutelle’) in the life of the French periphery.
41 In 2002 Corsica and Sardinia were still amongst the EU-15 regions with the lowest employment rates, 
respectively 44.8% and 46.7%. In the same year, the total unemployment rate in Corsica was 13.1%, of 
which 44.2% concerned young people; in Sardinia the respective rates were 18.5% and 48.3% (Eurostat 
2002). Structural unemployment drives young people to look for work on ‘the continent’ or abroad. The 
problem of depopulation is particularly relevant in the internal areas, since induced modernisation 
propelled the population shifts towards the few larger cities and the coast, where job opportunities are 
offered by public administration and a tourism sector concentrated in the summer season. Another 
problem is the poor quality of public infrastructure: the regions present the lowest level of electrification 
within their countries, an outdated and inadequate system of internal transport, and the additional costs of 
insularity for external transport for passengers and freight (CRENOS 2003). Since the reform of the SFs, 
Corsica and Sardinia have been inserted into the Objective 1 programmes designed for regions whose 
GDP per head is less than 75% of the EU average. After an initial period of stalemate, both regions 
gradually converged until they exceeded the threshold: Corsica entered the ‘phasing out’ stage in the 
2000-06 programming period, while Sardinia was inserted for the 2007-13 period in the ‘phasing in’ (a 
sort of transitional phase) to the Regional Competition and Employment objective (differently from 
Southern Italian regions, which were all included within the Convergence objective, with only Basilicata 
‘phasing out’).
62
The 1948 Republican Italian Constitution defined regions as one of the three levels 
of local government (in France this recognition came only with the 1982-83 reforms) 
and granted the Sardinian region an autonomous status and a special statute. We shall 
see how this has been partly a facade, and how in reality Italian regions -  especially in 
the Mezzogiomo — were entangled within a dependent relation with the central 
government, based on a clientelistic political system. Nevertheless, this allowed the 
possibility for the regional identities, also in the case of a ‘special region’ like the 
Sardinian one, to be ‘inserted’ in the national picture. Conversely, the French state 
repeatedly refused to recognise the ‘speciality’ of the Corsican region within the 
national framework, if not for geographic reasons linked to insularity; regional identity 
in the island thus came to be defined in antagonistic terms vis a vis the French state (as 
documented by the violent hallmark of separatist movements). Given those premises, 
the INTERREG ‘islands’ programme presented itself as a ‘least likely case’ or at least a 
‘difficult case’, where the success of public policies based on the use of cooperation to 
facilitate the achievement of common goals could be tested.
Accounting for the time factor
As argued in the previous chapters, the time factor is a crucial aspect to be considered 
when studying processes of institutional change. This has been taken into account in the 
research design through two main steps: First, the INTERREG ‘islands’ programme, 
identified as the ‘new’ European model proposed to the regions, was considered in all 
its three subsequent editions (from 1990 to 2005), allowing a sufficient time lapse to test 
the results of its implementation in the regions (presented in section III). Despite 
proximity, common problems and similarities the two island regions had never engaged 
in long-lasting exchanges or cooperation, but rather looked to their central government 
as the almost exclusive interlocutor. The fact that Corsica and Sardinia were lacking 
previously relevant traditions of partnership could allow better control of the role of 
INTERREG in promoting cooperation and cohesion among the two regions. Second, in 
order to better appreciate the significance of the proposed change in respect to previous 
relationships, I have included a historical analysis of the developmental policies 
implemented in the regions by their central government since WW2 (section II). In a 
before/after comparison, the previous ‘national model’ (reconstructed through the 
analysis of secondary literature) will be contrasted with the new ‘European model’, as 
defined by Cohesion Policy in INTERREG (reconstructed through field research).
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These two steps are driven by the theoretical indications offered by the historical- 
institutionalist approach to the study of institutional change, as seen in the previous 
chapters: on the one hand, to consider how constraints imposed on institutional reform 
may be dependent on previously adopted institutional paths; on the other hand, to make 
sure that the recognition of the embeddedness of social action in given historical and 
social contexts does not amount to assuming deterministic accounts of social change, 
but considers the institutional gaps and historical junctures offering actors possibilities 
for variation and change.
Formulating the research hypotheses
The theoretical position of HI is thus reflected in the definition of our explanatory 
model. In this regard, this thesis follows those scholars arguing that Europeanisation, 
like most processes of ongoing institutional change, is a process that “comes about 
through a series of steps” (Becker 1992: 208) and thus does not easily fit within the 
language of dependent/independent variables or with a logic of regression analysis 
(Olsen 1996: 271; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003: 4). Rather, it implies the idea of a 
multiplicity of factors coevolving, parallel, and not necessarily strictly coupled (Olsen 
1996: 271; Gualini 2005: 499). From the standpoint of the model of ‘weak causation’ 
here adopted, the ‘independent variable’ can be considered to be the INTERREG 
‘islands’ programme, seen as a case of the ‘European model’ (a new institutional 
setting, organizing power and territory according to the principles of MLG and 
territorial cohesion). Our dependent variable will be the regional administrations of 
Corsica and Sardinia, considered as actors embedded in the norms prevalent in their 
respective socio-cultural and institutional contexts.
As argued above, the research has been designed as a ‘least likely case’ to 
strengthen the validity of the argument developed by the research hypothesis, if 
confirmed: on the one hand, INTERREG represents an innovative Regional Policy 
requiring the two regions to cooperate in the self-management of strategies for their 
territorial development; on the other, the regions share a long experience of state- 
assisted development policies, whose failures have been related to local traditions of 
individual-familism, hampering institutional performance and thus regional 
development.
The theoretical hypothesis developed in the previous chapters, however, holds that 
institutional settings may change actors’ behaviour, and more precisely, that cooperative
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behaviour can be enhanced by specific forms of network governance. Thus the research 
question will be: “How have regional actors responded to the new institutional setting 
proposed by INTERREG?”
If the prevalent response through the different editions of the INTERREG ‘islands’ 
programme is lengthy refusal of the European model by the regions, or even a merely 
formal adaptation (while informally it is the old logic that moves the actors), our 
hypothesis would be negated. Indeed, in this case, the fact that the actors adopt a 
strategy exploiting the benefits of the policy with a minimum adoption of the formal 
requirements may indicate that the transition costs linked to change from the previous 
setting of reference are still too high (and thus that it is not yet time for multilevel 
governance and territorial cohesion). Or, it could be read as a validation of a 
deterministic version of the path dependency argument.
The research hypothesis would be confirmed if we predominantly notice a 
significant change towards the ‘EU model’, as coherently registered in regional actors’ 
behaviour, planning strategies, and discourses. In fact this would suggest that the 
institutional setting proposed by the EU facilitates the regions in learning how to 
operate as responsible actors, participating in a collective endeavour and considering 
what are the long-term advantages of cooperation. In this case a possible explanation of 
the persistence of regional backwardness could suggest that the individualistic 
component of their socio-cultural traditions may have been nurtured by their previous 
centre-periphery setting, as proposed at the national level -  a hypothesis td be explored 
with further research.
A second question to be addressed is that, considering possible differences between 
the two regional actors, do the responses adopted by the Sardinian and the Corsican 
region differ? In what ways? The answer to those questions will refer to the similarities 
or differences between the two regions in terms of the presence or absence of those 
‘mediating factors’ (such as features of institutional context, or political or economic 
entrepreneurs) that may have reinforced or obstructed ongoing change.
Collecting the data
The evaluation of the impact of INTERREG in the regional actors involved in the 
policy (described in chapter six) constitutes the original part of the empirical research, 
and is based on the analysis of two main types of primary sources relative to the 
planning and management of the policy: documentary analysis (official and internal
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administrative records, such as planning documents, minutes from monitoring 
committees, letters between the partners) and in-depth interviews with the national, 
regional, and EU administrators involved in directed management of the analysed 
policy. The data collected have been further triangulated with information derived from 
secondary sources (such as evaluation studies) and short interviews with informed 
observers (such as administrators, politicians, or academics only partly involved in the 
programme considered).
The interviews started in 1999 and were followed up until 2005. Each interview has 
been coded according to the main issues emerging from discussions starting from basic 
questions posed by the author to the administrators, with reference to the 
implementation and management of the programme from their side and that of the other 
partners. Quotations from different interviews (either with different interviewees or with 
the same interviewee in a different phase of the programme) have been confronted 
among them, as well as with further information from the pertinent planning documents. 
Quotations from the interviews have been extensively reported in the text, without 
revealing the name of the interviewees -  out of respect for their privacy -  unless the 
information was not considered to be sensitive, but always indicating his or her 
institution of reference (E = European Commission; I = Italy; F = France; S = Sardinia; 
C = Corsica). The language of the interviews was either Italian (for partners at the 
Sardinian region, the Italian ministries, and the Commission) or French (for partners at 
the Corsican region, at the French prefecture and at the Commission) and sometimes a 
mixture of the two (for some Corsican partners); the translations into English in the text 
are mine (a complete list of the interviewees’ names and their institution of reference is 
included in the annexes).
Being Sardinian has certainly represented a comparative advantage in terms of 
access to information and institutional actors at the Autonomous Region of Sardinia 
(RAS), but also at the Collectivite Territoriale Corse (CTC) -  given Corsican sympathy 
for islanders and Italians in general. Crucial for the research was my traineeship at the 
European Commission, Directorate General for Regional Policy (October 2000- 
February 2001), which represented a unique opportunity both for grasping the 
functioning of EU Regional Policy, the organization and workings of the Commission’s 
services, and having access to the material and people related to the programme I was 
analysing.
The choice of reiterating the interviews, in order to add necessary information and 
adopt a longer time-frame, has often allowed the creation of friendly contacts with the
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administrators involved in the policy management. The establishment of a setting where 
the interviewees could feel at ease has been crucial to developing a better insight into 
the point of view of the different territorial actors and thus to better appreciate what 
represented for each of them the main difficulties in the programme management. 
Interviewing people at their place of work was also very instructive, in that it allowed 
me to compare the different internal structuring of the institutions considered, as well as 
their accessibility and openness to the civil society.
Finally, further research on related issues (by participating in a CRPM study on the 
INTERREG IIC for the Western-Mediterranean regions, or evaluations of the Sardinian 
region in the management of the Structural Funds, or some of the INTERREG ‘islands’ 
projects) has represented a further opportunity to broaden my knowledge on the 
questions considered by this thesis.
Conclusion
The choice of studying Europeanisation by deepening the historical and contextual 
analysis of a focused case study clearly presents some weaknesses that need to be 
acknowledged.
First, case-oriented research, differently from the variable-oriented approach, 
places cases at the centre, studying how different features or causes fit together in 
individual cases (Ragin 1992: 5). This leads to the researcher engaging in the research 
to “dirty his hands” (Hirsch et al. 1990: 43) with in-depth empirical research and the 
consequent emergence of a multiplicity of factors, not necessarily strictly coupled, 
which hinder the explanatory power of the analysis. Second, the rootedness of a 
focussed study in a given social, historical, and temporal context hampers the possibility 
of generalising findings across time and space because of their ‘context sensitivity’ 
(Patton 1990: 40). Third, both the contextual character of the case study and its weak 
causal explanatory power lead to the criticism that “such analyses devote so much 
attention to how the result comes about that critics complain that the explanations are 
tautological” (Becker 1992: 209).
These limits are inbred in the adopted methodological approach, which has been 
chosen in line with the aims of the research as well as with the epistemological position 
adopted by the researcher: for this reason they may also appear -  in her view -  like as 
many strengths. First, research on institutional change or on Europeanisation using in- 
depth qualitative analysis reveals the priority of the researcher’s investigation to gain
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heuristic learning rather than theoretical stringency (Gualini 2005: 499). Second, part of 
the criticism moves from an epistemological bias towards an evolutionary, positivistic 
interpretation of the social sciences, which considers the categories produced by the 
research as social laws, rather than analytical tools. However “[c]ase studies have now 
acquired a different status. No longer located in an evolutionary perspective that 
transcends it, nor defined by its incomparability, a case becomes the opportunity to 
discover knowledge about how it is both specific to and representative of a larger 
phenomenon. Its originality does not keep us from making comparisons, and its 
representativeness does not refer to a metasocial law, but to analytical categories” 
(Wieviorka 1992: 170). Thus what is considered in the comparison of responses to 
institutional change in Corsica and Sardinia may be noteworthy in the study of other 
actors locked in paths of dependency.
Finally, even assuming as a limit of the in-depth analysis of a case study its weak, 
causal explanatory power, this limit would be compensated by the greater richness the 
analysis offers from the ‘understanding’ side of research methods. In fact, while 
avoiding the undervaluing of the object of his or her study, the researcher deepens the 
case study analysis in order to reveal unexpected features that challenge traditional 
views on the matter, to discover subvarieties of what seemed on the surface to be one 
sole thing, or to confirm or disconfirm what is already known with new, updated 
evidence (Becker 1992: 210). The stereotypical or simplistic representation of the 
regions, for instance, is certainly rejected by the present research, offering a different 
view of the two islands.
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SECTION II 
Regional policies and regionalisation in Corsica and Sardinia: 
the ‘national model9
In the first section we saw that institutional change is constrained by previously adopted 
paths. Because the ‘new’ is embedded in the ‘old’, in order to appreciate the quality of 
the possible change of regional actors towards the model organizing territorial and 
power relations proposed by the EU, we need to consider their adaptation to the 
‘national model’ hitherto established. Thus, before considering the response of the 
island regions of Corsica and Sardinia to an EU policy launched in the 1990s promoting 
interregional cooperation {section 7/7), in this section I will build an analytical history 
on the evolution of territorial relations and regional policies on the islands since the end 
of World War Two.
In fact both France and Italy -  following the principle of national solidarity — 
launched development policies aimed at tackling the backwardness and peripherality 
within their territories, which were increasingly demanded by regionalist movements 
also calling for the protection of their local language and traditions. However, central 
mistrust of the potential of the endogenous resources of Corsica and Sardinia -  still 
structured in traditional socio-economic patterns -  led to the adoption of exogenous 
models of development aiming to launch modernisation and integration in the shortest 
possible term. Regionalisation was mainly (when not formally, in practice) defined 
according to an image of territory structured according to a centre/periphery model, and 
policy planning for backward regions was defined ‘top-down’ by central governments’ 
bureaucrats.
The frequent distorted use of the public funds destined for regional development, 
often paid out to the regional elite by national politicians in exchange for electoral 
consensus, degraded civic and political life on the islands and frustrated their 
expectations for future change. As we shall see, there were notable endeavours moving 
towards an alternative model in organizing territorial relations and development 
policies, but they were not yet widely legitimised. It is only since the 1980s (in France) 
and 1990s (in Italy) that wide-ranging efforts to redefine relations between state and 
society were launched, and regional policies revised in the light of those new reflections 
and the failures of previous models.
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“Comme la belle France seraitplus heureuse si, 
au lieu d'avoir un centre elle en avait dix, 
dispensant autour d ’eux la lumiere et la richesse” 42
Chapter 4 - Regional policy and the Corsican question in France
The island of Corsica is a relatively recent territorial acquisition of the French state. 
Located in the centre of the Western-Mediterranean, the history of the ‘island of beauty’ 
was punctuated by external raids and occupations by different seafaring peoples. The 
most long-lasting influence on local customs, culture and architecture came from 
Genoese rule, which lasted nearly four centuries. A crucial episode in the collective 
identity of the islanders is the ‘Corsican Revolution’, a period of prolonged unrest 
against foreign rule, which culminated in 1755 with the election of Pascal Paoli as 
General of the Corsican nation. Under his rule a Constitution was adopted, a liberal 
legal code introduced, and agriculture and education encouraged for the new 
independent Republic,43 which, however, did not have a long life: in 1768 Genoa, 
recognising its inability to maintain control over the island, sold its sovereignty rights to 
France, which defeated Corsican patriots at Ponte Novo in May 1979.
Corsica was thus ‘attached to the hexagon’ both before the French Revolution (as a 
dependency of the monarchy) and after it (as one of the departments further sealed in 
the centralistic structure by one of the island’s most distinguished sons, Napoleon 
Bonaparte).44 French institutions were rooted in a long-established ideological tradition 
of etatisme (a conception expressing a ‘state above society’ relation for which the state 
has the right and duty to intervene to shape the destiny of the country).45 State 
interventionism and control also extended to the cultural and the social mores of the 
periphery, leading to a “gradual but ruthless suppression of all linguistic and regional 
identities, and the idea of nation became largely synonymous with that of the state 
itself’ (Cole 1998: 6).
Thus French was imposed as the official language of administration, education, 
commerce and politics on the island, but Corsican remained the spoken language of the
42 This citation from J.W. Goethe (1749-1832) was quoted in the Hautreux-Rochefort Report (1964), 
which, within the debate in those years on territorial development, supported the need to develop 
metropolitan areas alternative to Paris, able to redress an imbalanced spatial pattern of territorial 
development. Loeiz (2002), p.23.
43 The city of Corte, in the centre of the island, was both the capital of the new state and the seat of a 
University which, founded in 1765, was closed by the French four years later. Hudson (1997), p.xxii.
44 Napoleon Bonaparte was bom in Ajaccio on the 15th August 1769, just a few months after the defeat in 
May of Corsican patriots by the French army in Ponte Novo.
45 Wright (1998), p.361. The legacy dated back to the Ancien Regime (assimilating royal authority to 
divine will) and particularly to the politics of state interventionism and central control launched by Louis 
XIV and his minister Colbert. Stevens (1996), p.8.
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inhabitants, still organized in clans (social networks based on customary schemes of 
self-help and mutual aid derived from extended family circles). The clans were headed 
by the capurali (or principali), who effectively ruled the island (Ramsay 1983: 13). It 
was with these individuals that the various national representatives had to ally 
themselves in order to exert their control: the exchange was between “the undoubted 
influence of the clan leaders and to give them in return patronage and favours to 
distribute amongst their clientele” (Ramsay 1983: 13). Still today family names are 
often a more reliable label than party affiliations and political posts are ‘inherited’ by 
sons from fathers, which is why clanisme was repeatedly denounced by contemporary 
regionalist movements as one of the main obstacles to political reform in Corsica 
(Briquet 1997).
At the end of the 18th century Francois Miot, the General Administrator of the 
island, granted a series of concessions {les aretes Miot) covering customs, 
administrative, judicial and fiscal fields, originally conceived as temporary derogation 
to national regulations. The poor conditions of the island gradually improved during the 
19th century, when a railway and new roads were constructed, agriculture was expanded 
bringing under cultivation maquis areas, primary schools were established, and banditry 
was strongly suppressed. However, the agrarian collapse at the end of the century and 
the losses in manpower due to emigration and later to heavy conscription for the World 
Wars interrupted development plans put forward by the government, leaving the island 
in a condition of social and economic backwardness that triggered the resurgence of 
banditry.46 The increased gap with the rest of the country, which was meanwhile 
experiencing the first wave of industrialisation, was also in terms of delayed socio­
political modernisation: politics on the island continued to be organized around local 
notables, while entrepreneurship, trade unions and civic associationism were almost 
non-existent47
tfi thIn the period straddling the end of the 19 and the beginning of the 20 century, 
France experienced an outbreak of regional movements (in Alsace, Bretagne,
46 Tracing the history of the demographic evolution of the island is very problematic, because censuses 
were very imprecise and often inflated for electoral reasons. Available data show that emigration was 
quite high in the 17th and 18th centuries, diminished in the 19th century, and grew again after 1918, 
especially to the US and the French colonies (where Corsicans represented a large percentage of the 
administration), as well as towards mainland France (especially Marseille). Hudson (1997), pp. xxiii- 
xxiv); Antonetti (1990).
47 Gramsci’s thesis on the lack of an organized working class in Southern Italy because of its late 
modernisation is also applicable to the Corsican case. The regeneration of trade unionism was mainly a 
top-down initiative bom with development policies in the mid-1960s, given central planning’s attempts to 
bypass the traditional network of power of the local notables in order to include les forces vives of 
society. Crettiez (1999), p.275.
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Languedoc, and Pays Basque), mainly expressing the defence by conservative 
peripheral elites of local identities and rural traditions against republicanism’s 
modernising reforms (Pasquier 2003: 123). Also, in Corsica there was a revival of 
awareness of the specificity of insular identity and culture, bringing again to the 
surface the old conflict between its Corso-Genoese and French traditions.49 However, 
when in 1938 the Italian Fascist press called for the annexation of Corsica, ‘terra 
italianissima\ the answer of the population reunited in Bastia was the solemn oath 
“Before the world, and with all our soul, we swear in our glories, on our tombs, and on 
our cradles, to live and die FrenchF (Ramsay 1983: x; Antonetti 1990: 461). After 
Corsica’s occupation by Mussolini’s troops in 1942, the 4Operation Vesuve\ launched 
by de Gaulle in October 1943 made Corsica the first French departement to be liberated. 
The island would remain one of the most Gaullist regions: “Corsican identification with 
France was never higher than at the moment of the Liberation”.50 Unfortunately, this 
entente was not destined to have a long life.
The challenges of territorial planning to economic growth
The government of the Fourth French Republic -  the political regime created by the 
1946 Constitution -  faced both the needs of post-war reconstruction and those of 
modernisation of a predominantly rural society with a stagnant economy that was still 
mostly based on agriculture (Hall 1986: 140). The strategy chosen for the rapid upturn 
of the country’s economy, which in the spate of thirty years (les Trente Glorieuses) 
transformed France into an urban industrialised country and one of the leading world 
economies, was one of state-led growth characterised by the “expansion of the 
nationalized sector, a highly interventionist industrial policy towards the private sector, 
the extensive use of diplomatic pressure in support of exports and the development of a 
system of national economic planning” (Hall 1986: 140).
48 In 1896 appeared A Tramuntana, the first review in the Corsican language and in 1922 the autonomist 
movement Partitu Corsu d'Azione was founded, which became Partitu Corsu Autonomistu in 1927.
49 Corsica was considered as one of the lands that had been stolen from Italy, and thus was not yet 
redeemed (terre irredente) by the Italian movement of '’irredentismo'. In his Primato morale e civile degli 
Italiani (1843) Gioberti called on Corsicans to free themselves from France, while in the 1840s Mazzini 
repeatedly tried to involve them in the movement that eventually led toward Italian unity (Risorgimento). 
After the fall of Napoleon III the dislike on the part of the republicans in power of an island that had 
given birth to the first tyrant of France led the radical deputy Clemenceau to propose to the National 
Assembly a separation of Corsica from the Republic. However, Vittorio Emanuele II (the new king of 
Italy) believed that an Italian annexation of the island would not have benefited good-neighbour relations 
with France. Antonetti (1990), pp.457-459.
50 Ramsay (1983), p.23. Besides this emotional link with the memory of General de Gaulle, it is a more 
general tendency toward conservatism that characterises electoral behaviour on the island that can explain 
the continuing support for Gaullism in Corsica. See Antonetti (1990), p.484.
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The centrepiece of the strategy was national economic planning, initiated in 1946 
with the establishment of an independent national planning commission (Commissariat 
General du Plan), reporting to the Prime Minister and headed by Jean Monnet. The 
CGP’s main task was the preparation of a five year national socio-economic planning 
document (Plan de modernisation et d ’equipement), positing a series of economic 
scenarios for the following years and giving indications on the industrial goals and 
techniques to be adopted in order to reorganize and modernise the productive system of 
the nation (Hall 1986: 140). The CGP could rely on data provided by the Ministry of 
Finance and the newly-created National Agency for the Analysis of Economic Statistics 
(INSEE) as well as the advice of a network of committees (‘modernisation 
commissions’) whose opinions were integrated into the draft of the Plan to be discussed 
in front of the National Assembly before preparing the final draft (Hall 1986: 141). The 
correct implementation of the large-scale decisions of the Plan was to be assured by 
functionaries trained at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA), which opened in 
1945 and soon gained an influential position. The ENA graduates thought “that the 
restoration and rebuilding of the French economy depended upon them as much as, if 
not more than, upon the politicians” (Stevens 1996: 137). This sense of mission of the 
enarques often spilled over into an arrogant attitude vis a vis local authorities: they “had 
a strong feeling of competence, modernity and general interest, and believed they were 
up against tradition, self-interest, or inefficiency in the province. The weakness of grass­
roots politics would be overcome by a technocratic elite oriented towards the future” 
(Balme and Jouve 1996: 225).
The first Plans, developed under the urgency of economic recovery following the 
World Wars, were mostly concerned with the need to invest Marshall Plan aid and 
scarce domestic resources in those industrial sectors (such as steel, coal, transport and 
electricity infrastructures, and some agricultural modernisation) and territorial areas 
which could drive faster national economic growth (Hall 1986: 145-146). This choice 
did not go unchallenged. In 1949 a Directorate for territorial planning was set up at the 
Ministere de la reconstruction et de Vurbanisme (MRU), and soon entered into 
competition with the CGP: although officially the latter had responsibility over 
economic rebuilding and the former for urban reconstruction, in practice, the MRU 
challenged the CGP’s economic and sectoral approach by proposing a more integrated 
approach to industrial decentralisation (Pasquier 2003: 109). The friction came out into 
the open in 1947 with the publication of the book Paris et le desert frangais by the 
economist Jean Frangois Gravier, employed at the MRU, that accused the first Monnet
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Plan (1948-1952) of further exacerbating the existing imbalance between the Paris area 
(concentrating economic and political power) and the demographic and industrial 
decline of the rest of the national territory. Only a territorialisation and regionalisation 
of the national Plan, he argued, could have allowed a spatially balanced development of 
the country. The book was published with the support of the Federalist movement, 
looking at territorial policies as a possible field in which to raise the regionalist cause, 
discredited because of its previous links to reactionary groups involved with the Vichy 
regime. The Federalists’ insertion of regionalist themes within the new framework of a 
united and federal Europe aimed to gain the favour of local modernising elites and 
present them as part of the wider struggle for greater citizen autonomy from state tutelle 
(Pasquier 2003: 106).
In 1950 Claudius-Petit (at the head of the MRU from 1948-1952) reported 
Gravier’s arguments to the Council of Ministers during a discourse. Starting from the 
housing shortage created by industrial expansion in urban areas, he blamed the Monnet 
Plan for not having considered those consequences when locating industrial poles: 
“What does a powerful economic structure and even a developed social structure matter 
[he challenged fellow Ministers] i f  the physical and moral health o f a large part o f the 
inhabitants wilts in a miserable lifeT’ (Claudius-Petit 2003: 131). Claudius-Petit 
persuaded the government of the need to have a national policy of territorial planning 
(iamenagement du territoire) able to match growth with quality of life. A ‘green book’ 
prepared by his Directorate suggested among the priority policy options the 
decentralisation of industrialisation investments and cultural resources, the 
modernisation of agriculture and the improvement of services in the tourism sector. 
These arguments fitted with the widely legitimised Keynesian paradigm, with its search 
for a balance between economic growth and social equality. Thus in the same year a 
national fund for territorial planning (FNAT) was created and a central commission for 
territorial planning studies was established at the MRU. Meanwhile the regional 
movements strengthened their demands to the government for a fairer distribution of 
resources within the national territory (Pasquier 2003: 109).
In 1955 the CGP decided to group the departements into 21 Regional Action Areas 
(RAA), subnational planning areas where Regional Action Programmes (RAP) were 
implemented. The twenty-one regions corresponded to today’s regions (with the 
exception of Corsica, merged until 1972 with the Provence-Cote d'Azur region). 
However, the meaning of the move was underplayed and explained with reference to the 
fact that economic restructuring and infrastructure development would have been more
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effective if planned at an intermediate level between the central government and the 
departments {functional regionalism). The RAP drafted for Corsica by the CGP in 1957 
constituted “the first official recognition of Corsica’s special difficulties and the first 
suggestion as to how the island’s problems might be tackled on the economic front” 
(Ramsay 1983: 26). Following a technocratic approach, the Plan tried to identify which 
were the sectors where investments could have spread growth more rapidly, neglecting 
the delicate social aspects of development of the island (Kofinan 1981: 175). In order to 
lay the foundations of the tourist industry -  identified as the priority sector to boost the 
island’s development after the successful example of the PACA region -  a company 
was set up, the Societepour I ’equipement touristique de la Corse (SETCO). The other 
preoccupation of the Plan was to halt the decline of agriculture: to modernise the 
agricultural sector it provided for the development of the Eastern Plain through a 
diversification of an agricultural system relying too heavily on wine production 
(Kofinan 1981: 175). The Plan also thought that the Eastern Plain’s development, 
although run primarily by Corsicans, would probably have needed additional, expert 
handling, most likely coming from the French settlers in North Africa. Also in this case, 
a developmental agency was devised, the SOMIVAC (Societe pour la mise en valeur de 
la Corse). The rationale behind these structures fell within the logic of technocratic 
modernisation of central planning services, trying to impose innovative methods of 
public management as well as to bypass the power of local notables (Briquet 1997: 
272).
The weakness of political institutions during the Fourth Republic on the one hand 
allowed for the active interventionism in economic planning, in the hope of boosting 
France’s economy more rapidly than that of other Western European countries (Cole 
1998: 19); on the other hand, it paralysed its foreign policy. Involved in armed conflicts 
in a futile attempt to block nationalist movements following the decolonisation process, 
the French state had progressively to retreat from Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco: 
“France was gradually forced to accept that it was no longer a first-rank international 
player, that it could no longer sustain a far-flung empire, and that its interests lay in 
cooperating with others in Europe, and the Atlantic alliance” (Cole 1998: 18). However, 
in Algeria French colonial settlers (pieds noirs), supported by the armed forces, refused 
to give greater autonomy -  let alone independence -  to the predominantly Muslim 
Algerians. In May 1958 the Fourth Republic collapsed after the insurrection in Algiers, 
where military forces threatened to invade mainland France if General de Gaulle was
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not brought to power and, to reinforce their point, invaded Corsica with paratroopers 
(Cole 1998: 19,22).
Functional regionalism and regional movements in Corsica
De Gaulle became the first president of the Fifth Republic in 1958, and soon imposed 
his personal authority and the role of the presidency as the institution granting political 
stability to the new Republic (Cole 1998: 24). To foster the renaissance of a patriotic 
spirit of self-confidence in the French people he sought to re-establish in the economic 
domain the national ambition that had been frustrated in the military field: his 
consolidation of the Franco-German tandem as the motor of EU integration and the 
adoption of an international role more independent from the US51 both moved in this 
direction (Lacour and Delamarre, 2003: 25-26). National economic planning, which 
had started as a relatively technical operation managed by competent civil servants, 
under de Gaulle became increasingly exposed to political pressures from the 
government. The Prime Minister started to appoint Planning Commissioners according 
to political considerations and the Plan became seen increasingly as the government’s 
creature and responsibility (Hall 1986: 150). However, economic planning was also 
increasingly subject to the requirements of the international market and European 
integration. Thus the main feature of French ‘nouvelle politique industries  was 
translated into selective incentives given to support a few national firms of international 
size in most industrial sectors (Hall 1986:148).
Despite opposition from the prefectures and departmental administration, the 
region was confirmed again as the appropriate level to plan economic action and 
territorial readjustments (Balme and Jouve 1996: 226). In 1962 the Delegation a 
VAmenagement du Territoire et a VAction Regionale (DATAR) was created with the 
task of coordinating different ministerial actions in territorial planning and regional 
policy. A year later regional prefects were set up in each RAA in order to coordinate 
state interventions. They were flanked by Commissions for Regional Economic 
Development (CODER): local consultative bodies representing the first institutional 
structure at regional level, but lacking proper financial resources and having a mere 
advisory role (Pasquier 2003: 101; Kofman 1981: 174; Hayward 1969). The DATAR
51 French ‘exceptionalism’ in foreign and security policy was justified by de Gaulle in terms of national 
independence from the Atlantic Alliance: in 1961 he declared that France would have built its own 
nuclear missiles rather than buying them from the US, and in 1966 he announced withdrawing from 
NATO’s integrated military command structure. Cole (1998), p.25.
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shifted the approach of the Plan from earlier large-scale projects to a variety of actions 
also directed toward areas located in the South-West of the diagonal Le Havre- 
Marseille, traditionally identifying the dividing line of the wealthier industrialised core 
-  which had attracted most of the investments of the earlier Plan (Lacour 2003: 28). 
Following the theory of industrial poles of development promoted by the economist 
Francis Perroux, the 4th (1962-1965) and 5th Plans (1966-1970) launched a spatial 
policy of urban rebalancing within the eight major cities of the hexagon, which aimed at 
offering to local enterprises and populations the services that, until then, were available 
only in Paris (Lacour 2003: 39).
Not one of the industrial policies covered Corsica, whose territory fell under 
DATAR’s category of ‘rural renovation’. The Plan for the island, shelved during the 
crisis of the 4th Republic was reactivated in 1962 when, following the ratification of the 
Evian agreements granting Algeria’s independence, it served to facilitate the re-
c*y
incorporation of around 17,000 French pieds noirs settlers, often of Corsican origin. 
Owing to the Plan the island’s infrastructure was improved, nearly 30,000 hectares were 
reclaimed, and modem techniques and the cultivation of citrus {clementines) and kiwi 
were introduced. In order to spread modernising ideas and methods in the region, the 
Agency tried to use alternative networks to those controlled by local notables, by 
establishing direct relations with the socio-economic actors operating on the island 
(Briquet 1997: 273-275). For the same reason a high proportion of the incentives for 
crops in the reclaimed areas were allocated by the SOMIVAC to the pieds noirs, rather 
than to established local farmers. Resentment on the part of Corsicans involved in 
viticulture was partly justified by the fact that the activities of those who had maintained 
control of the quality wine areas (such as the Sartene or Cap Corse) were increasingly 
challenged by the large-scale production of ordinary wines initiated by some of the 
pieds noirs, which had a more entrepreneurial and unscrupulous attitude. However, 
more generally, local resentment was due to the feeling of expropriation and betrayal on 
the part of central government, which had granted to those latest arrivals the financial 
and fiscal incentives locals had long requested but never received (Antonetti 1990: 469-
52 De Gaulle’s decision to grant independence to Algeria was met with fury by French settlers and the 
army in Algiers, and there were several military uprisings and attempts to assassinate the General. Many 
of the settlers were of Corsican origin, and Corsica was in fact the only French departement to vote 
against the Evian agreements. Cole (1998), p.23; Hintjens, Loughlin and Olivesi (1995), p. 121; Antonetti 
(1990), p.468.
53 However, increased competition from other Mediterranean countries during the 1970s hit viticulture, as 
well as other local produce sectors on the island. Also, the traditional sector of ovine and bovine 
production, despite the funds given by the state and the EU, did not develop. Antonetti (1990), pp.490- 
491.
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470). The expansion of the tourist industry on the island was also not having the impact 
hoped for by local development: in fact the modernising approach of the SETCO 
encouraged the expansion of large-scale tourist resorts, mainly owned by French and 
foreign companies and recruiting personnel from outside the island,54 while neglecting 
the more modest forms of accommodation typically owned by the locals, such as family 
hotels.
The perpetuation on the island of conditions of backwardness produced by 
inadequate internal and external infrastructure and communication, the absence of 
research centres or universities, low wage levels and high unemployment rates (masked 
by the high emigration and official statistics, which amalgamated Corsica’s data within 
the PACA region), became more striking in the eyes of the Corsicans in comparison to 
the growing affluence in mainland France, where many of them emigrated either to find 
jobs or to continue their studies (mainly in Marseille, Paris or Toulon).55 Rising 
expectations boosted the regionalist movement -  which until then had mainly concerned 
itself with issues of economic development56 -  that spread throughout the island and the 
mainland presenting detailed projects to promote structural and political change in the
cn
region, supported by the work of Corsican student associations and newspapers. 
Among the main regionalist movements there were the UCA (Union Corse VAvenir), 
founded by the socialists Charles Santoni and Dominique Alfonsi, and the UPC (Unione 
di U Populu Corsu), formed in 1964 by a middle-class group from Bastia led by 
Edmond and Max Simeoni, and linked to the Centre d ’Etudes et de Defense de la Corse 
(CEDIC).
In 1966 the CEDIC and UCA united in a common Front Regionaliste Corse (FRC), 
denouncing how the island was prey to both the French colonialist regime and the local
54 “In 1974 only 28% of the salaried employees in hotels were Corsicans, 43% were French from the 
mainland and 29% foreigners”. Kofinan (1981), p. 177.
55 Unlike Corsica, Brittany, a peripheral region, saw in that period the location of large industries, 
research centres, and a special regional plan for its territory. The different treatment could be explained 
with reference to different factors: the lower location costs with respect to Corsica, and the good 
networking of the economic actors and their cohesive lobbying through the Breton members of 
parliament. In fact, also thanks to the strong mobilisation of the local authorities and the socio-economic 
actors united in the CELIB (Comite d ’etudes et de liaison des interets Bretons), at the end of the 1960s a 
major project developing transport infrastructures in the region (Le Plan routier Breton) was realised. 
Pasquier (2003); Lacour and Delamarre (2003), p.58.
56 The most well-known had been tLe mouvement du 29 novembre 1959’ which, animated by the 
communists and led by Paul Silvani, arguing that Corsica was still not fully integrated into the French 
state, called on the latter to intervene to grant the island basic infrastructure and economic measures to 
improve its backwardness, also in consideration of its insular status.
57 In 1960 the periodical Union Corse was first published and a year later the Association des etudiants 
corses (AEC) was created in Paris by Dominique Alfonsi, uniting students o f socialist sympathies, and in 
1962 the Union nationale des etudiants corses (UNEC) was formed in Corsica. In 1964 the UC and AEC 
groups united in the Union Corse de I ’avenir (UCA).
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clan system, and demanding an end to this state of affairs.58 A year later the less 
ideological fringe of the movement led by the Simeoni brothers created the ARC 
{Action Regionaliste Corse), defining itself as Corsican, democratic, and committed to 
“the economic, social and cultural development of Corsica through the achievement of 
the status of an autonomous region within the framework of the French Republic”.59 
While sharing many of the FRC themes, the ARC tried to reach a wider audience: 
assisted by a new newspaper in the Corsican language Arritti (1966), its aim was to gain 
support from the traditionally right-wing Corsican electorate living on the island who 
were reluctant to support the FRC (which was mainly composed of cultured Corsicans 
with socialist orientations, residing on ‘the continent’).
Regionalist considerations on the importance of regional policy collided with that 
of central planning services’, mainly seeing it in terms of a technical matter necessary to 
spur national economic growth (Balme and Jouve 1996: 226). Also, de Gaulle’s later 
project for further regionalisation was essentially supported by arguments functional to 
economic growth.60 However, when social unrest and regional movements started to 
gain a more radical dimension, de Gaulle added a political justification and presented 
regionalisation as 7a grande affaire’ of his presidency. In launching the campaign for 
the 1969 referendums -  which included regionalisation reforms -  he stressed that the 
upgrading of regions to the status of collectivites territoriales with elected regional 
councils would have allowed ordinary citizens to overcome the growing feeling of 
alienation and distance from institutions. However, after the victory of the ‘no’ front 
(promoted by local authorities and prefectural corps) de Gaulle had to resign and 
regionalisation reforms were dropped.
Regional voices and national deafness: the Corsican question as a national issue
President George Pompidou (1969-1974) tried to maintain continuity with de Gaulle’s 
politics in most policy areas and especially those at the core of French ‘exceptionalism’:
58 Antonetti (1990), p.477. The introduction of the postal vote in 1958, given the high numbers of 
emigrant Corsicans who became entitled to vote and the “notoriously inaccurate electoral registers”, 
increased the difiusion of electoral fraud. Hudson (1997), p.xxx.
59 Though declaring itself apolitical, the ARC presented a regionalist candidate at the elections, Max 
Simeoni, who was one of the founders of the CEDIC. However, electoral results between 1967 and 1971 
were disappointing, thus the ARC decided to concentrate on militant activism. Antonetti (1990), p.478.
60 “Z, ’evolution generate port, en effet, notre pays vers un equilibre nouveau. L ’effort multiseculaire de 
centralisation, qui Jut Iongtemps necessaire pour realiser et maintenir son unite malgre les divergences 
des provinces qui etaient successivement rattachees ne s ’impose plus desormais. Au contraire, ce sont les 
activites regionales qui apparaissent comme les ressorts de la puissance economique de demain”, quoted 
in Alvergne and Musso (2003), p. 15.
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foreign policy61 and interventionist economic management (Cole 1998: 30, 31). 
However, the intensification of presidential interventionism, through closer supervision 
in industrial and urban policy and control over the ruling Gaullist party, was 
characteristic of his weaker political legitimacy and charismatic leadership (Cole 1998: 
29). Further regionalisation of development policies was also continued, although 
presented in terms of functional moves to economic competitiveness. The objectives of 
the 6th Plan (1971-1975) were territorialised and regions were involved in the 
negotiations with the CGP via the DATAR (Alvergne and Musso 2003: 54). In 1972 a 
presidential decree set up regions as etablissements publics provided with a largely 
advisory role in economic development, and a limited budget for infrastructure 
improvements and studies. Corsica was eventually separated from the Provence-Cote 
d’Azur grouping and become the 22nd RAA. Two regional bodies with advisory 
functions were set up: the Comite de Developpement Economique de la Corse 
(CODEC), composed of local members of the national Chambers and Corsican 
department and communes; and the Conseil Economique et Social (CES), made up of 
representatives of the socio-professional organizations, where the autonomists fringe 
played an important role. These innovations notably reinforced the visibility and 
legitimisation of socio-economic actors on the island, increasingly challenging the 
traditionally undisputed power of local notables (Briquet 1997: 277).
Meanwhile, a second territorial planning document {Schema d ’amenagement de la 
Corse) had been prepared by the Mission Interministerielle in Corsica, where 
technocratic suggestions on how to launch the Corsican economy were moderated by 
the recognition that growth could not be the only criterion informing development. The 
Schema presented measures for the renewal of the tradition of raising livestock,
f/yconsolidating wine and citrus fruit production, preserving the natural environment, 
interlinking projects for the development of coastal areas with those to halt the decline 
of interior areas, and even foresaw the introduction of some light industry on the island 
(Kofman 1981: 176). However, the document did not critically revise the problems 
created by the previous Plan and reiterated its logic in concentrating intervention in 
selected areas (such as the Easter Plain) and its consideration of tourism merely in
61 Pompidou was, however, much less of an enthusiastic supporter of the Franco-German axis in 
European integration and retained a more open approach to the US and UK, for which he removed the 
veto for entry into the EU. Cole (1998), p.30.
62 The PNR Corse, one of the Parc naturels regionaux created by the Decree of 1st March 1967, was 
established in 1971. It extends for 350,894 ha. and covers 184 communes. Lacour (2003), p.46.
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quantitative terms, without gauging the impact of the policies in terms of social costs for 
the environment and the local population.
Criticism was focused on the Schema by the agencies invited to give their opinion, 
such as the CODEC and the trade unions (Kofinan 1981: 177). However, the situation 
was made worse by the fact that, before drafting the Schema, the DATAR had 
commissioned the Hudson Institute to prepare a report on development in Corsica, 
which it did not deem suitable for publication. The Hudson Report criticised policies 
adopted by the French government up until then and proposed two alternative scenarios: 
either to continue promoting waves of immigration leading to the wiping out of local 
culture or to define a policy aimed at the protection of the identity of the region and to 
give voice to the will of the Corsican population (Kofinan 1981: 177). A copy of the 
Hudson report fell into the hands of the FRC movement that -  once it realised that the 
suggestions had not been taken into account by the DATAR -  replied with the 
publication of the document Main basse sur une ile (Tillage of an island’), 
corroborating the colonisation thesis and arguing that it could only be solved with the 
recognition of a statute of regional autonomy that placed in Corsican hands decisions 
over the island’s future.
Probably because of the declared socialist alignment of the FRC and the fact that its 
leaders were mainly intellectuals of the diaspora, the document did not have the impact 
on the local population that its authors would have hoped for (Antonetti 1990: 477- 
478). Thus a ‘corsification’ of regionalist movements was launched to solve this 
problem: the FRC changed its name to Partitu di u Populu Corsu (PPC) and the ARC, 
while retaining its acronym, became Azzione per a Rinascita Corsa. The number of 
attacks of clandestine armed wings of regionalist movements against government 
properties started to spread across the island, the movements demanding that the French 
government formally recognise the Corsican people and nation.64 Increasingly covered 
by the media, by 1974 the Corsican question had became a public issue: on the island, 
where the population was divided between support for regionalists’ demands and doubts
63 The lowest of the two projections made to estimate tourist capacity by 1985 foresaw a number of 
tourists which was seven times that of the local population. Kofinan (1981), p. 176.
64 In December 1973 the FPCL (Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazioni) chose military action as its 
strategy for ‘liberation’ from France, as declared in its manifesto Ultimatum to the French Government, in 
which it asked for the recognition of the Corsican people as a nation according to UN criteria. The FPCL 
was involved in the famous ‘Red Mud Affair’: in the face of state indifference, it bombed one of the 
Tuscan boats dumping effluent mud from a Montedison chemical plant forty miles from the Corsican 
coast. Dumping continued for months, until five responsible directors of the Montedison chemical plant 
received suspended prison sentences and heavy fines in a court action in Leghorn.
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about their means of action,65 and in mainland France, where it became one of the 
standard reasons for political confrontations at elections.
The vicious circle between regionalist violence and state repression
During the campaign for the presidential elections in 1974, the declarations of socialist 
leader Francois Mitterrand, visiting Ajaccio to show his sympathy for “the right to be 
different” (Antonetti 1990: 479), spread the idea that better times could come with the 
Left in power. Albeit narrowly, the victory went, to Valery Giscard d’Estaing (1974- 
1981), who explicitly rejected the notion of a ‘Corsican people’ and recognised 
Corsica’s diversity only within the larger picture of local differences within the Patrie: 
“il n ’y  a pas de probleme corse, il y  a des problemes en Corse” (quoted in Crettiez 
1999: 209). During his campaign, Giscard d’Estaing had presented himself both as the 
heir of General de Gaulle and a pro-European reformist with modernist ideas. However, 
the possibilities for internal action were severely constrained by the external conditions 
created by the international economic context (Cole 1998: 30). In fact, the recession 
prompted by the 1973 oil crisis challenged the mono-sectoral model of production on 
which the ‘Trente Glorieuses’ had based its success. State intervention in the economy 
was reduced and incentives were reserved for firms and regions that seemed better 
equipped to respond to the changing needs of competition in an increasingly globalised 
market. The 7th Plan (1976-1981) continued on the path towards more direct 
involvement of regions in planning, drawing closer to later formalisations in the Contrat 
de Plan between State and regions (Lacour and Delamarre 2003: 55; Alvergne and 
Musso 2003: 241). The etatist foundations of national planning became increasingly 
challenged by the difiusion in public opinion of arguments defending the right to self- 
determination of local communities, which could not be manipulated in the name of 
national interests (Lacour and Delamarre 2003: 62). Faced with declining legitimacy, 
national territorial planning retrenched its efforts to basic guidelines -  such as measures 
of urban policy -  and a sectoral approach led by more day-to-day concerns (Alvergne 
and Musso 2003: 219,220).
In Corsica the victory of Giscard d’Estaing disappointed the ARC movement, 
which reacted by publishing the document Autonomia: the only solution to the colonial
65 There was broad support from the population on issues ranging from land speculation and expansion of 
large-scale tourism favouring capital from outside of the island, to the stationing on the island of French 
Foreign Legion troops, or plans to carry out nuclear testing and dump atomic waste on the island. 
However, the violent strategy chosen by the FPCL had created a movement of protest among Corsicans, 
both on the island and abroad. Hudson (1997), p.xxx; Antonetti (1990), p.479.
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system responsible for Corsica’s decay, it claimed, was the provision of an autonomous 
statute for the island. The statute, justified by the island’s territorial features, should 
have presented a de jure recognition of the Corsican people -  albeit within the French 
Republic -  and made provisions for the setting of regional institutions in the 
administration of specific development policies, as well as other measures enhancing 
local identity.66 This time the document found a strong backing amongst the Corsican 
population, which in previous years had been involved in the initiatives of the ARC in a 
process of emotional reassertion of the founding myths of Corsican identity: the use of 
the local language, the adoption of a Corsican national anthem and flag, the cult of the 
founding father Pascal Paoli (‘ UBabbu’).
Perceiving the sensitivity of the situation, the government revised its approach to 
development policy on the island and asked an experienced administrator and manager, 
Libert Bou, to mediate with the local population, in order to turn local needs into an 
effective policy. After having listened to politicians, administrators, regionalist groups 
and organizations on the island, Bou prepared a Charter of Development, which spoke 
of harmonious and balanced development, protection of the cultural heritage and sites, 
and mentioned Corsicans’ resentment against large-scale tourism led by outsiders. The 
policy recommendations of the Charter included the need to find a reasonable balance 
between the number of tourists and the local population and included measures for the 
renewal of rural renovation aid for the pastoral economy (Kofinan 1981: 77). The 
document was quite innovative compared to previous Plans, whose failures were, 
however, only reported in terms of social tensions arising from the launching of 
modernisation processes in the island. The Interministerial Committee, which had once 
considered the Charter, submitted it to the government that adopted it in July 1975, 
though changing its title from 4 Charte’ -  suggesting the language of rights used by the 
autonomists -  to 4Programme’ -  better befitting governmental concerns over economic 
development. Corsican suspicion over centralist good faith was also lifted by the 
creation in 1975 of two Corsican departements (Corse du Sud and Haute Corse) which, 
although presented by the government as a first step to appease demands for a wider
66 Among the development policies to be administered directly by the region, the book included EU 
regional policies, as well as national funds for the improvement of transport, the integration of coastal and 
interior areas and the preservation of the natural environment. Measures for the safeguarding of regional 
identity included the recognition of bilingualism and the reopening of the old University in Corte. See 
Kofinan (1981), p. 179.
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reform of decentralisation, was interpreted by many Corsicans as a tacit intent to
f k lundermine their resolve.
/ r o
The growing wave of mistrust and violence against the government on the island 
reached its peak in 1975 with the dramatic episode of Aleria when armed ARC men 
occupied a pieds noirs’ property to denounce his continuing illegal practice of 
‘chaptalisation’.69 The action resulted in the deaths of two of the 1200 policemen that, 
backed by helicopters and armoured cars, had been sent by the government to end the 
siege. The government reacted by announcing the dissolution of the ARC (whose 
militants regrouped in the UPC). However, it was also anxious to show a conciliatory 
face and appointed the Corsican Jean-Etienne Riolacci as prefet of the region -  the first 
Corsican prefect for more than a century.
For its dramatic nature the Aleria incident received great attention from the media, 
and became an excuse to discuss the more general issue of local autonomies in France: 
the majority of public opinion in France showed support for the motivations of the 
autonomists, and the socialist leader Mitterrand commented that the episode was a 
consequence of a too limited form of regionalisation. The Gaullist Prime Minister 
Jacques Chirac replied that a sharp distinction had to be drawn between decentralisation 
of administrative structures -  which he fully supported -  and the notion of political 
regionalisation, which represented “a great danger to national unity” led by a sort of 
“sudden romanticism” (quoted in Ramsay 1983: 153). Also in Corsica most chefs de 
clan (both left and right wing) feared that further regionalisation could undermine their 
influence. During his Presidential visit to the island in 1978 Giscard d’Estaing insisted 
that national solidarity would ensure the island’s economic and social development, 
given its specificity, but with no exceptional constitutional or institutional measures: 
“this unity is our strength, and it is no coincidence that we should have inherited this 
unitary conception o f the French Republic from the most illustrious o f all Corsicans” 
(quoted in Ramsay 1983: 153).
67 In 1796 Napoleon had already advocated the division of the island into two departemertts 
corresponding to the geographical division of en-deca-des-monts (U Cismonte, this side of the mountains) 
and au-dela-des-monts (U Pumonte, the other side of the mountains) with the aim of dividing the 
Corsicans in order to weaken the possibilities for revolt against the central government. However, in 1811 
he revoked this decision by signing a decree making the island a single departement of France with 
Ajaccio as its administrative centre. Hudson (1997), p.xxiii.
68 The number of bombing attacks grew from nearly 46 in 1973, to 110 in 1974 and 242 in 1975. 
Antonetti (1990), p.479.
69 The practice of chaptalisation, consisting of adding sugar during the process of grape fermentation, was 
prohibited by French law in 1972 Kofinan (1981), p. 178.
70 It was after the Aleria episode that President Giscard d’Estaing wrote to Prime Minister Chirac 
instructing him to apply the principle of territorial continuity to the island. Kofinan (1981), p. 180.
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tilAleria acted as a “detonator of a new violence” (Antonetti 1990: 480): on 4 of 
May 1976 twenty-one separate incidents on the island introduced the newly created 
Front de Liberation National Corse (FLNC), a clandestine movement more radical and
71better organized and equipped than its predecessors. As a response, anti-separatist 
groups such as Action Corse Francaise, Ghjustizia e Liberta, Action Verite Corse and 
especially the Front d Action Nouvelle Contre VIndependance et VAutonomisme 
(FRANCIA) also started to arm themselves and counterattack, often with the support of 
local state authorities, unable legally to control the situation on the island {polices 
paralleles). Despite official denials, allegations of the action of barbouzes (government 
undercover agents acting violently to intimidate the autonomists) were confirmed by 
another dramatic episode in Bastelica in 1980.72 The denunciation of the episode as one 
of ‘racial terrorism’ from the French government showed the hardening of its line 
towards separatist movements, not only in Corsica but also in Brittany, and in its 
overseas territories. A major investigation of FRANCIA was launched and more alleged 
FLNC men were arrested. However, while trials for members of the former were held in 
ordinary courts, those for the members of the latter had to be held before the State 
Security Court. During the following April the President called the six Corsican 
Parliamentarians to discuss with ministers further economic measures to be taken in 
favour of the island, but made clear once more that there was no question of conceding 
a special statute to Corsica.
Decentralisation and the reform of state-society relations under Mitterrand
In 1981 the advent of the Left to power for the first time during the Fifth Republic was 
preceded by an atmosphere of expectation -  nourished by the 110 propositions of the 
presidential manifesto -  of the arrival of a new political era, aiming to launch a
71 Their manifesto supported the recognition of national rights of the Corsican people; the removal of 
instruments of French colonialism from the island; a popular democratic government of Corsicans; the 
confiscation of colonial estates and property of tourist industry trusts; agrarian reform. Targets of its 
attacks were the symbols of ‘colonialist exploitation’: banks, police offices, governmental agencies and 
institutions, large-scale hotels, etc. Also, teachers coming from the mainland, considered as a means of 
destruction of the Corsican culture, were exposed to intimidatory actions. The only targets carefully 
avoided were those related to tourism, although the attacks did damage the island’s appeal as a holiday 
destination.
72 On 6th January 1980 local UPC activists stopped armed FRANCIA men trying to attack one of their 
members in Bastelica (a mountain village near Ajaccio). Once the prisoners admitted their intentions, the 
UPC men decided that they would not release them until a magistrate was appointed to investigate the 
links between FRANCIA and government officials. Again national forces were sent to the village in 
armoured jeeps and helicopters, while the UCP activists occupied the Hotel Fesch in the centre of 
Ajaccio. The building was surrounded by the police when shooting started from die crowd, killing a 
policeman and seriously injuring three others.
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profound process of collective renewal of French society (Cole 1998: 25). One of the 
main objectives of this aim was to overcome the etatiste ideology that had informed 
Gaullist policies: in order to respond to the challenges of modernisation, the state could 
no longer attempt “to change society by decree” (Crozier 1979), but rather to involve all 
citizens in the process of definition of their future. The Right was not the only 
ideological adversary of the programme of the renewed Socialist party: on the Left the 
statist tradition found strong support in the ‘Jacobin’ faction (led by J.-P. 
Chevenement),74 arguing that the unity of the Republic was to be severely jeopardised 
by the ‘autogestion’, while regionalist arguments were supported by the ‘girondin’ 
reformist fringe (represented by M. Rocard).
A crucial brick in the Socialists’ project of reform of state-society relations was the 
process of decentralisation, presented by Mitterrand as “la grande affaire du septennat” 
and a necessary step in the evolution of the Republic: “La France a eu besoin d ’un 
pouvoir fort et centralise pour se faire. Elle a besoin, aujourd’hui, dun  pouvoir 
decentralise pur ne pas se defaire” (quoted in Alvergne and Musso 2003: 15). With the
n(\law promulgated by the Minister of the Interior and Decentralisation, Gaston Defferre, 
the twenty-two regions became the third layer of local government in France: their 
upgrade was both at a juridical level (since they were finally recognised as a 
‘collectivite territorial)11 and at a political one (their democratic legitimacy being 
endorsed with the setting up of directly elected regional councils). The Defferre reforms 
(voted in between 1982-83) were presented by the government as a coherent 
continuation of the illuminist vocation that set up the Republic, in that it freed citizens 
from a tutelage by the state and allowed them to become masters of their own destiny
73 The PS (Parti Socialiste) was created in 1969 from the ashes of the SFIO (Section Frangaise de 
I ’Internationale Ouvriere); two years later Mitterrand was elected Secretary of the Party. He represented 
the ‘middle way’ for those PSF members who were not advocating a widespread structural reform, but 
rather were renewing the efforts of the state in reducing unemployment and engaging in redistributive 
policies. Hall (1986), p. 193.
74 Jean-Pierre Chevenement was the leader of the CERES group, “a neo-Marxist enclave which tended to 
favour large-scale nationalisation and an all-out dash for growth behind protective tariff barriers” and 
embraced “an etatist conception of socialism according to which the state would impose reform from 
above”, Hall (1986), p. 193. As we shall see, he later intervened in the Corsican question by resigning 
from his Ministry in opposition to Prime Minister Jospin’s decision to give more autonomy to the region.
75 Michel Rocard led the other major fringe of the party, namely “an anti-Marxist group which favoured a 
decentralised form of socialism” whose members “hoped to reduce the role of state in society and find a 
new path to growth based on autogestion, or worker’s control, within a more autonomous civil society”, 
thus on social change from below. Hall (1986), p. 193.
76 Both Deferre (former mayor of Marseille) and the Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy (former mayor of 
Lille) were known as confirmed regionalists.
77 Title 11 of the French Constitution recognised as basic units of local government (or collectivities 
territoriales) the commune (municipality) and the departement (district). However, it provided for the 
creation of other units by law, and this allowed the law of 2 March 1982 to add the region (region) as a 
third level of local government.
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(Alvergne and Musso 2003: 234). As a consequence the role of the prefect -  
representing the state in the periphery -  was changed “from a tutoring to a co-ordinating 
one” (Balme and Jouve 1996: 231).78
In the Socialists’ original programme further decentralisation did not amount to a 
rolling back of the state: on the contrary, it was strictly intertwined with central 
planning, also a crucial point of the electoral manifesto. The 1982 Nationalisation Act 
took into public ownership leading industrial groups and the main private banks. A 
Ministry for the Plan and Territorial Development was set up and assigned to Rocard,
70main advisor of the Contrats de Plan Etat-Region (CPER), planning contracts 
defining redistribution of competencies and division of financial responsibilities 
between the State and each region for five years over a series of development 
programmes agreed between the president of the regional council and the regional 
prefect. The Defferre reform set the legal framework to insert central planning within 
the processes of nationalisation and regionalisation initiated by the government 
(Alvergne et Musso 2003: 242) and in the 9th Plan, drafted to cover the 1984-88 period: 
“[f]or the first time, regional plans to implement the national program were to be 
negotiated with the new regional governments” (Hall 1986: 213).
The CPER, which greatly influenced the 1988 reform of EU Regional Policy, 
represented “a striking institutional innovation” (Hall 1986: 213), in that it marked the 
shift from a paradigm where the state as a solitary actor applied unilaterally defined 
developmental priorities in a national territory uniformly defined, to one where it 
became the promoter of participatory modes of decision-making, giving voice to local 
differences coordinated within the larger national picture (Hall 1986: 218; Alvergne and 
Musso 2003: 229).
After the first years of strong presidential interventionism, Mitterrand had to 
abandon the more anti-capitalistic points of his presidential manifesto under increasing 
pressures, both from the EU and the global economy, towards further deregulation and 
openness of national economies (Cole 1998: 35). Gradually he shifted the responsibility 
of domestic politics to his prime ministers, leaving for himself a prominent role in 
foreign politics and especially in the field of European integration, which became the
78 The prefects’ executive powers were transferred to the presidents of the regional councils, his a priori 
financial and administrative powers abolished, and a posteriori control assigned to the administrative 
tribunals and the newly created regional Cours des Comptes. Renamed Commissaire de la Republique, 
the prefect was, however, left a relevant role of coordination of economic planning between the regional 
authorities and ministerial field services.
79 See Balme and Jouve (1996). The priorities of the government on territorial development are defined in 
the Comite interministeriel de Vamenagement et du developpement du territoires (CIADT), headed by the 
First Minister or, in his absence, by the Minister designated for Territorial Development.
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leitmotif of his second mandate (Cole 1998: 36, 37). National territorial policies 
abandoned the previous logic of ‘top-down’ decentralisation to look for synergies 
between successful initiatives in different territories by using network structures 
(reseaux d ’entreprises, reseaux d ’activites et d ’emplois, etc.). Their reference was the 
contemporary development of industrial districts in Northern and Central Italian regions 
-  also a driving force for EU Regional Policy -  showing that medium-sized and socially 
integrated communities were not only reconcilable but even more suitable for market 
requirements in the post-Fordist era (Piore and Sabel 1984; Becattini 1987). Within this 
picture, the DATAR -  which some had suggested should close down because of its 
links with previous centralistic planning -  gradually found a new raison d ’etre as 
coordinator of territorial networks and mediator between the state and local authorities 
(Alvergne and Musso 2003: 247, 248).
Priority in territorial development policies was given to investments in quality 
goods and high technology: ‘technopoles'’ were developed in Montpellier, Nice, 
Grenoble and Lyon (Lacour 2003: 71) while works on the TGV, the high-speed train 
connecting main cities with the capital, promised an even brighter future for the 
economic development of mainland peripheries. The upturn of economic activities in 
the South-Western part of the country, in a time when traditional industrial areas of the 
North-East declined, made some authors talk about the “revenge of the Souths” (Lacour 
2003: 53). However, the expression sounded a little sinister if referred to the situation in 
Corsica, where autonomist violence had branched out across the island. The increasing 
links between autonomist movements and ordinary criminality further deferred hopes 
for the catching on of the development policies launched with national and EU funds,
OA
which continued to assist the island’s economy.
The institutional approach of the Socialists to the Corsican question
The institutional change promoted by the Socialist governments in the organization of 
centre-periphery relations was also reflected in their approach to the Corsican question. 
During his campaign Mitterrand had presented the deterioration of the situation in the 
island as an example of the right-wing authoritarianism he planned to overthrow 
(Ramsay 1983: 199). The decentralisation reforms proposed for the whole of France
80 In 1985 Corsica was included in the Integrated Mediterranean (IMP), for which it received for the 
1986-88 period 274 million francs (intended? for ports or airport equipment, SMEs, agriculture, forestry). 
Antonetti (1998), pp. 493—94. In 1989-93 Corsica was granted Objective 1 status in the use of Structural 
Funds (although it exceeded the established threshold of 75% of the EU’s average GDP), while for the 
following planning period (1994-99) it entered into the ‘phasing out’ regime.
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were to be of particular relevance for the island, “une petite patrie dans une grande
D 1
nation ”. Corsican autonomists and the FLNC proclaimed a cease-fire so as not to 
damage the Left during the elections. After his victory, Mitterrand dissolved the State 
Security Court, liberated several Corsican nationalists, and provided for the reopening 
of the old University in Corte and the inclusion of a special statute for Corsica within
O')
the decentralisation reforms.
Minister Defferre agreed that Corsica’s specificity deserved to be considered 
separately, as in the case of Sicily and Sardinia in Italy; however, its statute would have 
represented a blueprint for decentralisation in the rest of the country also (Hintjen, 
Loughlin, Olivesi 1995: 123). With the new statute Corsica became a collectivite 
territorial of the Republic and its elected body was named the ‘Corsican Assembly’ 
(instead of ‘regional council’, as in the case of other regions) and was flanked by two 
consultative committees. The major achievement was the unique capacity of the 
Corsican Assembly, which did not have legislative powers, to communicate directly 
with the government on all matters concerning Corsica (article 27). Hostility to the 
reform from Right wing opposition parties and local chefs-de-clan forced the 
government to attenuate the most innovative parts of the law, reaffirming the safeguards 
of the national interest: article 1 of the statute recognised Corsica’s geographical and 
cultural specificity and gave to its representatives control of its economic development 
and the preservation of its culture, but the expression 7e peuple corse’ appearing in the 
original version of the text was removed (Hintjen; Loughlin, Olivesi 1995: 123).
Dissatisfied with the statute, but also worried about the fading away of 
revolutionary zeal in the face of a more conciliatory government, the FLNC revived its 
attacks, the first one demonstratively carried out on the same day of the election of the 
new regional assembly in August 1982, and started imposing on militants and 
sympathisers a ‘revolutionary tax’, similar to that of other armed national movements 
like the Basque ETA. The increasing number of episodes of racketeering and extortion 
(nearly 800 in 1982), which demonstrated the links between the nationalist army and the
81 This Mitterrand quote is cited in Crettiez (1999), p.209. Part of the regionalist demands, such as the 
amnesty for imprisoned autonomists and a special statute for the island were included in the 110 
propositions of the Mitterrand programme. See Loughlin and Mazey (1995), p.92; Hintjens, Loughlin and 
Olivesi (1995), p. 122.
82 Relevant also was Mitterand’s appointment of the Corsican Bastien Leccia as Parliamentary Secretary 
of the Home Office, with special responsibility for Corsican Affairs.
83 Antonetti (1990), p.481. The elections were preceded by strict control of the electoral lists, which 
brought the striking off from the rolls of nearly 5,500 names of deceased or incapacitated people and the 
banishment of another 8,500 registered on the mainland but voting in Corsica. Prosper Alfonsi, of the 
Mouvement Radical de Gauche (MRG), became the first president of a Corsican Assembly, which 
immediately became well known for its chronic instability: in the space of ten years it had to call 
elections no less than four times. Hintjens, Loughlin and Olivesi (1995), p. 124.
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island mafia, led the government to decree the dissolution of the FLNC in 1983 and the 
appointment of a Commissaire de la Republique with police powers in the region. The 
strategy adopted by the government was to continue the institutional dialogue with the 
autonomists, while using an iron hand with the nationalist clandestine movements, 
branded as criminal organizations (Crettiez 1999: 210).
The victory of the Right at the legislative and regional elections in 1986 brought 
about Mitterrand’s cohabitation (1986-88) with Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, leader 
of the RPR-UDF coalition, who “engaged in a radical programme of economic 
liberalisation, combined with a strong dose of social and political conservatism”.84 
Charles Pasqua, the new Minister of the Interior, intensified a strategy of police and 
judicial repression of clandestine movements in Corsica, by acting through police 
blitzes and the carrying out of search warrants, interrogations and arrests. However, 
requests for the liberation of imprisoned nationalist militants was no longer backed by 
the expression of solidarity from the population of the island, due to the violent drift of 
nationalist action (Antonetti 1990: 482). The cohabitation ended with the 1988 election 
that confirmed Mitterrand as President of France against Chirac, who was replaced by 
Michel Rocard becoming Prime Minister with a relative parliamentary majority. The 
Socialists’ victory -  supported by the FLNC through a pre-electoral ceasefire -  
confirmed the institutional approach to the Corsican question: the government engaged 
in a process of greater devolution for the island, based on a dialogue with local 
politicians as well as representatives of legal regionalist moVefhents. This exchange 
excluded the armed nationalists and separatist factions.
The functioning of the new regional institutions proved to be harder than expected: 
over a period of ten years there were four rounds of elections for the Corsican Assembly 
and the region was discredited due to the spread of financial clientelism practices. Faced 
with the chronic instability of the Corsican Assembly, the Minister of the Interior Pierre 
Joxe set up in 1988 an Inter-ministerial Committee to deal with the cultural, economic 
and social development of Corsica. The Committee presented in May 1991 the new 
Statut Particulier for Corsica, which upgraded the island to a collectivite territoriale 
with greater powers than those defined by common law for the other regions and 
provided it with an elected assembly (Assemblee territoriale), an executive (Conseil 
executij) and a consultative body {Conseil economique, social et culturel). The 
Assembly, elected for six years in a two-round proportional election, did not have
84 Chirac’s political line had “obvious overtones of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in 
the United States”, see Cole (1998), p. 37.
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legislative powers, but rather worked as a deliberative body consulted by the 
government in matters directly concerning the island. Among the members of the 
Assembly, seven were selected to form the Executive Council, headed by a president. 
The role of the CESC was mainly to deal with issues related to territorial development 
on the island (from economic to social and cultural matters). Article 1 of the Statut 
Particulier also recognised the existence of a Corsican people, although as a component 
part of the French people. This time accepted by the Parliament, the article was later 
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council, on the grounds that in France 
there was only one people: le peuple frangais.
The new statute became effective with the 1992 regional elections, confirming the 
victory in the islands of the Right, which lost only two French regions. The regionalist
o r
movement, however, grew in electoral force while the FLNC revived attacks using a 
‘Europe of the regions’ rhetoric as an argument for liberation from centralised nation 
states (Antonetti 1990: 493). Interlinked with the persistent difficulties in performance 
of the reformed regional institutions were the failures of policies launched for the 
development of the island: Corsica had become one of the French regions benefitting 
most from state aid as well as from lower transport fares to the mainland, lower taxes on 
cigarettes, car fees and petrol. However, those measures were not supported by a strong 
strategy to launch self-sustaining development in the region, considering the daunting 
socio-institutional context of the island.86 Despite the resources received by the island 
from the EU, the 1992 French referendum on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
was voted against by 57% of the voters in Corsica, while it passed at the national level 
with 51% of the vote. The vote revealed Corsicans’ fears of assuming a further 
peripheral and vulnerable role within a more enlarged and competitive European 
context (Olivesi 1999: 748), as well as the increasing gap between the reliance on state 
protection of the majority of people and the separatist ambitions of a violent minority in 
the island.
85 The nationalists received 14% of the votes and gained nine seats at the Assembly. As we shall see in 
section III, the elected President of the Council Jean Baggioni (RPR) was extremely active in organizing 
and defending the dossiers relative to the less-favoured Mediterranean regions within formal and informal 
European settings (as member of the European parliament elected in 1994 for the RPR-UDF coalition, at 
the CRPM within the Inter-Mediterranean and Islands Commissions, and within the presidency of the 
IMEDOC partnership).
86 Since the 1990s the inactivity of the French state vis a vis Corsica became increasingly questioned. In 
1989 Prasa recommended a progressive return to Common Fiscal Law in Corsica; in 1995 Oudin 
estimated that the transfers Corsica received from Paris and Brussels amounted to 7 billion Francs in 
1993; in 1997 the General Inspection of finances denounced the ‘fiscal paradise’ that the island had 
become and the National Assembly carried out an official investigation (see Report o f the Parliamentary 
Investigation Commission on the Administration o f  Public Funds, 1998).
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The ‘Matignon process’: strengthening the path towards institutional change
The cohabitation between the RPR President Jacques Chirac and the PSF Prime 
Minister Lionel Jospin (from 1997 to 2002) was characterised by a package of 
economic austerity measures, required by the strong commitment of France in adopting 
the single European currency (Cole 1998: 39-40). Within Chirac’s objective to restore 
the pivotal role of the state, the DATAR was handed back its central role in territorial 
planning. However, planning was now conceived as a flexible instrument defining a 
developmental perspective coordinating different territorial actors in a common vision, 
made of few identified priorities but open in principle to contributions and revisions 
with the aim of creating a wider consensus over interventions as well as improving their 
effectiveness.
The Corsican question saw the front line engagement of Prime Minister Jospin, 
determined to solve it by reinforcing the Socialist approach to dialogue and institutional 
reform. As stated before, the situation on the island was still deteriorating: the
0-7
nationalist front was reduced to inaction by the atomisation of its factions, and was 
increasingly involved in the racketeering and other illegal activities (as became apparent 
from the fortunes built by leaders as Santoni, Orsoni, Filidori).88 In February 1998 the 
prefect Claude Erignac, who had passionately engaged in Corsican institutional life 
(and, as we shall see, also in the implementation of EU programmes), was murdered in 
Ajaccio in an attack claimed by A Cuncolta (the Cargese stream of the FLNC). The 
murder had a very emotional impact in mainland France, discrediting the Corsican 
question in the eyes of national public opinion. The attempt by Bernard Bonnet, 
Erignac’s successor, to use an iron hand to impose law and order on the island was 
stopped by the ‘scandale des paillotes\ 89 resulting in the jailing of the prefect and the 
government’s failure to tackle the Corsican problem.
In November 1999 -  five days after two day-time attacks in Ajaccio -  with the aim 
of opening up a process to assure peace and development on the island, Prime Minister 
Jospin launched an official dialogue with political forces in Corsica. With five of his
87 Officially declared ceasefires, for instance, were no longer respected by the different factions.
88 Audition de M. Yves Bertrand, Directeur central des renseignements generaux, 29 June 1999 (in 
“Auditions de la Commission d ’enquete parlementaire sur le fonctionnement des forces de securite en 
Corse”, Assemblee Nationale, www.assemblee-nationale.fr ).
89 During the summer of 1999 one of Bonnet’s men set fire to the seaside restaurant Chez Francis to 
‘teach the owner a lesson’. The owner was a nationalist sympathiser but in close contact with the local 
police. However, the papers left to attribute the act to armed anti-separatist movements, were copied with 
the prefecture’s photocopier. The episode reaffirmed the persistence of the barbouzes problem on the 
island.
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ministers he met a delegation of Corsican deputies in Matignon (after which the 
initiative became known as the ‘Matignon process’) and asked them to draft their 
proposals. Split between two factions, one favouring autonomy and the other greater 
decentralisation, in May 2000 the Corsican Assembly voted by a margin of a few votes 
to support the latter option. The MRG leader Zuccarelli triumphantly commented: “Now 
it can no longer be said that Corsicans want autonomy/”90
Both proposals (of consultative nature) were brought to the attention of Jospin, who 
set up two working groups, composed of Corsican deputies and government 
representatives, in order to define the law’s details.91 Finally adopted by the Parliament 
in January 2002, the new law gave significant autonomy to the Collectivite Territoriale 
Corse (CTC), which can now write its own development plan fixing the objectives of 
economic, social, and cultural development and preservation of the environment; pass 
its own budget, and ask the Parliament to adapt national laws to the specificities of the 
island. The law also provides for the Corsican language to become a taught subject in 
the nursery and elementary schools of the region and for the transfer to the CTC of all 
historical sites, ports, airports and railway in Corsica in possession of the State. Finally, 
it reasserts the principle of territorial continuity and some fiscal incentives.92
The juridical iter prior to the adoption of the law on Corsica was accompanied at 
the national level by a heated political debate: on the one hand there were those 
approving the government’s action and on the other were those complaining about its 
weakness in yielding to the bomb-strategy of nationalist clans, or worrying that the 
Corsican precedent could induce other regions to claim a similar form of treatment, 
thereby endangering national unity.93 Thus it looked as if the ‘Corsican Question’ would
90 “On ne pourra pas dire: les Corses veulent Vautonomie” (Le Monde, 11.3.2000). Zuccarelli, regional 
councillor and mayor of Bastia, previous Ministre de la Fonction Publique et de la Decentralisation in the 
Cresson government, belongs to one of the most well-known families of notables in Corsica.
91 The final draft, approved by the Corsican Assembly, provided for a reform to be completed in two 
phases: the ‘transitional stage’ saw a first transfer of powers (in development, territorial administration, 
culture, education, infrastructures) to the CTC and a delegation of legislative powers under the 
Parliament’s control. The second, ‘constitutional stage’ foresaw the extension of the transfer following a 
reform of the French Constitution, and the introduction of one single regional institution (instead of the 
CTC and the two departements), provided that civil peace was maintained.
92 Besides the confirmation of the measures deriving from the Law on a Free Trade Area for SMEs in 
Corsica, an extraordinary program covering investments for fifteen years is foreseen, coordinated with the 
objectives of the CPER and Structural Funds planning, in order “to help Corsica overcome the natural 
handicaps constituted by its relief and insularity” (law 92/2002, title IV, art.53).
93 One month after Jospin’s proposition of the law to the Corsican Assembly, the Minister of the Interiors 
Jean-Pierre Chevenement, resigned because of his open disagreement with the Prime Minister over the 
reform. He declared that he would never have signed a document that endangered the unity of the 
Republique. As seen, Chevenement had been one of the historic adversaries of decentralisation, which he 
saw as contrary to the Left’s tradition of egalitarian, universalist and republican values. Cole (1998), p. 
255.
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become one of the issues on which to play out the presidential election in April 2002.94 
However, as abruptly shown by the success in the first round of Jean-Marie Le Pen (the 
xenophobic and anti-European candidate of the extreme Right), the issues at stake for 
the French electorate at the dawning of the new millennium seemed of a wider nature, 
likewise those worrying other European countries: unemployment, criminality, 
terrorism, immigration, EU enlargement.95 The defeat of the Socialists favoured the 
reconfirmation of the RPR leader Chirac, followed by the victory of the Centre-right in 
the legislative elections.
Despite criticism of Jospin’s approach to the Corsican question, the Centre-right 
government coalition partly continued his policy. However, both Prime Minister 
Raffarin and Minister of the Interior Sarkozy privileged the economic and pragmatic 
aspect of the Corsican laws and inserted them within a more general plan of 
constitutional revision on decentralisation in France, glossing over the political and 
ideological implications.96 The aim to bring back to ‘normality’ the Corsican question in 
avoiding a federalist drift once again raised tensions with armed nationalist groups in 
the island -  partly improved during the Jospin mandate -  further strengthening their
Q7justification in continuing the status of conflict with the centralistic state. Sarkozy’s 
attempts to proceed with institutional reform in Corsica were frustrated by the failure of 
the referendum he launched on the island in July 2003 to suppress the two departements 
and create a sole, more effective regional body holding general jurisdiction for Corsican 
affairs. The 51% of contrary votes revealed the prevalence of the forces aiming to keep 
the status quo on the island. At the national referendum of 2005, asking French citizens 
if they wished to ratify the European Constitutional Treaty, again the majority of the 
Corsican electorate voted ‘no’ (58%). However, this time they were in good company, 
given that 55% of the French electorate also voted against the European Constitution.
94 In fact one of the candidates was Chevenement, at the head of the Movement for the Citizens, trying to 
capture the electorate with a revival of the traditional democratic and republican values for a unitary, 
Jacobin state.
95 “As old cleavages based on class and sub-cultural identity have diminished, however, new ones have 
emerged, notably those tied up with the advent of a post-industrial society, European integration and 
immigration”, Cole (1998), p.219.
96 Reuters news: “Nicolas Sarkozy presente la Corse comme un ‘precurseur' de la decentralisation” (27 
July 2002), “ Visite surprise de Jean-Pierre Raffarin en Corse” (28 July 2002).
97 Agence France Presse, “The FLNC reacts to the visit in Corsica o f Raffarin and Sarkozy” (1 August 
2002). The FLNC reacted to the governmental visit by organizing a masked and armed press conference 
in which it expressed its doubts on the possibility that the government was better able to solve the 
Corsican question than its predecessors.
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen, following the case of the island of Corsica, how gradually 
in France regions became recognised as one of the main levels of subnational 
government within a wider picture of less centralised territorial relations. A crucial role 
in this process was played by territorial development policy which, since the Second 
World War, was organized into regional areas in order to grant a balanced and 
integrated development of French territory, and not only the growth of its economic 
system. Regionalisation through regional policy, however, was officially defined by 
governments in functional terms as an effective means to plan economic restructuring 
and infrastructure development, and still answering what I have defined as the ‘national 
model’ of organizing territory and power. In fact the strongly centralised nature of the 
French state and its republican values based on a ‘simple egalitarianism’ (Walzer 1993) 
-  implying the promotion of universal citizenship and culture within its boundaries -  
did not allow a justification of regional autonomy nor a recognition of ethnic 
distinctiveness within the nation. In those cases where, as in Corsica, regional 
differences were more pronounced, the imposition of an ‘equal treatment’ by the central 
government fuelled the action of regionalist movements, asking for recognition of the 
special features of their cultural, socio-economic and geographical context. The only 
recognition by the French governments of a special status to the region was based on its 
geographical features, justifying state aids, while regional claims for greater autonomy 
in respect of cultural and historical differences were firmly repressed. This gradually led 
to a ‘reactive formation’ of the autonomist ideology on the island (Hecter and Levi 
1994: 184—185), which grew by defining its goals mainly in opposition to the French 
state and initiating a spiral of violence still active today. Meanwhile, the result of ‘top- 
down’ planning, ignorant and distrustful of local resources and traditions, led to the 
implementation of regional policies raising social problems without launching self- 
sustaining development in the island.
However, increasing external pressures from globalisation and EU integration, 
backed by internal requests from subnational actors and civil society for greater 
participation in decision-making processes, gradually challenged the ‘national model’ 
even in France, where it was chiefly rooted. After a series of governments’ makeshift 
solutions, the advent of the Socialists in power in the 1980s brought about a 
comprehensive of revision of state and society relations in France. The wider setting for 
this change, tying to accommodate to the changed context without repudiating national
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traditions, was offered by the EU. Within this wider-ranging project of social renewal, 
reforms on decentralisation were recognised as a crucial position. Besides formal 
institutional reforms (from the 1982 Deferre Act to the Constitutional Law 2003-276), 
the redefinition of the French model in centre-periphery relations and territorial policy 
was also reflected at an informal level in the adoption of a negotiation approach 
(<concertation) between national and regional actors, acting in partnership in the 
definition of the Contrats de Plan (CoR 2004: 274), which influenced in turn the design 
of Structural Funds’ management. Accordingly, the government’s approach to the 
Corsican question was revolutionized: political dialogue was launched with local 
authorities and leaders of regionalist movements, a special status was formally 
recognised to the island and powers concerning the economic development and the 
protection of cultural and natural heritage were devolved to regionally elected 
institutions. The fact that the shift to the new institutional model was not rewarded with 
immediate success does not change the relevance of having offered to the Corsican 
question the prospect of a long-term solution. In the next section we shall see how the 
‘EU model’ has further strengthened the feasibility of this path.
98 As summed up by President Mitterrand’s catchphrase in his 1988 New Year’s Eve speech to the nation: 
“France is our homeland, but Europe is our future P\ quoted in Guyomarch, Machin, Ritchie (1998), p.l.
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“One day Sardinians saw from their shores 
a column o f  smoke which advanced towards their ports.
It was Europe coming to them
Chapter 5  -  Regional policy and the Sardinian question in Italy
Like Corsica, Sardinia became part of the mainland only during the last two centuries. 
Inhabited since prehistoric times by the Nuragic civilisation, the island experienced the 
invasion of the different civilisations of the Mediterranean. After the ‘judical period’ of 
the early Middle Ages (when it was governed by four independent constitutional 
monarchies) Sardinia fell under Spanish rule for nearly 400 years. In 1720 the Kingdom 
of Sardinia was ceded by Austria to Carlo Alberto, Duke of Savoy and Prince of 
Piedmont, in exchange for the Realm of Sicily. Despite opposition from the liberal 
Sardinian elite, in 1847 a ‘perfect fusion’ of the Sardo-Piedmontese institutions was 
carried out: parliament, government and the judiciary of the realm were all located in 
Turin, exacerbating the island’s peripherality from the decision-making centres of the 
new kingdom. A year later Vittorio Emanuele II, flanked by his Minister Cavour, 
launched the military operations that led to the unification of Italy in 1861, through a 
policy of annexation of different geographical and cultural realities in Italy to the Sardo- 
Piedmontese realm.100
In the debate leading up to the unification of Italy, Carlo Cattaneo and other 
leading figures of the Risorgimento had advocated a federal design of regional 
decentralisation and local self-government for the new State. However, contemporary 
agricultural riots in the South alarmed both Piedmontese elites and the great landowners 
of the South who, fearing that federalism would encourage centrifugal tendencies, opted 
for a model of centralised state.101 To stress the continuity of its dynasty, the king 
maintained the old numbering in his new title. However, despite the fact that the 
Kingdom of Sardinia could be considered as being at the origin of the Italian state 
(Casula 1997), the island was to become one of its most peripheral and forgotten areas.
99 J.P. Jurien de la Graviere, La marine d ’autrefois. La Sardaigne en 1842, Paris, 1862; quoted in Mattone 
(1998), pp. 14-15, with reference to the fact that the diffusion of steamships in the middle of the 19th 
century allowed for more regular connections between Sardinia and the mainland, which until then had 
been quite problematic.
100 This was the meaning of the famous phrase of the statesman Massimo d’Azeglio after unification: “We 
have made Italy, now we must make Italians/” In fact the movement which had led to political 
independence and unification had involved only a restricted elite. Germino and Passigli (1968), p.l.
101 In 1861 a law promulgated by Prime Minister Bettino Ricasoli extended the centralised and uniform 
Piedmontese administrative structure to the whole of the new Kingdom of Italy. At the formal level, the 
law followed the model put into place by Napoleon III, which assigned to powerful prefects the control of 
budgets and activities of local authorities. However, at the informal level, it was characterised by a great 
deal of accommodation and compromise with local notables. Partridge (1998), p.52.
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Within the larger picture of the new Italian state the ‘Sardinian question’ soon became 
interweaved with that of the Mezzogiomo, with which it shared a condition of economic 
underdevelopment and social backwardness -  as dramatically witnessed by the mass 
emigration of Southern Italians to the American continent.102 The model of capitalist 
development chosen by the Italian government to boost the country’s economy turned 
to financing the development of the industrial sector in the Northern areas -  more 
developed and at an advantage in terms of location in relation to the advanced European 
markets -  while customs protectionism hit the more dynamic areas of the Mezzogiomo 
(Barbagallo 1996: 614, 615). This dualistic pattern of development was further 
strengthened by the World Wars, when the weapons industry developed in the North 
and Southern men were sent to war en masse.
Although the peripherality of the island did not allow Sardinians to participate fully 
in the debates animating Italy over intervention, the First World War represented a 
crucial moment for the ideological formation of the political class. As with other 
Southerners, Sardinian men were sent to the front in great numbers: most of them 
served in the Brigata Sassari -  one of the few regional units in the Italian army, 
reuniting soldiers of modest rural origins with cultivated officials in the same daunting 
experience. Soon the Brigata gained a reputation for its heroism and a consciousness of 
its regional identity. After the war, the debate over autonomy regained importance, 
animated by intellectuals and ex-officials (such as Umberto Cao, Camillo Bellieni, 
Emilio Lussu)103 who in 1921 founded the Partito Sardo d ’Azione (PSd'A), a regionalist 
political party supporting the development of the island, advocating political and 
administrative autonomy and free trade. Although there were several interpretations of 
the notion of autonomy on the island, the one that was mostly shared referred to 
regional self-government, rather than to independence from mainland Italy. Sardinia 
was in fact defined as a kind of ‘abortive nation’, whose fate had become interlinked 
with that of Italy in an indissoluble way. As a consequence, cultural nationalism “was 
recognised as a historical and linguistic legacy, but it was curiously left at a subordinate
102 Over four million people from the South of Italy emigrated to the Americas in the first fifteen years of 
the 20th century. The exodus was later limited by the new rules regulating emigration flows to the US in 
the 1920s. Barbagallo (1996), p.618.
103 Umberto Cao published the booklet For Autonomy in 1918, which underlined that the traditional 
Sardinian fatalistic attitude toward the possibility of change had been altered by the heroic experience of 
the war, and which proposed the foundation of an autonomous Sardinian party. Once faith was found 
again in the possibility of changing things, Sardinians would be ready to fight for autonomy even inside a 
united Italy. Clark (1990), pp.392-393.
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level” in autonomists’ claims (Clark 1990: 397).104 The war experience also specified 
the terms of the autonomy issue on the part of the government, which accepted 
Sardinian requests for special treatment partly on the grounds of the ‘debt of gratitude’ 
the Italian state had contracted with the island (Clark 1990: 392).
When fascism made its appearance, the PSd’A firmly condemned it as an 
instrument of Northern capitalism. However, with Mussolini in power, several of its 
members joined the fascist party. The most influential leaders of the PSd’A stayed out 
of this fusion, and the party continued to exist as the major anti-fascist force in the 
region until 1926, when it was dissolved by Mussolini and Lussu was sent into exile to 
the island of Lipari.105 During the 1920s, within Mussolini’s policy of modernisation for 
the South,106 agriculture and infrastructures were developed in Sardinia through state 
interventions that were not compatible with the traditional economic activities of the 
island.107 As part of the ‘battle for wheat’ (battaglia del grand), aiming to make Italy 
self-sufficient in food production, the government discouraged the flourishing local 
sector of cheese exports -  which were smuggled through Corsica -  to fund investments 
in agriculture in the island’s plain areas (Clark 1990: 408). Two new villages, 
Mussolinia and Fertilia, were settled with farmers from the Po valley, major drainage 
projects were completed and even land that was not suitable was ploughed, at the 
expense of vineyards, gardens and pastures. Fascist policies were thus not “directed to 
self-development within competitiveness, but rather on growth within autarchic and 
political protectionism” (Sapelli 1995: 165). Moreover, early interventions were not 
followed up by other projects and thus lost some of their potential benefits; in fact 
attention towards Sardinia declined in the 1930s as a result of the increasingly critical 
international situation. The still difficult connections with the mainland made 
unprofitable the investments in the agricultural sector, and the island was viewed as 
mainly a source of raw materials and labour to be used in urgent military expeditions.108
104 This was also the view of Camillo Bellieni, one of the main leaders of the PSd’A. Sardinian traditional 
values were seen as something peculiar, “but backward, they certainly did not constitute a platform for 
respectable and modernising political men”, Clark (1990), p.397.
105 Lussu escaped from the island of Lipari with Feruccio Parri and the Rosselli brothers to Paris, where 
they founded the anti-fascist Giustizia e Liberta movement.
106 In 1924 the ‘billion law’ (so called because it destined 1,000 million lire for a ten year period to be 
spent on public works in Sardinia) was promulgated and a Proweditorato alle Opere Pubbliche was 
created in Cagliari to plan and administer the firnds.
107 Initial projects were based on the debatable theory that wide reaches of uncultivated pastures could be 
made fertile. Moreover, the ‘nuclear’ structure of the Sardinian family did not match the traditional 
extended family of the mezzadri in central Italy (where sharecropping represented a predominant structure 
for the cultivation of land by landless farmers). See DaRe (1990).
108 The Sardinian mining sector (in crisis since the Great Depression) was expanded to cover military 
needs. The major part of the investment was not Sardinian and most of the coal, lead and zinc extracted 
was exported.
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However, although they remained very isolated, Sardinian cities were growing and 
illiteracy on the island started to decline.
The Southern question in the aftermath of World War II
The impact of the Second World War was less significant in Sardinia than that of the 
First World War. Given the island’s distance from military actions and the lack of 
participation in the Resistenza and the liberation movement,109 the island did not 
participate in the formation of a shared background of common patriotic and political 
experiences between the citizens and their political leaders. However, Sardinians clearly 
experienced the economic downsides of the war, worsened by the already backward 
socio-economic conditions of the island. These conditions were described in reports 
drawn up by two delegations of the Italian Parliament in the early 1950s, listing the 
factors making the “vicious cycle of Sardinian underdevelopment” (Bottazzi 1998: 2- 
3): malaria, low population density, lack of security, malnutrition, low productivity, 
lack of skilled labour, difficult transport and communications both internally and with 
the mainland. Underdevelopment characterised the life of the islanders, who lived in the 
interior, divided into small villages, without any prospect or hope for change.110
To break this vicious cycle, common to most Southern Italian regions,111 and launch 
a process of development, structural actions were needed to challenge the traditional 
dualism of the country’s economy.112 With this aim in mind, the Italian government 
elaborated a policy of state intervention for the South with an ‘extraordinary’ character 
(the so-called Intervento Straordinario, based on additional rather than ordinary funds 
supplied by the state for regional economic development) planned in two stages: a first 
phase, designed to buttress the development of agriculture and basic infrastructure, was 
to be followed by a second phase, focussed on the completion of the process of 
industrial development. In 1950 an agency for the development of the South (Cassa per
109 However, many Sardinians fought for the Resistenza on the mainland. The main effect was the allied 
bombings of Cagliari (February 1943) and ports of Olbia. Even at the fall of fascism there were no great 
demonstrations on the island: General Basso assumed civil power and let the German troops on the Island 
leave peacefully, passing through Corsica almost without a fight.
110 The absence of expectations, or the will to react or improve, was another of the characteristics 
identified by the Parliamentary Reports. Italian Parliament (1953a; 1953b).
111 At the beginning of the 1950s Sardinia held, with Sicily, the lowest activity rate of all Italian regions: 
35.4% (which worsened to 31.1% ten years later). Mutti (1981a), pp.200-201.
112 Of fundamental relevance for the island’s development was the US troops’ disinfestation of the coastal 
plains with DDT in 1946-49, which allowed the rooting out of malaria.
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il Mezzogiomo) was created -  based on the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority -  
benefitting during the first decade from decisional and administrative autonomy.113
In the first years of activity the Cassa funded measures including the creation or 
improvement of transport, electricity and water infrastructures, the modernisation of the 
agricultural sector, the establishment of schools and social services, regional agencies 
and cooperatives.114 In Sardinia a significant exodus from the agricultural sector took 
place in the labour market, leading to a progressive emptying out of internal and rural 
areas and the expansion of cities and coastal villages.115 However, this migrating 
working force could not be entirely absorbed by the weak, insular industrial sector: 
funds from the Cassa for industry were scarce and the local mining industry -  quite 
developed before the Second World War -  was declining.116 Thus workers leaving the 
agricultural sector either left the island completely (mainly for industries in the Centre 
and North of Italy),117 or poured into the island’s tertiary sector in search of 
employment. With reference to this second aspect, some authors have written that the 
evolution of the Sardinian labour market and society has in a sense ‘skipped a phase’ of 
modernisation, and thus Sardinia “has become post-industrialised without having really 
been industrialised” (Bottazzi 1998: 6).
Increasingly the ‘extraordinary’ funds of the Cassa were used by the Italian 
government as substitution, rather than in addition, of ordinary resources made available 
for public works, and the Mezzogiomo seemed to serve mainly as a source of labour for 
the expanding economy of the North and as a market for the goods produced there 
(Barbagallo 1996: 620; Mutti 1981a: 205-206). Gradually doubts on the possibility of 
breaking the cycle of dependence linking Southern development to central budgetary 
transfers began to surface even among the early promoters of the Intervento
113 The Tennessee Valley Authority had managed the development of a depressed area following the New 
Deal policies launched by F.D. Roosevelt in the U.S. The adoption of a similar model was thus welcomed 
by the World Bank, financing investments for the development of the South within the Marshall Plan. 
Barbagallo (1996), p.620.
114 Among the main regional agencies or credit institutions created in those years: Ente autonomo del 
Flumendosa (1946), Istituto zootecrtico e caseario per la Sardegna (1948); Ente sardo industrie turistiche 
(1950); Ente per la trasformazione fondiaria e agraria della Sardegna (1951); Banco di Sardegna, 
Credito Industriale Sardo, Ente sardo di elettricita (1953), Istituto sardo organizzazione lavoro artigiano 
(1957). Mutti (1981a), p.202.
115 The percentage of the working population in the agricultural sector represented in 1951 more than 
50%, but only 10% thirty years later. Bottazzi (1998), p.6.
116 After WW2 the mining industry experienced a progressive decline in the changing international 
division of work, because of its ‘proto-industrial’ character. In Sardinia mining activities had been 
concentrated only in some parts of the island (mainly the South-Eastern area of Sulcis-Iglesiente) and had 
been limited to the less profitable phase of extraction. See Bottazzi (1998), pp.9-10 and Mutti (1981a), 
p.203.
117 The annual emigration rate, more or less stable until 1957, of around 3,500 people, increased 
exponentially during the following years: in 1960 nearly 15,330 people were leaving the island (Istat 
2001).
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Straordinario. However, the Sardinian region had an additional card on which all hopes 
for its development were to be played: the ‘Rebirth Plan’ (Piano di Rinascita) promised 
by the Italian state to the island at the awakening of the Italian Republic.
The Italian Constitution and the Rebirth Plan for Sardinia
The Italian Constitution (1948), a highly progressive document written by the main anti­
fascist forces in society (including Sardinian autonomists) with a fresh memory of the 
risks deriving from the concentration of power, provided for a decentralised state 
structure “as a safeguard for the democratic system against the risks of a return to 
totalitarianism” (Desideri 1996: 66). Three different levels of elected local government 
were identified, without strict hierarchical relations: the comuni (municipalities), the 
province (districts),118 and the regioni (regions). Among the regions, the Constitution 
distinguished between fifteen with ‘ordinary statutes’, activated through ordinary 
national legislation, and five regions with ‘special statutes’. The latter were granted 
greater legislative and administrative autonomy in recognition of their differentiated 
historical and cultural traditions, often linked to a peripheral location within the country 
or to the presence of significant ethnic groups or linguistic minorities.119 The Sardinian 
representatives were offered a statute giving them exclusive legislative powers in many 
fields, based on the one drafted by the representatives of the Sicilian region and 
accepted by the De Gasperi government before the election of the national Constituent 
Assembly writing the Italian Constitution with royal decree.
However, the offer was proudly (and perhaps unwisely) refused, on the grounds 
that Sardinians wanted to write ‘their own’ statute. In April 1947 the Consulta Sarda, 
after long debates among its members on the interpretation to be given to the notion of 
autonomy, presented a draft text of the statute to the Constituent Assembly. In the 
statute the interpretation of regional autonomy that was adopted -  after the initiative of 
the local DC party leader and future president of the Republic, Antonio Segni -  offered 
to the regional government only a limited transfer of legislative powers. Claims to 
exclusive competence in the major fields of economic, educational or cultural policy­
making for the island were thus waived for the recognition of a special status set in the
118 Due to the above mentioned influence of the French model in the foundation of the Italian state, 
decentralised state agencies were located at the provincial level, although their role was limited to a 
supervision of local authorities and co-ordination of national services. In Sardinia, there were initially 
three provinces: Cagliari, Sassari, Nuoro. Oristano was added in 1974 while another four provinces have 
been added since the 2005 elections: Ogliastra, Medio-Campidano, Sulcis-Iglesiente and Gallura.
119 The ‘special statute’ regions created in 1948 were Sardinia Trentino-Alto Adige and Valle d'Aosta. 
The Sicilian Region was created in 1946 and Friuli-Venezia Giulia in 1963.
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framework of a centralised Italian nation state.120 The most convincing answer to the 
question of why most Sardinian politicians were so hesitant (vis a vis their Sicilian 
counterparts) in asking central government to provide them with more independent 
powers remains that of Antonio Gramsci. In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci wrote 
extensively on the Southern question and his native Sardinia, noticing among other 
things that while Sicilian landowners were (economically, politically, culturally) very 
powerful and had interests to defend against Rome, most of the Sardinian elite came 
from a middle class dependent on the state’s colonial power and resources (Gramsci 
1997: 197; Clark 1990: 423-424).
The national Constituent Assembly revised the Sardinian statute further by limiting 
the legislative and financial powers of the regional Assembly and the president of the 
region. However, the Sardinian political elite observed that those losses were worth the 
acquisition of article 13, which stated that: “The State, in concert with the Region, 
provides for an organic plan to favour the economic and social rebirth o f  the Island\ 
This was an implicit acknowledgement of Sardinia’s special condition, in that it 
embodied the promise from the state of a specific development policy for the island, 
which no other Italian region had been granted. However, it inevitably led to the gradual 
shift of the debate from that on the island’s autonomy to one concerning the adoption of 
developmental plans dependent on state funds: “in Sardinia autonomy did not mean 
self-government, but a quest of material concessions and modernisation” (Clark 1990: 
428).
Expectations and disappointments with regard to the island’s ‘rebirth’
During the drafting of the Italian Constitution the regionalists’ front had been strongly 
supported by the Christian Democratic Party (DC) which included subsidiarity and 
decentralisation as points of its electoral programme (Dente 1985: 128). However, once 
in government, the DC started to strengthen central control, fearing that the Left could 
get into power in the ‘red regions’ of central Italy (Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and 
Umbria). Equally the Left, for the same reason, abandoned its position of centralism for 
one supporting regionalisation. This explains why the constitutional provisions setting
120 See Clark (1990) pp.423, 426. The Sardinian statute contemplated a series of ‘delegated’ 
administrative tasks from central authorities which, however, were transferred very slowly, partially, and 
with reluctance: see Ballero (1983). There was no reference to the use and teaching of the Sardinian 
language mentioned in the case of other ‘special statute’ regions, such as the Trentino-Alto Adige (for the 
German-speaking community in Alto Adige), or later the Friuli-Venezia Giulia (for the Slovene 
communities in Venezia Giulia).
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fifteen regions with ordinary statutes had to wait over twenty years before being finally 
enacted. Resistance by the central government to the devolution of powers in favour of 
local authorities was also linked to the organization of the Italian political parties in a 
system -  later known as partitocrazia -  which perpetuated traditional clientelism, 
systematically favouring specific social groups in return for electoral support (Dente 
1985: 105). The state thus retained its prerogatives over most policy areas (especially 
over the territorial redistribution of resources and economic planning) as well as over 
the administrative class (mainly recruited and backed in its career patterns through party 
affiliation, both at the central and local level) (Grote 1996: 259-261; Cerase 1992).
Also in Sardinia, as in the rest of Italy, the first legislative elections after the war 
(April 1948) saw the success of the DC party, confirmed in the first regional elections 
(May 1949) with the victory of a centrist DC-PSd'A coalition.121 The PSd’A had 
addressed its electoral programme to the ‘Sardinian people’, defined as victims of 
colonialist state exploitation protecting the monopolies of the Centre-North through 
policies managed by a centralised bureaucracy (Mutti 1981a: 222). In contrast, the party 
claimed economic liberalisation and a broader range of regional autonomy (sometimes 
making use of minority nationalism arguments, stressing the different national roots of 
the Sardinian people vis-a-vis the Italian one, and hinting at separatist solutions).122 
However, despite the popularity of its arguments on the island, especially among 
farmers and shepherds, the PSd’A did not regain the political influence it had had in the 
early 1920s. This had partly to do with the memory of its fusion with fascism in 1923 
but mainly with the fact that by then the autonomist arguments had been adopted by all 
other regional political forces (such as the local DC, adopting several of the arguments 
against central colonialism) and therefore ceased to be a unique ideological blueprint.123 
Soon DC leaders gained control of most of the posts in the civil service, regional 
agencies and the commissions for agrarian reform or economic development on the 
island. The distribution of posts followed a power-sharing logic organized on a 
provincial basis: the local DC politician took “the role of patron usually played by the 
landowners and the lawyers, and he played it even better” (Clark 1990: 432). The 
puppet-masters of the patronage were, however, in Rome and this further demeaned the 
cause of regional autonomy: “autonomy did not mean a Sardinian concerted effort for
121 The first president of the Sardinian government was the DC leader L. Crespellani (1949-1954), while 
the first president of the regional assembly was A. Contu, of the PSd’A.
122 See the collection of articles o f ‘7/ Solco\ mouthpiece of the PSd’A, in “Stampa periodica in Sardegna 
1943-49” (1975).
123 After the 1948 electoral defeat, Lussu left the Psd’A to found a more leftist faction (the PSd’AS), 
joining the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) a year later, in whose ranks he was elected as senator in Rome for 
the following twenty years. Clark (1990), p.429.
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self-government, nor even a concerted expression of Sardinian requests; it meant 
government -  in fact, party -  concessions to clients on the island, just as the old 
centralisation had done” (Clark 1990: 435).
However, the autonomist ideology still held a strong cohesive potential on the 
island. This was proven by the response of civil society to the debate over the ‘rebirth’, 
launched by the Left and the Labour Chambers of the three provinces during the early 
1950s. The mobilisation was preceded by several preparatory encounters throughout the 
island and the initiative culminated in a two-day ‘Congress of the Sardinian People’ 
held in Cagliari in 1950. Participation in the Congress was widespread and it brought 
together a great number of representatives of political parties, agricultural and mining 
sectors, and other civil organizations. Opened by Lussu, calling for unity of those who 
loved their land beyond political or social divisions, the Congress was a great success 
for the Left124 inasmuch that local DC deputies -  ignoring the initiative after the national 
leaderships vetoed their participation -  were forced to acknowledge its relevance and 
embraced its conclusions in the regional Council (Ruju 1998: 834; Accardo 1998: 31, 
35). Among those conclusions was the refusal to adopt a secessionist interpretation of 
autonomy for the island. The island’s rebirth was considered to lie within the wider 
interests of the national community. As a consequence, the Rebirth Plan {Piano di 
Rinascita) was presented as a policy to be defined in agreement between the state and 
the island in order to cover all aspects of regional development and not to be packaged 
within the Cassa funding, whose interventions had a different aim and characteristic 
(Accardo 1998: 34).
However, the evolution of the Plan failed to meet the great expectations it had 
raised. At the national level, in fact, there was resistance to the setting up of the policy: 
the research committee created in 1951 by the government to define the content of the 
Plan was left without funding until 1954 (Ruju 1998: 835). A year later the regional 
president Alfredo Corrias resigned in protest against the government’s delays in 
assuming its obligations toward the industrialisation of the island and the 
operationalisation of the Rebirth Plan (Ruju 1998: 835). When in 1958 the final report 
was presented, it was economically and politically outdated: in fact, it identified 
agricultural development as the main means to achieve the equalisation of regional GDP
124 The main leaders of the Sardinian PCI (Italian Communist Party) were Velio Spano -  who tended to 
focus the party’s line on the Sardinian workers’ movements, especially around the issues involving the 
mining sector -  and Renzo Laconi -  who supported a more overarching strategy, uniting all movements 
on broader issues: see Ruju (1998), pp.832-833. Laconi’s contribution was crucial in the drafting of 
article 13 of the Sardinian statute as a recognition of the need to define for the island a policy specifically 
designed for the integrated development of the island, rather than ordinary public works interventions. 
See Accardo (1998), pp.30-31.
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with the national average within 15-20 years ,125 while the Italian government had just 
launched the second phase of the policy of modernisation via industrialisation for the 
Mezzogiomo.
Changing the Rebirth Plan’s objectives to those of the Cassa 
The tendency of the Sardinian political elites to conform to the twists and turns decided 
nationally was strengthened both with the increased watering down of the autonomist 
cause and the gradual integration and homogenisation of civil society on the island with 
the national one (Accardo 1998: 45). In the mid-fifties the national DC leader Amintore 
Fanfani promoted a general renewal of the party’s organizational structure in order to 
make the DC’s political power more independent from external influences (especially 
those of Catholic Action and Luigi Gedda’s Civic Committees). Party representatives 
were strategically placed in leadership posts within public firms (Mutti 1981a: 210), the 
leadership was renewed and recruitment came from the ranks of the party bureaucracy 
rather than from the bourgeoisie’s notables.126 In Sardinia this renewal became evident 
between 1956 and 1958, when in Sassari the local DC leader Campus was defeated by a 
new faction -  the so-called ‘young Turks’127 -  supported by the national leadership and 
the local church.128
To a lesser extent, changes also took place in the more conservative and less 
dynamic DC section in Cagliari, whose new leader Efisio Corrias was elected president 
of the region for two terms (1958-66). Corrias -  a member of the urban groups 
reasonably open to the important social issues of the day, supported by the labour 
organizations and the Acli -  helped to ‘ferry’ the Sardinian regional government
125 A role for small industry was also foreseen, linked to the development of local productions (such as 
the dairy or olive oil industry). However, the identification of economic development with 
industrialisation was clearly rejected as a dangerous mistake. See Ruju (1998), pp.836-838.
126 DC youth was thus encouraged to obtain public posts as a first step in their political careers. Sidney 
Tarrow, in analysing those organizational changes within the DC party, has defined it as the passage from 
‘notables’ clientelism’ to ‘bureaucratic or organizational clientelism’. In the first case the political 
exchange between support and benefits or protection is based on a vertical relationship of solidarity based 
on personal trust and faith and linked to a more traditional agricultural society, while in the second case 
there is a horizontal relationship between the voters and the organizational structure of the party, with 
associations set in the middle. Tarrow (1972), pp.270-319.
127 Nino Campus was one of the founders of the Popular Party in Sardinia and cousin of the later 
President of the Republic Antonio Segni, who surprisingly did not oppose the ‘white revolution’ of the 
‘Young Turks’. Ruju (1998), p.829. This new class of young professional politicians (whose main leaders 
were Cossiga, Dettori, Soddu, Colavitti and Giagu de Martini) declared among their aims that of bringing 
to an end the clientelistic management of the party based on the personal prestige of the old leaders, by 
establishing the supremacy of the party. However, in reality this amounted to gaining power within the 
party and replacing the old guard.
128 A clear sign of the strong links between the national DC leadership and the Sassari was the election of 
two Sassari DC leaders as Presidents of the Italian Republic (Segni and Cossiga).
106
towards the support of the Centre-Left path in creating governing coalitions. This path 
followed the national trend, which with the opening to the Left aimed to isolate the 
growing force of the PCI through an alliance with the PSI. The Sardinian version of the 
strategy contemplated the involvement of the Psd’A and the identification of the Rebirth 
Plan as the main battleground for the fight for regional autonomy (Accardo 1998: 46). 
During his first government, Corrias assigned the crucial regional Ministry for Industry 
to the Psd’A leader Pietro Melis and created a regional Ministry for the Rebirth, giving 
it to Francesco Deriu.129 The latter organized in 1959 four conferences on the Rebirth 
Plan, which testified to the resilience of the political and social consensus over the issue 
of the island’s autonomy, attainable via socio-economic development.130 Wide 
agreement was found on the basic tenets that should have formed the basis the 
operationalisation of the Rebirth Plan: a ‘bottom-up’ definition of the priorities to be 
followed by regional planning; the additionality of resources vis a vis those destined to 
the Cassa for the development of the Mezzogiomo as a whole; the central role to be 
played by the Sardinian region in the management and implementation of the funds 
(Accardo 1998: 49-50).
Following changes in the political leadership, a new working group was created to 
present a new project for bringing the objectives of the Rebirth Plan into line with the 
second phase of the extraordinary intervention of the Cassa in the South.131 A newly 
created planning centre (the CRP, Centro Regionale di Programmazione) directed by 
Colavitti (one of the ex ‘young Turks’) was created to implement a developmental 
strategy whose guidelines were defined at the central level by a DC-led government that 
followed the latest economic modernisation theories. As we have already seen in the 
third chapter, the recipe of industrialisation via development poles consisted of the 
funding of the installation of large industrial plants whose spill-over effects should have 
launched the development of the region in the short-term. The choice of the chemical, 
iron and steel industries was dictated by the need for Italy to widen its productive base
129 A further step towards the opening to the Left was taken by Corrias during his second term (lasting 
only one year), when he presented a government in which the Socialist Party made its first appearance. 
Accardo (1998), p.48.
130 The sprouting of journals in those years on the islands’ development (II Bogino, Ichnusa, Rinascita 
Sarda, II Democratico, Sardegna oggi; Autonomia cronache) represented a conscious attempt on the part 
of politicians but also intellectuals (such as R. Laconi, A. Pigliaru, M. Pira) to link the issue of regional 
identity and culture to the political debate over the Rebirth Development Plan. Accardo (1998), pp.65-77; 
Ruju (1998), pp.836-837.
131 One of the main advocates of the need to merge extraordinary and ordinary development funds was 
Francesco Cossiga (ex-leader of the ‘young turks’ and future president of the Republic), who argued that 
the role of the region had to be reduced in favour of a greater presence of the state. Accardo (1998), p.51. 
Quite ironically, Cossiga today advocates extreme forms of regional nationalism, such as in the case of 
the Basque nationalists.
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by providing the country with the necessary basic resources to further develop the 
industrial sectors as the mainstay of the ‘economic miracle’ of the 1950s in North- 
Western Italy, based on heavy industry and car production.
In 1962 the Rebirth Plan was approved by the national Parliament and officially 
launched. Among its declared priorities was the modernisation of the economic and 
social structures throughout the region, in order to achieve the highest levels of steady 
employment and a faster increase in wage rates (Mutti 1981b: 383). The 400 billion lire 
allocated for twelve years (1962-1974) should have represented additional resources vis 
a vis other national funds destined to the island within the government’s policy for the 
South. However, the additionality of the funding was soon ‘forgotten’ by the national 
government. The bulk of resources, initially destined for agriculture, was redirected 
mainly toward the industrial sector (especially in the petrochemical and basic 
chemicals) and unevenly distributed in the provinces, while almost no reference was 
made to the mining and sheep-farming industries -  considered as backward and 
unproductive.132
Although supported by most of the political class and economic categories on the 
island -  looking at industrialisation as a necessary stage for modernisation (Ruju 1998: 
840-841) -  the limits of the industrial poles approach soon became apparent. The 
petrol-chemical industries financed were capital intensive and largely external -  both 
for their input and outputs of economic factors -  to the economy of the region; the 
limited number of jobs they offered was often reserved for specialised technicians called 
from mainland Italy, while Sardinians continued to emigrate. Since the industrialisation 
process was not diffused throughout the territory, but rather concentrated in areas that 
became known as ‘cathedrals in the desert’, the higher demand for goods produced by 
the rise in regional income, instead of stimulating internal production, resulted in a 
growth of imports of those goods from the outside.133 This led to a crisis in the regional 
craft and SMEs, unable to compete with those of the Centre-North of Italy, while the 
agricultural sector continued to decline. What had been launched in the Mezzogiomo
132 Of the investments financed the distribution by sector saw 74% of resources to industry and only 10% 
to agriculture, while territorially 63% of resources went to the Cagliari province, 30% to Sassari and only 
7% to Nuoro. These differences between the intentions of the Plan and its implementation emerged from 
the comparison of the original formulation of the Plan with the 6th Periodic report. See Mutti (1981b), 
pp.384-386.
133 In 1959 the Lumbard entrepreneur Nino Rovelli -  strongly supported by the Sassari DC elite — 
founded the SIR (Sarda Industrie Resine) to build a petrochemical plant in Porto Torres (on the Northern 
shore of the island). He later bought the chemical firm Rumianca in Assemini (near Cagliari) and the two 
main daily papers of the island, L ’Unione Sarda and La Nuova Sardegna (this fact clearly did not help to 
develop a critical perspective on the issues at stake in public opinion on the island). In 1964 the Lumbard 
entrepreneur Angelo Moratti started to build in Sarroch (on the coast near Cagliari) the SARAS refinery, 
still the main provider of industry on the island today.
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was a ‘modernisation without development’ policy (Barbagallo 1996: 621; Trigilia 
1992).
The limitations of the chosen developmental strategy were exacerbated in the case 
of Sardinia by factors internal to the region, such as the inefficiency of regional 
agencies, or the relinquishing -  by the local political elites -  of decisional power to the 
central government. The autonomy formally granted to the region had, in fact, been 
translated by the political elite only in terms of the quantity of resources which could be 
squeezed from the state, “abdicating completely the negotiations on the quality of 
development” (Mutti 1981b: 394). The cycle of dependency of the region started with 
the discretionary use of public funds by politicians and administrators, resulting in large 
numbers o f ‘assisted’ voters who offered electoral support in return (Mutti 1981b: 412; 
Regini 1991). Regional coalitions, which had found in this perverse mechanism a 
source for their ‘reproduction’, were held together by a logic of power-sharing rather 
than ideological legacies proposing different approaches to development (Mutti 1981b: 
398).
A policy against the mainstream: the OECD Pilot Project
While modernisation theories based on industrial poles were establishing themselves, a 
totally alternative policy paradigm was being proposed on the island. The OECD ‘Pilot 
Project Sardinia’ was instituted in 1956 with the participation of the Italian government, 
SVIMEZ, and the Sardinian region, and with a total budget of 1,035 million lire. The 
area identified for the development of the program included 41 communes in the 
triangle between Bosa, Macomer and Oristano (in the eastern part of the island) with a 
total population of nearly 100,000 inhabitants. The rationale behind this innovative 
project was to stimulate the development of human and social capital while 
experimenting with an integrated approach to the socio-economic development of the 
area.
The initiative included the mapping of existing and potential local resources and 
their coordination within an integrated development strategy that could link traditional 
activities with modem economic requirements, and also give special attention to the 
condition of women (Anfossi 2000: 6). Although the concept of social capital was not 
yet developed, we can see how one of the specific goals of the OECD Project was to 
promote “local development and communitarian actions”: thus it deliberately identified 
social networks present within the communities (although within traditional settings),
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and reinforced or created relations of trust through the involvement of social actors 
engaged in common tasks and the promotion of innovative practices and information 
aiming at the development of their territory (Anfossi 2000: 6, 19).
During its most active period, the Project counted only 50 people, chosen after a 
selective recruitment process following the criteria of technical competence and 
personal and human skills that were needed for the different tasks and fields of 
intervention, which included adult education, agriculture and zoo-technique, rural 
domestic economics, art craft and social services. No specific measure was dedicated to 
industry, absent in the area considered. In order to prevent opportunities for corruption, 
often linked to development funds, the Project offered free of charge assistance and 
information or sometimes asked for the payment of a token fee, just to make the public 
appreciate the value of the service provided (Anfossi 2000: 14, 18). The units were 
located in strategic sites, easily reachable, and searched to build the necessary 
familiarity and trust that could lead the inhabitants to cooperate in local development 
initiatives, learning to orient their actions not exclusively according to utilitaristic 
motivations, but also following social concerns.
To bear fruit, such an innovative project would have needed another element: 
sufficient time to take root in the social context. However, when at the end of 1962 the 
OECD project was closed, despite its role in the successful launching of a series of 
initiatives, both the state and the regional partners, now committed to the development 
of industrialised ‘development poles’, did not show any will to invest further resources. 
Although at its launch Sardinian authorities had agreed they would carry on the Project 
once OECD funding was exhausted, only a few measures were followed up by some 
regional and local offices, and even these were soon abandoned (Anfossi 2000: 15). Part 
of this lack of interest was also due to the fact that the Project had focused on local 
communities and overlooked local and regional authorities, who hence either dismissed 
the Project -  failing to understand its innovative character -  or openly opposed it -  
perceiving it as representing a potential menace to their power, directly linked with the 
redistribution of funds (Anfossi 2000:16).
The issue of internal areas, between past traditions and assisted modernisation
In the first twenty years of the politics of public intervention in the South -  which 
represented a phase of great economic development for Italy as a whole -  another 4 
million people emigrated from the South to Northern Italy and Europe. In Sardinia from
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1960 almost 10% of the population left over the course of ten years, mainly from 
Barbagia, the central area of Sardinia in the province of Nuoro, which had received only 
the last scraps of the Plan’s funds.134 This was a result of having ignored the Plan’s 
original objectives in favour of the adoption of the policy of developing industrial poles 
chosen for the South (Mutti 1981b: 386-387). Moreover, the unaccomplished 
administrative decentralisation to communes and provinces (as provided for by article 
44 of the Sardinian statute) had led to a kind of ‘ministerial feudalism’ in the 
distribution of roles among the regional president and the members of its executive 
(Accardo 1998: 49).
It was in Barbagia that, in the late 1960s, there was an escalation of violence and 
protest. On the one hand there was a resurgence of banditry -  a longstanding feature of 
Sardinian shepherd communities -  which became more professional and progressed 
from the stealing of sheep to the kidnapping of affluent people to collect ransoms. Faced 
with the rising number of kidnappings (33 between 1966 and 1968), the government 
proclaimed a state of siege, sending policemen and trained soldiers (baschi blu) to scour 
the mountains and control the area. Sociologists debated the possible causes of the 
phenomenon, seen either as an expression of a culture of violence, isolation and 
underdevelopment or an anticolonialist movement for liberation of the Sardinian people 
(Clark 1990: 447). In the same period there were also several cases of occupation of city 
councils in the area by citizens protesting over issues ranging from unemployment, 
militarisation of the island, to ‘top-down’ developmental projects favouring private 
capital.135 Also, on the rest of the island there were public outcries on the part of miners, 
students and factory workers that went on for months until the national Parliament, 
pressured by Sardinian politicians, instituted a commission to investigate criminality 
and public discontent in Sardinia.
Predominately in Barbagia there was also a flourishing of a new cultural wave 
(neosardismo), which proposed the idealisation of an agro-pastoral world that was 
fighting against a forced form of colonialist modernisation: “it was the first time that the 
Sardinian cultural identity was recognised by many as something desirable, that was 
worth defending against modernity” (Clark 1990: 453). In this way the internal areas, 
humiliated by the oblivion of regional and national politics, found a kind of moral
134 In the 1962-1970 period the province of Cagliari absorbed 62.7% of the total of the Plan’s 
investments. 30.4% went to the Sassari province, while only 6.9% went to the Nuoro province. Mutti 
(1981b), p.386.
135 Opposition to the government’s plan of creating a national park in central Sardinia or locating a 
shooting range in the Pratobello area was mainly driven by the fears of shepherds’ communities losing 
their traditional access to those areas for grazing.
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legitimisation as the cultural core of the island. Arguments about the ‘violated culture’ 
or ‘historic resistance’ of the Sardinians against colonisers (Lilliu 1970; 1971) or the 
revival of the use of the Sardinian language (sa limba), animated nostalgic debates on 
the Sardinian nation with a flavour of ethnic separatism -  sometimes inserted within the 
picture of a Europe of regions (Simon Mossa 1984; Ruju 1998: 872) -  which, however, 
remained in the domain of a minority group (Clark 1990: 428; Mutti 1981b: 402).
These waves of popular and political discontent were exploited by young DC 
leaders from Nuoro (the so-called Forze Nuove movement, led by Ariuccio Carta) 
which attacked the old notables. P. Dettori, DC president of the region from 1966, 
launched against the state a ‘policy of contestation’ (politica contestativa), based on 
cooperation among all of the regional autonomist political forces. He called on the state 
to carry through the promises made to the island over the Rebirth Plan and demanded a 
new role for the Sardinian region: allowing for a greater participation of its institutions 
in decision-making over economic planning and the insertion of its development within 
the Mediterranean area, through projects such as the establishment of a free trade zone 
or a large canal port in Cagliari.136 The ideology of autonomy was thus renewed by 
using ‘neo-sardist’ rhetoric, reassembling Sardinia’s political forces around the regional 
government while placing all of the blame for past failures on the central government, 
responsible for a colonial logic of exploitation via industrialisation. However, after less 
than a year the government collapsed due to scandals within the DC party. Moreover, 
the feasibility of the project to re-establish the original drive of the autonomist discourse 
in regional politics was hampered by several factors: the resistance of the local elite, 
unable to cut the umbilical cord with the central government (Accardo 1998: 85; Mutti 
1981b); the decline of DC votes following the diminishing influence of the Church in 
Italy, leading DC leaders to ally with almost every other party in search of a majority. 
This dispersion of power -  for which each party felt entitled to a ministry or a 
development agency -  created growing political instability within the executive branch 
of regional government and made it unable to carry out a coherent programme that 
could please everyone. Finally, the rhetoric used in the neo-autonomist discourse of 
regional politicians was linked to a rural world that did not exist anymore, rather than 
being adjusted to a social context that had been transformed by thirty years of state 
intervention (Mutti 1981b: 428).
Del Rio (DC), who was elected president after Dettori, took up this autonomist 
programme by declaring his commitment to the internal zones (especially Barbagia,
136 Mutti (1981b), pp.426,427. The canal port project became operative only during the last few years.
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defined as the area of the authentic Sardinian identity) (Accardo 1998: 86). In May 1969 
his executive approved the fourth executive programme of the Rebirth Plan, which for 
the first time tried to supply ‘autonomous’ regional planning: after having expressed 
serious concerns over the process of industrialisation on the island, it provided for 
measures in favour of SMEs or industries with high labour intensity. In 1972 the results 
of the parliamentary report on criminality in Sardinia were presented:137 the 
underdevelopment and precariousness of the pastoral condition were identified as the 
main causes of the phenomenon and a critique of the previous industrialisation model 
was addressed. The report recognised the failure of central institutions in administering 
the Plan and recommended for the next version measures regarding sheep-rearing, the 
creation of small-sized industries with high labour intensity, and the setting up of police 
stations in Barbagia.
The recommendations of the report were taken up by the following Plan (law 
268/1974), which financed the ‘rebirth’ with another 600 billion lire for the following 
10 years.138 Dettori, now regional minister of the Budget and Planning, tried to reform 
regional planning by introducing ‘projects’ operationalised in 25 territorial districts 
(icomprensori). The three priority axes identified were the industrial development of 
SMEs and labour intensive industries, the expansion of urban areas, and the reform of 
the agro-pastoral system.139 Also, a measure was envisaged to reduce to three (one for 
agriculture, one for industry and one for tourism and water resources) the multitude of 
regional agencies. However, despite all the criticism of previous policies and the 
declared good intentions of the new one, the first half of the 1970s saw further large 
investment in the petrochemical sector, although this time it was mainly destined to the 
centre of the island with the establishment of the Ottana pole in the Barbagia area. 
Although the pole was justified as being the first to be really integrated into the 
economy of the territory, its goal was mainly political, intending to give an answer to 
banditry and revolts in the internal areas through forced modernisation of local society 
(Mutti 1981b: 413). The international crisis of the petrochemical sector in the mid­
137 Senato della Repubblica, Commissione parlamentare d ’inchiesta dei fenomeni di criminalita in 
Sardegna, (1972).
138 Sardinia’s under-populated areas have been seen as the ideal place for military training and NATO 
bases. The Italo-American agreement of 1972, to set up in Santo Stefano an American nuclear base, was 
signed by the Italian Defence and Foreign Office Ministers without prior consultation or informing the 
Sardinian assembly (or the national Parliament).
139 The reform, at the centre of attention because it was meant to solve the problem of criminality in the 
internal areas, was to transform sheep-rearing from being nomadic to being residential and the 
constitution of a common area reserved for grazing (the so-called ‘mount of pasture’), that could relieve 
the shepherds of the cost of paying in order to pasture the flock, through the acquisition or expropriation 
of uncultivated land.
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seventies hit the Sardinian plants particularly hard, which were little differentiated and 
mainly concentrated on basic chemicals, and thus the remaining funds from the Plan 
were used following a logic of an emergency to save the sector. The project of 
downsizing the regional agencies was blocked by strong resistance from corporative 
interests; rather, Nuoro DC leaders were included in the redistribution, in recognition of 
their growing influence in the power-sharing game of regional politics (Mutti 1981b: 
422—423).
The rise of the Communist Party (PCI) on the Italian political scene and the 
subsequent ‘historic compromise’ adopted by national parties was reflected in Sardinia 
with the signing of the Intesa Autonomistica, a general agreement linking the DC 
president with leftist and autonomist forces in a common project of unity and solidarity. 
Starting from the conclusions of the parliamentary report on criminality, the agreement 
identified as priority fields of intervention an agro-pastoral reform and industrial 
development driven by the utilisation of local resources, like the development of mining 
activities (Mutti 1981b: 423). However, one result of this alliance was the withdrawal 
into a defensive attitude by the social movements, which calmed social protest and 
opposition to encourage regional governments to adopt rescue operations of the 
industries as a response to the socio-economic crisis afflicting the island.
Signs of transition: 
from the closing of the Cassa to the outset of the ‘Sardinian Project’
The 1980s represented a moment of retrenchment and stagnation with regard to the 
Italian state’s policy for the Mezzogiomo: in 1984 the Cassa was suppressed and was 
substituted two years later by the Agensud (Agenzia per la promozione dello sviluppo 
nel Mezzogiomo). The latter was introduced “with the expectation that it would adopt a 
more technocratic approach to the implementation of projects and undertake serious 
forms of evaluation of the impact of nationally managed and funded projects. However, 
the reality proved to be considerably different” (Leonardi 1995b: 234). The policy of 
extraordinary intervention was replaced with aid measures based on state transfers 
sustaining the purchasing power of southerners. Funds previously destined for the 
development of a weak and monosectoral industrial structure were redistributed through 
clientelistic channels to low quality interventions, unable to stimulate investment and to 
create jobs (Barbagallo 1996: 621): “[t]he result was an apparent modernisation and a
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facade of affluence compounded by a general deterioration of local politics towards 
clientelist methods, corruption and crime” (Desideri 1995: 84).
Also in Sardinia disillusionment over the possibility for change gained ground 
again among the population, faced with the inability of the political class to present a 
common front against the central government and to sustain their calls for an 
autonomous definition of the island’s development prospects. After thirty years of DC 
government, the presidency of the region went to the socialist F. Rais (1980-82), whose 
executive was prevented from launching the development plan by continuous political 
crises (Maurandi 1998: 302). Returning to a DC leader for another two years, the 
regional presidency went to the PSd’A leader Mario Melis from 1984 to 1989, who 
renewed autonomist and separatist themes within the wider enthusiasm over the ‘Europe 
of the Regions’ debate. Together with other prominent figures in the debate on 
autonomy (such as Umberto Cardia, Michele Columbu, Pietrino Soddu) and somehow 
anticipating the approach of the ‘Barcelona Process’, he tried to carve out for Sardinia a 
proactive role in the definition of cooperation initiatives among islands and regions of 
the Mediterranean (although the initiatives mostly remained at the symbolic and 
definitional level).140
Meanwhile, the territorial question was brought back into the Italian political 
debate by the secessionist challenges of the regional Leagues (Leghe\ protesting against 
an unproductive and corrupted South dependent on state subsidies dispensed with 
money from a prosperous North by an inefficient and clientelistic government, and 
proposing a federal division of the territory in three macro-regions. The more separatist 
sectors of the PSd'A -  claiming a sovereign, democratic and pacifist Sardinian state -  
started to flirt with the Leagues, meeting their leaders and joining their denunciation of 
Roman centralism and partitocracy (Accardo 1998: 134). However, those arguments 
were harder to support in the Sardinian case, where the despised state subsidies 
represented an essential means of sustenance of the region. The success and affirmation 
of the Leagues141 was amplified by the occurrence of the ‘Bribesville’ investigations 
(Tangentopoli), which in the early 1990s uncovered the thin line dividing clientelism 
from corruption in the Italian political system. The decline of the already quite weak 
faith in state institutions and feelings of national identity further undermined the
140 The project for the setting up of the “Conference of Mediterranean Regions, Islands and Middle-towns 
for a Common Policy” and having Cagliari as the headquarters of the general Secretariat, was drafted 
between 1987 and 1988 and presented to the regional government, but it was never formally accepted. 
See Marilotti (2005).
141 In the 1992 parliamentary election the Lega Nord obtained over 8% of the vote, thus becoming the 
fourth largest party in Italy; once in government, its early extremely provocative positions were notably 
moderated.
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argument for solidarity as the basis for the redistribution of resources that was 
traditionally adopted by the Italian government to tackle the persistent economic 
differentiation between its regions (Diamanti 1996).
In the 1990s, within the wider national picture of transition to the ‘Second 
Republic’, Sardinian politics seemed to follow a policy of drift and retreat from the 
definition of an autonomous political project. The fact that regional presidents managed 
to hold onto their positions throughout the legislature should not be misread as the 
regional governments having finally achieved political stability: the executives of the 
DC, M. Floris (until 1991), the Socialist A. Cabras (until 1994) and the PDS, F. 
Palomba (until 1999) all represented weak centre-left coalitions that were constantly 
subjected to political blackmail by the different allies, and thus were unable to confront 
the central government with a coherent developmental strategy (Accardo 1998: 135). 
Also, the opportunity for change offered by the new EU Regional Policy was not 
exploited, given the evident difficulties of the region in implementing the funds 
received according to the new policy paradigm.142
This situation was shared with all other Italian Objective 1 Southern regions, 
whose political leaders seemed more concerned about continuing to get -  from the EU 
today and from the state in the past -  their share of allocated funds,143 rather than 
investigating the reasons for their backward development. Moreover, it further 
amplified at the European level the already diffused reputation of Italy for its low level 
of administrative capacity (Bull and Baudner 2004: 1065), often explained with 
reference to the ‘Mediterranean Syndrome’ (LaSpina and Sciortino 1993: 219). 
However at the end of the 1990s a newly created Department of Development Policies 
(DPS) within the Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning launched a new series of 
policies (Nuova Programmazione) aimed at enhancing the virtuous use of local 
resources in backward areas (Viesti 2003: 98-99). This ‘New Planning’ was inspired by 
several of the tenets of EU Regional Policy (such as ‘bottom-up’ strategic planning 
regulated by transparent norms on monitoring and evaluation) and later extended to the
142 The percentage of use of the IMPs funds received by the Sardinian region for the 1989-93 period 
(almost 336,046 million Italian lire) was only 70%. See Pruna (2001), p.92. The spending rate for the 
same period for Objective 1 regions, as registered between the end of 1993 and June 1994, was 47% in 
Italy, while 89% in Spain, 91% in Portugal, and 94% in Greece. When, by the end of 1995 the latter 
countries had almost reached 100%, Italy still registered only 72% in spending rates. Naldini and Wolleb 
(1996), pp.53-54. The failure was also striking at a domestic level, where most areas of the centre and 
north have adopted a leading role of ‘motor regions’, making the most of the opportunities offered by the 
EU. See: Bull and Baudner (2004), p. 1066.
143 Running in the 1999 elections for the European Parliament, the ex-president of the Sardinian region 
Palomba presented his candidature proudly reminding the electorate that he was the man who had 
confirmed Sardinia’s Objective 1 status (a clear message to his ‘clientele’, but which, however, meant he 
had managed to keep the region in the group of the most backward EU regions).
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management of the 2000-06 Structural Funds in Italian regions, focussing on qualitative 
measures aiming to improve regional institutional capacities (Viesti 2003: 100; Barca 
2000).
The rising discontent of the Sardinian citizens with regard to their regional political 
class became evident in the 1999 regional elections. As quoted by the local press, the 
candidate for the right wing coalition M. Pili (a young journalist whose campaign -  
presented as a blueprint for change -  had been directly supported by Berlusconi),144 
received a very high level of support from the electorate, although this was more on the 
basis of distrust of the well-known ‘official’ figures of politics than for his personal 
merits.145 The local ex-DC leader Floris, backed by the Sardinian ex-president of the 
Italian republic, Cossiga,146 denounced Pili’s victory as the abandonment of the 
Sardinian region to external forces, and proposed an alliance of the centrist parties with 
the declared aim of restoring its ‘autonomy’. Although elected by the regional council 
with a small majority in August 1999, Pili was forced to resign two months later after a 
political gaffe147 and replaced by Floris in November. However, legitimised by the 
popular support and strengthened by the contemporary ascent to the national 
government of the Forza Italia (FI) coalition, Pili managed to get re-elected, although 
with an unstable majority, causing the executive to undergo a prolonged crisis: between 
2001 and 2003 he was able to govern only for twenty troubled months.
Despite the instability of his government, Pili managed to engage in several of the 
debates concerning the development of the region, showing commitment and familiarity 
with the vocabulary of a policy agenda increasingly defined at the EU level, and directly 
participating in the activities of European regional lobbies or the Committee of Regions 
on the issue of insularity (which had growing relevance following the realisation that 
Sardinia would soon exit Obj.l). The same claims were also used at home to support the 
‘territorial continuity’ argument -  often using the Corsican case as a model -  asking the
144 In the 1999 regional elections Pili received 151,000 preference votes, compared to the 90,000 of his 
predecessor. Only thirty-two years old at the time of the election, Pili had previously been a journalist and 
mayor of Iglesias (the main city in the southwest of Sardinia), directly elected from a civic list. In 2000 
Silvio Berlusconi (national leader of the moderate right coalition Forza Italia and former and future Prime 
Minister) nominated Pili regional coordinator of his party.
145 For further details on the election, see the articles in the local daily newspaper, L ’Unione Sarda 
(10.08.1999).
146 After the dissolution of the DC party Floris, who had already been president of the Region, joined in 
the centrist party founded by Cossiga called Union of Sardinians (UDS).
147 It was discovered that part of his introductory speech, which contained his programme for governing 
the region, had been copied from the one made three years earlier by the FI regional president for 
Lombardy, Formigoni. Together with some copied lines on unemployment, environment, social services, 
some ludicrous passages on “the eleven Sardinian provinces” (which were four at that time) or stating that 
“Sardinia had to look towards the Alps” made it even more plausible that the ‘accident’ was more of a 
conspiracy on the part of the old guard against what they perceived to be an ‘external’ element.
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Italian government for reduced special fares to reach mainland Italy from the island. 
However, many of his initiatives were blocked by internal resistance of the regional 
administration to his authority and continuous crises within his government.
For the regional elections in 2004 Pili based his campaign on the need for 
continuity, so that what he had started could be brought to fruition. However, this time 
he had a stronger opponent: Renato Soru, founder of Tiscali (the well-known internet 
access provider company), who was also a ‘new man’ of politics but was able as well to 
build on his own reputation as a skilled businessman with a strong attachment to the 
island. Building a centre-left coalition around a ‘Sardinian project’ (Progetto Sardegna 
became the name of the coalition) undertaking to launch on the island a development 
strategy linking technological innovation with the preservation of the environment and 
cultural identity and a moral renewal of regional politics. His victory brought new 
technical figures borrowed from civil society (university professors, managers and 
administrators, with women significantly represented) to main posts of regional 
institutions, traditionally held by professional politicians and local notables, and a 
political strategy increasingly restive with national decisions regarding the region’s 
socio-economic development.148
The Soru government has launched an internal restructuring of the region inspired 
by the models of New Public Management (as we shall see in the next section, those 
models are supported by EU policies), with a special emphasis on the improvement of 
regional services and communication with the citizenry (health service, e-govemment, 
etc.). However it is too early to judge his overall accomplishments. Moreover, what has 
still not emerged is a clear ‘proactive’ regional strategy linking the project of integrated 
development in with a wider territorial setting. Regional action seems to follow the 
traditional logic dictated by deadlines or ‘emergencies’ in the different policy areas: 
Sardinia is present in several EU and international projects with individual initiatives 
led by universities, cultural centres, firms, chambers of commerce, communes and 
provinces, as well as regional services which, however, have not been networked and 
enhanced within a common line of action adopted by the regional government.149
148 Typical examples are the recent conflicts between the regional executive and the Italian government 
over the NATO military base at LaMaddalena and radioactive waste disposal (typical themes of the 
autonomist tradition), and the law prohibiting building in coastal areas.
149 The Regional Law 19/96 “Norms on cooperation with developing countries and international 
cooperation”, which had also identified the Mediterranean as at the centre of regional initiatives, has 
never really been implemented. See Marilotti (2005).
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Conclusion
Although the regionalisation of the Italian territory was introduced by the 1948 
Constitution, it took over 20 years to implement. The resistance of DC central 
governments to regional devolution was linked both to their fears of the seizing of 
power by the Left in the ‘red regions’ and to the clientelistic relations linking political 
parties to their electorate. During those decades the state managed to retain its 
prerogatives over most policy areas, especially development policies and economic 
planning, as well as over the bureaucracy, mainly brought through party affiliation.
Sardinia, however, had been granted, with the other four peripheral regions, an 
autonomous status providing a limited transfer of state powers. Its special statute also 
included a formal commitment from the state to the social and economic ‘rebirth’ of the 
island: thus the autonomist rhetoric used by regional politicians was soon translated into 
requests addressed to the central government of material concessions for modernisation, 
rather than for a real exertion of self-rule on the island. Despite its commitments, the 
national government inserted Sardinia’s ‘rebirth’ within the policy of ‘extraordinary 
intervention’ for the development of Southern Italy. Policies for the island’s 
modernisation were defined in a ‘top-down’ manner in accordance with the same 
development model, which did not activate connections with the local socio-economic 
structure of Southern Italy, but rather encouraged a collusion of public and private 
industries with political power. The Sardinian regional elite, embedded within the 
clientelistic system of redistribution of state funds, exchanged its political support of the 
central government by negotiating over the quantity, and not the quality of development 
policies for the region. Although there were occasional attempts by the regional class to 
change this situation and regain self-rule over the development of its territory, the 
culture of subsidies spread over a declining civic and political life in Sardinia (as in the 
rest of the country).
Since the 1990s the redefinition of relations between politics and society has 
become a priority issue in national as well as regional politics. As we shall argue in the 
following section, a way towards a new path to regionalisation is that offered by the 
‘EU model’, legitimising regions as autonomous actors responsible for the definition 
and implementation of their developmental policies in partnership with other territorial 
levels.
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SECTION ra
Regional policies and regionalisation in Corsica and Sardinia:
the ‘European model9
Chapter 6 -  The story o f  the ‘islands’ INTERREG
In the present section I will examine the influence of the ‘EU model’ of organization of 
power and territory through the analysis of the implementation in Corsica and Sardinia 
of an initiative of EU Regional Policy extending MLG to cooperation among regional 
actors belonging to different MSs. I will analyse the story of the INTERREG France- 
Italy ‘islands’ programme for Corsica and Sardinia since its launch in 1990, in order to 
establish the response of regional actors to the innovative logic introduced by the 
programme. How INTERREG, through its different editions, has gained a more 
coherent and effective structure, winning itself an increasingly relevant role within EU 
Regional Policy, will be considered. I will then introduce the main characters of our 
INTERREG story and reconstruct in detail what have been their main activities 
(planning, monitoring, financial management, evaluation) through the consideration of 
evidence drawn from the analysis of planning documents related to the programme, and 
the key points emerging from the interviews.
Finally, the core features of the ‘EU model’, as presented by INTERREG, will be 
contrasted with that of the ‘national model’ (traced in section II through the historical 
analysis of the regional policies implemented on the islands in the post-war decades). 
The notable innovations proposed by the programme included, inter alia, that the two 
regions should cooperatively plan and manage according to an ‘area-based approach’, 
integrated developmental strategies linking their outlook within the wider picture of a 
spatially coordinated development of the European territory. Our task will be to see 
whether regional actors -  used to implement regional strategies defined according to the 
‘national model’ -  have been willing or capable to adopt and learn the quite different 
logic suggested by the INTERREG or, conversely, if mechanisms of path dependency 
have prevailed.
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The backgrounds: the evolution of Community Initiative INTERREG
Since the 1988 reform of EU Regional Policy, a small part of the Structural Funds 
budget was devoted to Community Initiatives (CIs), innovative projects experimenting 
with new approaches and generating new ideas in European regional development to be 
applied to mainstream policy when successful. The action of CIs had to be 
complementary to that of other SFs, and thus had to follow their general rules and 
objectives. However, while measures proposed for financing in the Community Support 
Frameworks of mainstream policies were drafted by the MSs, in agreement with 
regional and local actors, the Community Initiatives Programmes (CIPs) were drafted 
by the Commission, defining objectives, participants, measures and policy areas to be 
targeted.150 Their main aim, in fact, was to tackle development problems through 
coordinated action at Community level, targeting specific disadvantaged groups and 
involving regional and local actors. In order to be able to realise what arguably 
represented the most creative and coherent translation of a truly European approach to 
regional policy, it was important to avoid gatekeeping or rough adaptation from the 
national level. Thus, especially at the beginning, the Commission negotiated national 
programmes on the basis of a ‘carrot and stick’ strategy: “while the Commission usually 
gave in on the implementation of the infrastructure part of the package [...], it insisted 
on proper implementation of the more innovative programmes” (Grote 1996: 278).
The experimental character of the policies justified the relatively modest sums 
involved, and also considered the high number of initiatives launched in the first 
edition. For the 1989-1993 planning period 13 CIs were funded with a budget of 5.8 
billion ECUs, almost 9% of the total Structural funds allocation.151 During the second 
planning period (1994-1999) the contribution for CIs nearly doubled -  in line with the 
overall increases to the SFs; the followed-up initiatives were improved and those 
surpassed by events were substituted. For the third planning period (2000-2006) the 
number of initiatives was drastically reduced to four, in order to increase their visibility, 
and received little more than 5% of the Structural Funds budget (see figure 6.1).
150 After having heard the opinion of the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and 
— since 1993 -  the Committee of the Regions, the Commission adopted the final guidelines published in 
the Official Journal, and invited MSs to submit proposals and projects for the financing of specific 
projects.
151 A share of the CIs funds also went to Community projects adopted before 1989: STAR 
(telecommunications), VALOREN (renewable energy resources) RESIDER (conversion of steel-making 
regions) and RENAVAL (conversion of shipbuilding regions). See Commission (1994).
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fig. 6.1 - The evolution of Community Initiatives
(1990-93)
INTERREG (cross-border cooperation); RECHAR (converting coal mining areas); 
RETEX (converting textile areas); KONVER (economic diversification of areas reliant on 
defence industry); LEADER (rural development); REGIS (integration of the most remote 
regions); TELEMATIQUE (advanced telecommunication services); PRISMA (business 
services related to the single market); EUROFORM (new types of vocational 
qualification); NOW (equal opportunities for women in the labour market); HORIZON 
(access to the labour markets for disabled and disadvantaged groups), ENVIREG 
(environmental protection); REGEN (energy networks); STRIDE (research, technology 
development and innovation in the regions). Initiatives launched before 1989 and included 
in the CIs: STAR (telecommunications); RESIDER (converting steel areas); REN AVAL 
(converting shipbuilding areas); VALOREN (renewable energy resources).
(1994-99)
INTERREG II, RECHAR II, LEADER II, REGIS II, RESIDER II, RETEX, KONVER, 
URBAN (development of urban areas); SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises); PESCA 
(diversification in areas reliant on fisheries); ADAPT (adaptation of the workforce to 
industrial change); EMPLOYMENT (vocational training measures in disadvantaged 
regions); PEACE (initiative for peace in Northern Ireland).
(2000-06) INTERREG III, LEADER+, URBAN, EQUAL (transnational cooperation to combat discrimination in the labour market)
fig. 6.2 - The evolution of Community Initiative INTERREG
Community Initiative’s 
Goals/ Time-frame
INTERREG I 
(1990-93)
INTERREG H 
(1994-99)
INTERREG III 
(2000-06)
cross-border
cooperation
31 programmes 
(4 maritime)
A) 59 programmes (16 
maritime), of which 31 
internal and 28 external 
border programmes
A) 53 programmes (14 
maritime), of which 24 
internal and 29 external 
border (12 external with 
new MS, internal by 2004)
completion of energy 
networks
B) Continuation of the 
REGEN Cl (3 
programmes)
transnational
cooperation
C) focus on regional and 
spatial planning (ESDP): 
programmes on 
transnational cooperation 
(7), flood mitigation (2), 
drought prevention (4)
B) 13 programmes, mostly 
related to previous IIC 
programmes and pilot 
actions; 2 new 
programmes for outermost 
regions
interregional
cooperation
C) 4 programmes dividing 
the EU administratively 
into four large areas of 
territorial cooperation 
(North, East, South, West)
[source: our elaboration from INTERACT (2005), Commission (2000)]
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INTERREG was one of the initiatives that survived the shake-out. Promoting
cooperation between bordering regions as if they were a sole geographical entity,
INTERREG was always recognised as a priority within CIs and received nearly half of
their resources (see figure 6.2). When launched in 1990 the initiative had the explicit
aim of contributing to the economic integration of designated cross-border areas in view
of the completion of the Single European Market project. Claims for a wider
participation of peripheral and border areas in the benefits of European integration had
1been raised by regional lobbies since the 1970s, and were strengthened during the
subsequent decade under the ‘Europe of the Regions’ tide. This led the European
Commission to devise a group of pilot projects, undertaken in 1989 by the Commission
under article 10 of the ERDF regulations, to promote cooperation between border
regions, counting on a 21 million ECU budget. INTERREG was drafted on the basis of
those projects and was launched a year later with the task of helping internal and
external border regions of the EU to surmount specific developmental problems
deriving from their relative isolation within national economies and the wider EU
setting. In complementary fashion, the REGEN Community Initiative was launched the
same year, to complete some missing links in the trans-European network for transport
and energy distribution in Objective 1 regions. The total budget for INTERREG was
1 ^1,075 MECUs (of which the Community contribution covered nearly 57%), to be 
used within a three-year period in thirty-one programmes of cooperation between 
neighbouring border regions, statistically defined at the NUTS 2 level: nine for external 
frontiers, the rest for internal borders.
However, it soon became apparent that the objective of economic integration of 
peripheral areas was beyond the means of the programme. The structural nature of the 
core-periphery distribution of economic activities in the European territory, in fact, 
could not allow INTERREG, given its limited resources and area of intervention, to 
achieve the integration of the regional economies of border regions. Its specific 
contribution seemed rather to consist in the promotion or enhancement of cooperation 
between territorial actors at a horizontal level, against the competitive logic led by 
national or local interests. As reported in the ex post evaluation assigned by the 
Commission for an assessment of the first edition: “[t]he least established impact, at the 
end, is the economic development of cross-border areas, although it constituted the
152 Among them, two of the most influential are -  even now -  the Association of European Border 
Regions (AEBR), and the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CRPM) respectively founded 
in 1971 and 1973.
153 Nearly 80% of Community’s contribution came from ERDF funds, while the rest was derived from the 
ESF, EAGGF, and article 10-ERDF. See FERE (1996), p. 15.
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primary objective o f most o f the programmes” (FERE 1996: 20). On the other hand it became 
apparent that, as put by the First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, “INTERREG, in 
particular, represents an unprecedented example o f regional cooperation under the Structural 
Funds” (Commission 1996: 111).
Table 6.3 - The evolution of CIs’ and INTERREG’s allocation within the SFs’ budget
1989-93 (EU-12)
□  INTERREG
1.7%
91.6%
2000-06 (EU-15)
□  INTERREG
2.7%
other SFs 
89.9%
□  INTERREG
2.5%
1994-99 (EU-15)
other CIs
7.6%
Once it was recognised that a strong economic impact was beyond the programme’s 
scope, INTERREG was directed by the Commission to ‘softer’ outcomes, particularly 
related to that ‘quality’ of territorial partnerships which was emerging as bearing the 
most ‘integrative potential’ of the policy. Precisely because of the unexpected relevance 
of this aspect of the policy, initially territorial partnerships were not cultivated, but grew 
out of a more ‘voluntarist’ approach (FERE 1996: 18). This fact clearly facilitated those 
territories that already shared a tradition of cooperative practices or where the interest to 
cooperate was stronger. Conversely, where these factors were not present -  as in the 
case of our island regions -  in front of aims and procedures not yet clearly defined, 
regions tended to adopt innovations only in terms of a ‘minimum level of adaptation’ 
logic for the new administrative and planning procedures (FERE 1996: 18).
Beginning with the second CSF cycle (1994-1999) the policy was tied to the 
budget and regulations of the Structural Funds. INTERREG II was divided into two 
strands: strand A was dedicated to cross-border cooperation in internal and external 
border areas of the EU (also with the aim to ease the accession of applicant countries), 
while strand B  inherited the task of the former REGEN initiative — to complete the 
trans-European network for transport and energy distribution. In 1996 strand C was 
introduced, to promote an integrated approach among groups of regions, cooperating to 
solve problems linked to territorial development, flooding and drought. INTERREG III 
(2000-06) maintained the triple structure, although varied on the last two strands: cross- 
border cooperation remained unchanged {strand A), transnational cooperation {strand B) 
continued the approach that had been tested with the II-C strand in the previous edition, 
and interregional cooperation (a new strand C) was devised to facilitate the exchange of 
know-how on territorial development among macro areas of regions).
Thus, although today INTERREG arguably represents the most well-established 
case among Community Initiatives, it underwent several changes and reassessments 
concerning both its internal organization as well as the evolution of its strategy (for a 
synthesis, see figure 6.3). In this last regard the introduction to the policy, with the II-C 
strand, of an innovative spatial approach to the integrated planning of regional areas 
defined by the Commission deserves special attention. The approach reflects what is 
today known as the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), a document 
adopted in Potsdam in May 1999 by the informal European Council of EU Ministers 
responsible for Spatial Planning. The document was the end product of a series of 
informal meetings organized among representatives of the Commission’s services and 
national ministries responsible for regional and spatial planning.
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The ‘revolutionary’ potential of the document lays in the fact that it proposes a 
‘territorial isation of the EU’, i.e. a consideration of the European territory in its entirety, 
beyond those borders traditionally defining the contours of national societies. The 
document considers EU regional policies as manageable on an area-wide and integrated 
basis, against a traditionally sectoral policy approach. On the premise that “growth in 
itself or convergence of economic key figures is not sufficient to develop a balanced and 
sustainable economic and spatial structure of the EU”, the document draws a ‘triangle of 
objectives’ inserted within a virtuous circle: Economy (intended as a more balanced 
competitiveness of the European territory), Society (social cohesion and conservation of 
cultural heritage), and Environment (conservation of natural resources) as the 
interconnected objectives collectively contributing to achieve the main goals of EU 
policies (Commission 1999b: 9-10). Such an integrated and multi-actor approach to 
development policies relies on increased efforts of coordination through cooperative 
networks: “[c]o-operation is the key to an integrated and spatial development policy and 
represents added value over sectoral policies acting in isolation (European Commission 
1999b: 35).
fig. 6.4 -  The triangle of objectives 
for balanced and sustainable spatial development
Society
9> }
Economy Environment
[source: Commission (1999), p. 10]
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Since the drafting of the ESDP, the Commission has sought to diffuse the 
document among national, regional and local authorities, enterprises and government 
officials and the general public. However, the Treaties did not contemplate any specific 
competence for the EU on spatial planning. After its adoption, the ESDP represented “a 
legally non-binding document” for MS: “the existing competencies of the institutions 
responsible for Community policies remain unchanged” (Commission 1999b: 11). The 
only way the Commission could proceed in this field was thus to prepare the ground for 
future integration concerning EU spatial planning through soft mechanisms of ‘framing 
integration’. The extended approach to MLG proposed by INTERREG offered a perfect 
tool for this aim, and was further extended to wider regional areas: “[f]rom a spatial 
development standpoint, the Community Initiative INTERREG is the most significant 
measure of the Structural Funds, as it provides an integrated approach to spatial 
development. Priority (...) is given to the relation between the factors influencing 
territorial organization in an integrated development approach in border regions and 
larger transnational cooperation areas” (Commission 1999b: 16).
In the third INTERREG edition the ESDP became one of the primary references in 
the planning documents of the territorial partners. Thus, through its evolution, the policy 
managed to find an objective suited to its properties: the main aim of interregional 
cooperation was no longer to promote integration of peripheral regions in the European 
market but to contribute to the socio-economic and, especially, territorial cohesion of 
the European territory.
Prologue: launching the INTERREG between Corsica and Sardinia
Despite being only 15km apart and having commonalities in cultural traditions, 
environmental resources and developmental handicaps, Corsica and Sardinia did not 
engage in long-lasting practices of cooperation (with the exception of transport in illegal 
contraband). Economic weakness and dependency on the central government proved to 
be a stronger barrier than the strip of water dividing their shores. This started to change 
from the 1980s when, following the drift of the European new-regionalist wave, both 
the islands joined the increasingly organized lobbies of peripheral and maritime regions, 
contributing to the creation of ‘islands committees’ in their midst. One of the main aims 
of those lobbies was to intervene in the ongoing debate on European integration asking 
MSs to display the value of European membership also in peripheral or disadvantaged 
areas.
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As seen in the second chapter, EU Regional Policy represented one of the main 
fields in which this confrontation was played out. In the case of our island regions, in 
1989 the European Parliament proposed to adopt a common approach to their territorial 
development and appointed the socialist deputy Alonso Cabeson rapporteur for the 
Commission of Regional Policy and Regional Planning on a dossier regarding the 
‘Regional problems of Corsica and Sardinia’. After his report, the Parliament produced 
a Resolution where it invited the Commission to give “special attention to those two 
regions because of their near geographical situation, their specific socio-economic 
characteristics due to their insular and peripheral character”, and encouraged “a policy 
of development of economic, cultural and social exchanges (...) notably for the 
development of maritime and air links”.154
In 1990, following the Parliament’s invitation, the Commission included in the list 
of eligible areas for cross-border cooperation under the INTERREG initiative the 
departement of Corse-du-Sud and the provincia of Sassari in the North of Sardinia, 
considered as areas divided by a ‘maritime border’ between France and Italy. The 
political choice of including the two island regions in the programme required a few 
interpretive adjustments. The consideration of the Strait of Boniface as a maritime 
border between France and Italy was certainly a new idea for the two islands, 
surrounded by the Tyrrhenian Sea and used to locate the borders of their respective 
states on the mainland (‘the continent’). The maritime border between Northern Corsica 
and the Leghorn province in Tuscany, defined by the INTERREG II-A programme, 
later merged with the ‘islands’ one, was a case of a border between France and Italy 
even more disputable. This is how the functionary following INTERREG programs at 
the Italian Ministry of transports expresses the peculiarities of the programme:155
[In Italy] the 'islands9 INTERREG programme is unique in different respects: first, it has been 
the only maritime frontier considered as a border since the first edition (later also recognised 
for the Adriatic); second, it is the only cross-frontier with two regions from the same state 
(Sardinia and Tuscany) in the A stream. (I.2.I-III)
154 Resolution of the European Parliament (26.5.1989). See Olivesi (1999), pp.752-753.
155 All the quotations are extracted from the interviews I had with administrators directly involved in the 
partnership management of the INTERREG ‘islands’ programme. The reference at the end of each 
sentence indicates the institutional affiliation of the interviewee (C = Corsican region; S = Sardinian 
region; I = Italian state; F = French state; E = European Commission), the different identity of the 
interviewee (a different number is associated to different persons of the same institution) and the 
INTERREG edition to which he/she has participated (I-II-III). A complete list of the people interviewed 
is provided in the annexes. Translations from the original French/Italian text of the interviews to English 
are mine.
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The declared aim of the ‘islands’ programme had the double objective of 
overcoming the isolation of the two regions both at the national and European level, and 
encouraging the creation of a ‘Corso-Sardinian’ economic block, to be integrated within 
the European single market. With the same objectives the programme was reconfirmed 
for the next planning edition (1994—99), while in INTERREG III (2000-06) the overall 
strategy was revised in light of new developments in the definition of the policy’s 
objectives. However, since the first editions it was evident to the partners that the 
rationale of the policy was mainly political: in fact, despite the ambitions of the declared 
aims, the modest sums involved suggested that the main goal of the programme was to 
grant visibility to, or even ‘pay o ff, two peripheral regions of the EU that had only 
limited participation in the benefits of the process of economic integration of the EU. As 
we shall see further, the tangible effects of the policy later also came to the fore, and 
were especially relevant for the Corsican partner. Similarly, with the advancement of 
the programme the link between the goal of territorial cohesion and the 
‘denationalisation’ of territory accomplished by a truly ‘Europeanised’ approach to 
development was reinforced.
INTERREG moves little sums, therefore it rather has a political value: it is seen [by the island 
regions] as an offered opportunity to narrow the gap with other European regions. (S.2.I-II)
INTERREG is not a rich policy: the Corsican part o f the PIC funds is nearly 5% o f what the 
region gets with its Structural Funds share. However, it is important and this time not only at 
the institutional level. In fact in the new edition the CTC is also the Managing arid Payment 
Auxiliary Authority: in order to perform these functions we have opened a single office 
( ‘guichet unique) at the CTC, also offering advice to the partners interested in benefiting from 
the funds. (C.4.III)
I  have followed INTERREG as [regional] planning minister from September 1994 to January 
1998, thus until the closing of the first edition and the launching o f the second. In my opinion it 
is not a policy of great impact on local development, as in Sardinia there has been LEADER 
(...) its main result has been some projects realized. (S.l.I-II)
More than all other Community Initiatives, INTERREG responded to what had been the 
Commission’s intention when launching them, namely the construction of Europe, as it was 
never realised by the MSs. (1.3.2002)
INTERREG has facilitated the reciprocal knowledge, among the administrations o f Corsica and 
Sardinia, o f the different working practices and the different approach to planning. The 
programme suggests thinking in terms o f initiatives going beyond the national level. (C.3.II-III)
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The actors: role of the partners in the ‘islands’ programme
The French and the Corsicans
In the first editions of the programme, the INTERREG ‘islands’ was managed by the 
decentralised services of the French state in Corsica. At the Centre for Planning in 
Corsica (SGAC) of the Prefecture,156 INTERREG planning was formally included 
within the tasks of a Planning Committee set up to follow the Single Planning 
Document for the SFs and other CIs. Along the lines of planning dictated by the 
DATAR, the SGAC had to elaborate, in partnership with the CTC and other local 
institutional and socio-economic actors, the drafts of the regional programmes which -  
after being examined by the prefect of Southern Corsica and the General Councils -
1 57were again submitted to the DATAR and the ministries concerned, finally presenting 
it to the European Commission. Initially directly followed only by a single functionary, 
lamenting its ‘oversized’ character in terms of planning requirements, the policy was 
passed in 1998 to the newly created ‘Europe unit’ (Cellule Europe) at the SGAC, where 
it was handled by a team of around three people (backed by the functionary that had 
followed it previously).
I found a general acknowledgement, among the partners, of the good level of 
preparation of French administrators, strictly interlinked with a feeling of national pride:
In France there is a good tradition, given from  the ENA [the National School o f  Administration, 
n.o.a.], creating a category o f  administrators, the so-called ‘enarcs ’, to whom the idea o f  the 
grandeur o f  France, country at the centre o f  the world, is inculcated. (E. 1.1-11)
The characterization of enarchs is often completed by the partners by defining their 
preparation as rigid, and thus often not fitting with the flexibility required by the 
INTERREG programme, and their sense of national superiority as often leading to an 
arrogant attitude improper with the partnership’s cooperative requirements (even when 
they are, in principle, right).
... discussion with them [the enarchs, n.o.a.] is like trying to have a conversation with a tape 
recorder: it always gives back the same answers! (E.l .1-11)
156 The General Secretary for Regional Affairs (SGAR) replaced in 1982 the Regional Missions in 
application of the decentralisation laws. Following the 1991 law for decentralisation in Corsica, it was 
named General Secretary for Corsican Affairs (SGAC).
157 In France formal responsibility for territorial policies passed from the Ministry of the Interior (under 
whose supervision are the regional and district prefects) to the Ministry of Environment (Secretariat for 
Regional Planning); however, the practical competence is under the responsibility of the DATAR (the 
French State Agency for Territorial Planning and Regional Policy).
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A few times the French prefecture has entered into the merits o f the Sardinian programme, 
disputing its functionality to the cross-border objective (especially for the measures on the port 
in S. Teresa di Gallura and on the holiday-farms). From the Sardinian side we have never 
discussed the Corsican measures, although even from their side more often than not measures 
did not have the required cross-border impact! (S. 1.1-11)
From the Corsican side the role of the SGAC, formally that of a mediator between the 
State and the Corsican territorial communities, was seen as that of a ‘tutor’ frustrating 
local initiative on matters concerning their own territory. As confirmed by the other 
partners, this situation certainly thwarted the ‘bottom-up’ approach of the policy in its 
early stages.
Among the internal difficulties I  would recall that o f associating the State services with those of 
the CTC (...) All has to pass through the prefect, representative of the State in the region!
(c.2.n-ni)
The Corsicans have internal problems. One o f those is the brake of the French authority... 
(E. 1.1-11)
The difference between the roles played by the two MSs in the project is that for Italy it was a 
role coordination, while for France it was o f strong centralism delegated to the Prefect, which 
created tension in the dialogue with Corsica, always to be mediated by him. Also the co­
presidency at the Monitoring Committees was with the higher State authorities, and not with the 
territorial ones. The situation was not without resistance from the Corsicans, and thus a 
‘triangle situation ’ emerged... It had been the same thing also in the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes and in the other EU programs. (I.2.I-II)
Sometimes the Corsicans have tried to make agreements with the Italians against Paris! (1.1.1- 
III).
The attitude of the French state in the programme partnership seemed to be reflected by 
the location site of the Prefecture in Ajaccio, capital city of Corsica, entrenched on the 
belvedere on the top of the city. Both during the interviews and through emails and 
phone calls, conversations were very formal and fastened (although not in the case of 
the Corsican functionaries ‘attached’ at the Province service, some later passed to the 
CTC) and additional information on internal documents (such as financial plans or 
annual reports) was given reluctantly and in minimum quantity. The opposite 
impression is offered when visiting the CTC, located in a beautiful villa in one of the 
main streets crossing the centre of Ajaccio, and with the informal attitude of its 
functionaries. The antithesis is often used by the partners in describing the French and 
the Corsican functionaries.
Local administrators in Corsica, on the contrary [to enarchs, n.o.a.], are neither prepared nor 
industrious: they aren V eager beavers... (E.l .1-11)
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A better knowledge of the Corsican regional administrators was gained by the other 
partners only after an increasingly active role was offered to the CTC within the 
programme. In fact, during the implementation of INTERREG II, launched in a line of 
continuity with the previous edition, changes in the organization of the management of 
the policy began to emerge, anticipating those defined in the third edition. When in 
1997 the INTERREG IIC strand was introduced -  in which Corsica could participate 
within the Western-Mediterranean area -  the CTC was ‘allowed’ by the state services to 
have direct financial and planning management. Functionaries at the CTC seemed to 
compensate for the lack of direct experience in administrative and financial 
management, both at an individual and at an institutional level, with an enthusiastic 
approach to their new role, also shown through their availability and cooperation during 
the interviews. Moreover the potential offered by INTERREG for a greater role for the 
region was readily seized by Norbert Pancrazi, a brilliant young functionary following 
the policy at the CTC. Pancrazi was supported, at the political and ideological level, by 
Jean Baggioni, influential president of the executive of the Corsican region (and as such 
participating in the INTERREG committees) and a charismatic advocate of the insular 
cause within European regional lobbies, often used as platforms to gain more visibility 
at home.
Thus the new Territorial Planning Unit at the CTC was established, having already 
in mind a clear picture of the potentials offered by INTERREG to the island in terms of 
the autonomous redefinition of its own territorial identity within the European setting. 
One of the first moves of the CTC as the formally recognised Management authority for 
its territory since 2000, was the creation of the guichet unique (a single office situated 
on the ground floor of the CTC), working under the direction of Pancrazi to provide 
assistance in all INTERREG programmes.
The Sardinians and the Italians
The situation on the Italian side was quite different, where since the first edition the 
programme was directly managed by the Sardinian region, keeping the contacts both at 
a subnational and supranational level. The Centre for Regional Planning (CRP), as seen 
in the previous section, was an ad hoc office originally created within the Planning 
Ministry of the Sardinian region to manage the Plan of Rebirth and to later administer 
other EU development funds. The CRP is located in one of the many anonymous 
buildings hosting the regional offices spread in Cagliari, capital city of Sardinia, and
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responding to the typical image of bureaucracy ‘Italian style’ (Cassese 1994; Ichino 
2006): grumpy or bored porters, loafers out of their office to chat in the corridors or to 
shop around, leaving the donkey’s work on the shoulders of the other few. Within the 
CRP, INTERREG was assigned to one single functionary, with a degree in engineering, 
not entirely convinced of the benefits that the region could get from a policy he found 
disproportionate in terms of demanding requirements and ‘meagre’ budget. In the third 
edition, the Sardinian region was chosen as a single Management Authority 
coordinating the work of the three auxiliary management authorities (the provinces of 
Sassari and Leghorn and the CTC). At the CRP, which became the official interlocutor 
to the Commission for the programme, two functionaries substituted the previous one 
(who was leaving the post for a career advancement). Also, in the province of Sassari 
the INTERREG Unit was reorganized.158 All the functionaries interviewed have always 
been very friendly and cooperative in giving useful material for the research (the 
different versions of the CIPs, annual reports, financial plans).
The central role of the CRP in the partnership allowed the other partners to develop 
a quite defined impression of the Sardinian one, with which they declare to have worked 
well and in a nice environment. However, shortcomings also emerged from the 
interviews, when I asked for an indication if there had been difficulties encountered 
with any of the partners.
Also, Sardinians do not speak foreign languages and administrators are little trained, with a 
fe w  exceptions... (E. 1.1-11)
As fo r  those [difficulties] with the Sardinians, they relate to a certain unreliability in terms o f  
meeting deadlines and problems in communicating (they do not answer the phone in their 
offices and they leave fo r  lunch at 2pm, while in Corsica the lunch break starts at 12am)
(c.2.n-ni)
A problem with the Sardinians has been the different working hours: in the afternoon it was 
difficult to fin d  them in their office. (F.l.I-HI)
There are other peculiar attitudes [ o f  Sardinians, n.o.a.]: on the one hand their resignation that 
things will continue as they always have; on the other hand a sort o f  will o f  ‘doing it by 
themselves ’ and the tendency to minimize the problems instead o f  facing them. (E.3.II)
I found this latter opinion to be particularly piercing, in that it shows a contradictory 
tension between Sardinian thrusts towards ambitious goals and lack of motivation to 
support their realisation in the long-term, or incapability to revise the goals ahead of 
obstacles (Elster 1983). This shortcoming was also found in some of the more relevant
158 PIC INTERREG IIIA, Italia-Francia, Sardegna-Corsica-Toscana, DOCUP 2000-2006, p. 148.
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episodes in chapter five (like the one on the drafting of the regional statute). Continuing 
with examples related to the analysis of INTERREG, since the first edition the CRP 
expressed its coordinating role in the programme with reference to a governance 
structure, represented with the image of a star featuring the CRP at its centre and other 
regional and local actors at its ends. However, things in reality looked quite different: 
regional agencies and ministries, as well as local authorities, did not recognise a 
coordinating role for the CRP, while the sought devolution for the province of Sassari 
was blocked by the absence of reference in national legislation. Also in this case, as we 
shall see, the situation notably improved with the advancement of the programme.
The Italian state, formally responsible for the ‘islands’ INTERREG, participated 
with functionaries from the Service for Community Funds of the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers, moved in 1997 to the Ministry of Public Works (later named 
Ministry for Transports and Communications), playing a supervisory role, and the 
ministries of Finance and Economy for the ordinary monitoring of financial 
accounting.159 The ministries are located in a huge historical building in the middle of 
the travelling centre of Rome, internally articulated in a Kafkian labyrinth of corridors; 
however, in a closer view, bureaucratic life looked very similar to that seen in the 
Sardinian region. The functionaries have been very pleasant and seemed quite self- 
assured and relaxed in their work in INTERREG; perhaps too relaxed, according to the 
opinion of their partners.
The participation o f the Italian ministry is virtually non-existent. There are representatives of 
the different ministries which assist the Monitoring committees without saying a word. 
Unfortunately Italian functionaries earn a poor wage, and thus are attracted from the mission 
[to the Monitoring committees, n.o.a.] as money for jam. ( E. 1.1-11)
So far the intervention o f the Italian state has been non-existent, or rather it has intervened with 
wrong or poorly coordinated directives; perhaps in the future there will be a sort o f ‘comeback’ 
of ministerial control. (S.2.I-II)
Representatives from the Italian ministries have been absolutely non-influential (however we 
did not miss the directives from the centre...). In addition they were often replaced, and so they 
did not know the programme details (S. 1.1-11)
Our relations with the national level have been non-existent: ‘do as you like' they used to tell us 
from the Public Works ministry. Instead, from the Ministry o f Finance, we have often had
159 The move was only motivated by internal organizational reasons linked to the transfer of the head of 
the service (as well as her staff), following the policy at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers to the 
latter Ministry of Public Works. The Ministero del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica and the 
Ministero del Tesoro were later merged in a single Ministry (Ministero dell’Economia) that became 
responsible for the coordination of the interventions co-financed by the Structural Funds {Dipartimento 
per le politiche di Sviluppo), the financial monitoring of the interventions (Ragioneria Generate dello 
Stato-Igfor) and the collection of all information on the situation in the regions (Cabina di Regia 
Nazionale).
134
contradictory directives (for instance in early July they approved the financial plan of the 
programme, and two weeks later they sent us a fax with a new financial plan.) (S.3.I-III)
However, as recognised by the same Sardinian partners, this ‘relaxed’ attitude of the 
Italian functionaries seems to be particularly related to the management of the 
INTERREG programme, requiring a stronger role for the regions, while a more 
traditional centralistic and ‘gatekeeping’ role was played in the administration of 
mainstream EU regional policies for the Mezzogiomo.
The Sardinian OP has to conform to that dictated by the CSF for Italian Objective one regions, 
without the regions being allowed to identify their strategic lines for their development (for 
instance, an interim report o f ours mentioning the transport axis as a priority o f the [Sardinian] 
region was refused by the State). (S.3.I-III)
In INTERREG the State has been more in the background, and in fact each o f the Italian 
INTERREG programmes is completely different, with the only exception, in the Italian case, 
being the IIIB programme, where the transnational coordination authority is precisely the 
Italian Transport Ministry. However, also in this case the programme has been transferred to 
the CRP [the IIC was managed by services at the RASPresidency, n.o.a.]. (S.4.II-III)
The European Commissioners
Initially the INTERREG ‘islands’ was followed at the European Commission by two 
functionaries from the DG for Regional Policy in Brussels, while functionaries from 
other DGs occasionally intervened for measures also concerning their field. The two 
functionaries belonged to two national (French and Italian) Geographical Units of DG 
REGIO where -  given the little relevance initially given to. INTERREG within the SFs 
administration -  their task was not particularly sought after. Their participation in the 
Monitoring Committees of the ‘islands’ programme was regular, but considered by the 
other partners to be unhelpful in either giving a clear direction to the programme or 
solving technical disputes of a legal or bureaucratic nature. The functionaries were both 
close to retirement and of Italian nationality, and thus had a better acquaintance with the 
practices of the Italian partners, although they had no greater esteem. The opinion was 
reciprocated:
The EU really gave us the leftovers' of the Commission: their role was not adequate for the 
necessities in the first two editions, now [with the new functionaries for the 3r , n.o.a] the 
situation has notably improved. (1.1.1-III)
Overall, in the interviews regional and national actors lamented the lack of dialogue and 
lengthy delays of Commission services in providing them with operative answers, faced 
with the problems emerging each time. In reality, several of the problems attributed to
135
the functionaries were partly linked to the programme itself, as confirmed in a later 
interview with a functionary from the newly created Evaluation Unit in 2001:
Some difficulties in the CIP Corsica-Sardinia derived from problems inbred in INTERREG 
itself: before, at DG REGIO, there wasn’t a specific office for technical assistance with 
INTERREG, and within the Geographical Units, dealing with the much more substantial 
resources of the Structural Funds, the programme was often overshadowed. (E.4.II-III)
In the second edition the policy was handed over to a younger functionary (again, an 
Italian) from a new INTERREG unit, who also followed the Western-Mediterranean 
area for the INTERREG IIC-IIIB strand. Given the increasing relevance of the latter 
strand, the ‘islands’ programme was later passed to another, half-French, half-Sardinian 
functionary in the same unit. Most of the partners those changes recognised as an 
improvement, although some lamented the excessive formal and standardized character 
increasingly assumed by the regulations in the new editions of the programme, 
burdening its management.
The Commission exerts a sort o f 'psychological terrorism ’ through a tough aprioristic control, 
not contextual to the programme (for instance, we received a standardized form making 
observations on the requirements unattained by the programme, which often did not match with 
the programme actually presented). (S.3.I-III)
Other characters
As the new regulations for SFs and INTERREG II had extended the partnership 
principle formally to include economic and social partners, greater care was taken by 
the partners of the ‘islands’ programme to involve competent bodies and authorities. 
Representatives of socio-economic interests had always been included in the delegation 
of the Corsican region, where they already played an institutionalised, consultative role 
within the regional structure. In the case of the RAS, the province of Sassari organized 
prior to the planning phase a round of consultations with the main socio-economic 
actors, stakeholders and potential beneficiaries.
The participation of socio-economic actors in the extended version of the MC -  
including all subjects involved in the implementation of measures -  varied according to 
the location where it was held: the expensive costs of travelling from one region to the 
other in terms of time and money led most partners to follow the MC when it was 
convened in their own territory. Following regulations for the third edition, 
representatives for equal opportunity and for environmental issues were also involved in 
the partnership.
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A two act play: the evolution of the ‘islands’ programme
n  1990-1999: INTERREG I and II
There have been three editions of the INTERREG ‘islands’ programme, but analytically 
we can discuss the first two jointly, because the findings clearly indicate that 
organizational change only emerged from the end of the second edition. This is also 
linked with the brevity of the first edition, launching cross-border cooperation between 
the Corse-du-Sud departement and the province of Sassari in the North of Sardinia, with 
a maximum of 20% of the resources also available to fund projects in the bordering 
provinces.160 The programme should have covered the period from 28th February 1991 
to 31st December 1993. However, delays of a bureaucratic nature led to an approval of 
the programme by the Commission only in May 1992. At that point, the regional 
executive of the Sardinian region underwent a long period of crisis “preventing for 
months the undertaking of operative decisions”: the programme became actually 
operative only in the middle of 1993, and thus the Commission allowed the 
postponement of the deadline for payments for one year.161 The second edition of 
INTERREG, attached to the subsequent SFs programming period (1994-99), could 
count on a longer time span for implementation: the deadline for the obligations of 
funds was fixed for the 31st December 1999, and two years later for the payments. The 
‘islands’ programme was reconfirmed, but again delayed by the complicated 
bureaucratic procedures necessary to obtain the Commission’s decision approving or 
modifying the programme. Moreover, the postponement of the deadline for the 
completion of the first edition led to an overlapping of the two programmes, which did 
not allow the partners to engage in a useful reassessment of the validity of the means 
and strategies used in the continuation of the policy (which is the rationale behind 
planning within defined periods of time).
In the first editions the partners chose to decline the Commission’s suggestion of 
adopting an integrated approach to the management of the cross-border programme. The
160 There were exceptions to this rule, as in the case of academic cooperation: cooperation between the 
University of Sassari and the University of Corte was allowed, although the latter was located in the 
department of Haute-Corse, because it is the only one on the island and this justified the entry of the 
University of Cagliari in the Southern province of Sardinia.
161 See RAS, Final Report of the INTERREG I (1999), pp.9, 29. The number and date of the 
Commission’s decision referring to the INTERREG I France-Italy ‘islands’ programme is C(92)948 of 
21.05.92.
162 The references to the Commission’s decisions concerning the INTERREG II France-Italy ‘islands’ 
programme are: C(99) n. 4579 of 28.12.99, which modifies the C(99) n. 827 of 7.4.99, which modifies 
the C(97) n. 3223 of 20.11.97, which modifies the C(96) n. 2580 o f27.09.96.
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planning of measures was thus drafted independently by the partners, according to their 
national administrative practices, and only in a second stage confronted, discussed and 
integrated with that of the other partner in order to be eventually jointly adopted at the 
MC. Even in the second edition, despite increasing understanding, this choice was 
confirmed and thus the programme continued to have a ‘parallel’ coordinated 
management, with all the consequent limitations in terms of waste, both of time and of 
potential added value in the achievement of common goals.
Initially there wasn’t a great deal of working together, i f  not for the proposition o f the 
programme: the Sardinians were having some difficulties in implementing the programme as to 
the devolution to the province of Sassari, while in Corsica it was always the Prefecture to take 
decisions. (F.l.I-III)
Unfortunately the will o f the few able individuals (such as this or that elected Sardinian or 
Corsican politician) did not manage to break through this situation of lack o f cooperation. 
(E.1.I-D)
The management was ‘regionalised ’ and was not ‘cross-border ’. At a first level o f agreement 
the projects were defined by the MSs, only later we had to reorganize with communications 
among regions: it required nearly two years to get to the final version of the programme. 
(C.l.H-III)
Different reasons emerge from the interviews to explain this choice: one obstacle was 
represented by the larger devolution powers granted to Sardinia vis a vis the 
gatekeeping role still willingly played by the Prefecture with the CTC; on the other 
hand, Sardinians seemed to be content to manage the programme at their convenience, 
without further intrusion from the French enarques. The costs to be paid in order to 
overcome those obstacles did not seem rewarding in front of the limited benefits 
envisaged from closer cooperation.
The planning document of the INTERREG programmes, called the Community 
Initiative Programme (CIP), was very similar to that of mainstream policies, and thus 
included an ex ante evaluation or analysis of the situation; an account of the planning 
process; a statement of the joint strategy and priority axes for the development of the 
geographical area covered by the programme, with a summary description of the 
measures planned; an indicative financing plan and commitments for a transparent 
information and active promotion of the programme. In the case of the ‘islands’ 
programme, each page of the CIP was presented with a parallel version of the text in 
French and in Italian. In the first INTERREG edition -  and to some extent in the second 
-  planning requirements were not particularly binding, and much was left to the good 
will or practices of the partners. Until INTERREG III the ex ante evaluation was not
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compulsory, but only subject to an 6appreciation’; also the CIP of the ‘islands’ 
programme only presented a very general description of the socio-economic situation, 
the common handicaps and local assets; however, unsurprisingly, the document did not 
lead to the formulation of a focused common strategy.
The CIP was developed by the regions as a sort of complement to their individual planning 
documents for the management o f their respective Structural Funds. The only exception is the 
Marine Park, which has received common interest from the two parties. As for the rest, there 
was reciprocal indifference to the others ’problems. (E.l.I-II)
The initial total budget for the first INTERREG ‘islands’ programme was 43 MECU, 
half of which was paid with a EU contribution from the three SFs: almost 24.5 MECU 
for the Italian side and 19 for the French side. Private funding, although initially 
foreseen for each edition, was never activated. The amount of resources available, 
although consonant with the experimental character of CIs, was meagre if compared to 
what was received by both regions under the Objective one status. This ‘minor’ 
character of the policy (whose specificity, as seen, was covered by the high number of 
CIs launched in the same period) also meant that lower attention was paid to its 
management within administrations, having more urgent matters to follow. The 
breakdowns indicating financial planning and progress in engagement and spending 
were presented by each partner separately with different editing styles and descriptions 
of measures, often only in the national currency, and this created mistakes and delays in 
the later integration of documents for the MCs.
[In the first editions] even the financial tables o f the two regions for expenses in the INTERREG 
for Corsica and Sardinia presented different data! (E.l.I-II)
For the French side, the CTC was excluded from the management of the financial 
contribution, which was assigned to decentralised state services in Corsica (the regional 
and departmental Prefecture). The delays in the launching of the programme and its 
demanding planning and organizational requirements made spending the funds in due 
time problematic, despite the limited amount of resources involved. This was 
particularly true for the French partners, because of their complicated system of 
payments, and partly of unfulfilled devolution. From the first Monitoring Committees, 
the Corsican side asked for a reduction of its funds share, since they could not be 
committed within the set deadlines, and yet it was not able to spend all remaining funds
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in time.163
On the French side a problem was caused by the rigidity in the administration of the funds: 
there had to be three payments, one for France, one for the CTC and one for the EU, while in 
Sardinia all the funds were given to the RAS with only one payment. (F.l.I-III)
For the Italian side the financial management of the programme was delegated to the 
Sardinian region, while the national ministries responsible for Finance and the Economy 
performed an essentially procedural control. Also, the Sardinian partner showed 
problems in meeting the deadlines for financial spending, deriving from the late 
engagement of the funds, and this led to the failure of some planned measures. 
However, the RAS managed to limit the amount of funds lost, largely through the 
substitution of some of the planned measures, with others already accomplished 
independently from the programme.
For the second edition of the INTERREG ‘islands’ programme, funds almost 
doubled, receiving an allocation of 74.5 MECU (see table 6.6). The amount assigned to 
the Corsican side remained almost unaltered from that of the first edition and was 
exiguous if compared with that received by the region under the Objective 1 status 
(nearly its 2%).164 Yet the region again showed problems with spending the funds in due 
time, complicated by the opening of the debate between the central government and 
regional and local representatives over devolution for the island {see chapter 4). When 
at the end of the second edition it became apparent that Corsica was at risk of losing its 
funds again, the MC allowed their transfer to the Sardinian partner. This move was 
presented as the realisation “of the principle of partnership and of the complementarity 
of resources inside INTERREG, which therefore increases its value as a single and joint 
programme”,165 and anticipated the solution adopted in the third edition.
In the first edition, monitoring and technical assistance for the Italian side was done 
by the CRP of the Sardinian region, without any aid or control from external actors. The 
annual or final reports were usually issued quite late and only considered the measures 
concerning the Sardinian region. Although quite detailed, and revealing a certain
163 From the initial allocation of nearly 19M Euros, the funds for the Corsican side were downsized to 
nearly 15M Euros: part of the ERDF funding was shifted to another Community Initiative on 
environment (ENVIREG), and 25% of the ESF funding was diminished (Region de Corse, PIC 
INTERREG A, Italy-France ‘islands’ -  Sardinia and Corsica (1990-93), Summary Report of the 
Monitoring Committee (Ajaccio, 07.03.96), p.4.
164 If the total budget for the ‘islands’ programme was of 74.5M Euros, for the same programming period 
(1994-1999) Corsica received under the Objective 1 status about 679M Euros of SFs (other CIs excluded) 
while the only EAGGF contribution to Sardinia was about 644M Euros.
165 INTERREG IIA Italy-France ‘islands’ -  Sardinia and Corsica (1994-1999), Summary Report of the 
Monitoring Committee (Sassari, 15.12.99), p.3.
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practice of the region with the management of development funds, those reports had a 
self-indulgent approach that did not sufficiently address the reasons behind the delays 
and shortcomings of the programme, and thus did not leave space for constructive 
feedback. Much shorter were the reports issued by the SGAC, which mainly referred to 
the financial evolution of the programme (only for Corsican funds). For the second 
edition, the Sardinian region assigned the interim evaluation of its part of the 
programme to a temporary association of firms also carrying on the interim evaluation 
of its OP,166 while the Commission continued to manage the ex post evaluation for the 
whole programme.
At the RAS, ‘evaluation ’ initially meant the Commission’s approval In the CSF1994-99 it was 
assigned to a consulting company, which, however, did not do a good job: essentially it was an 
accounting type of evaluation, o f little efficacy. One has learned a great deal with the new CSF 
[for the 2000-06 edition n.o.a.]. (S. 1.1-11)
Also, the culture o f evaluation developed much later: before INTERREG III the ex ante was not 
required, only an ‘appreciation ’ of the programme. (E.4.II-III)
There has been a great impact o f EU Structural Funds on the methodology [necessary for 
planning]: monitoring, evaluation, control. Before, in Italy, with the Cassa per il Mezzogiomo 
resources were spent without any control taking place afterwards. (1.1.1-III)
Thus familiarity with planning and evaluation techniques and trust in their usefulness 
increased in INTERREG, also as a result of contemporary practice of regions and MSs 
with SFs management, supported by the diffusion by the Commission of publications
1 f%7and guidelines dealing with different issues on territorial development planning.
In the first editions of the ‘islands’ programme information and publicity were 
quite scarce. Some sporadic initiatives were taken (such as the launching of unofficial 
web pages or communications in the local newspapers) but they were not updated or 
targeted. Participation in the programme mainly amounted to word-of-mouth 
advertising among regional and local actors. In Sassari, the province organized
166 The evaluation of INTERREG was carried out within the general interim evaluation of Structural 
Funds for the Sardinian region in the 1994—99 planning period, and thus included the evaluation of the 
POP Sardegna and the CIP LEADER II: this explains why the space dedicated to INTERREG was 
relatively limited. The temporary association of firms (ATI) to which the evaluation was assigned was 
constituted by the following societies: Coopers & Lybrand-Consulting Spa, ISRI (Institute of Studies on 
Industrial Relations), Passamonti Spa (the ATI later changed its name to ‘Gemini Consultants and 
CENSIS Foundation’). Although the evaluation was assigned to the ATI in 1996, registration procedures 
(and especially the approval of the Regional Court of Accounts) were completed only in December 1998, 
delaying its work and reducing the usefulness of its task.
167 One of those reference texts for evaluation is the MEANS (Methods for Evaluating Structural Policies) 
collection, a set of handbooks on various evaluation techniques to be used in different policies, published 
by the European Commission in 1999, which soon became a standard text of reference for European 
planners and evaluators. Recently the collection was updated by the volume ‘Evaluation of Socio­
economic development. The Guide’, available online at the publication website of the Commission: 
http://www.evalsed.com/Jrame_downloads.asp.
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informative meetings for the communes, which, however, only participated in small 
numbers.
In Sardinia the communes did not show up at the informative meetings concerning INTERREG: 
it was the functionaries that had to go to each single commune to mobilize them. Today [2001] 
there is more attention [paid to the programme]. But it is hard to change the [well-established] 
way of thinking that one cooperates only if  he is adequately paid. (S.2.I-II)
Despite the parallel planning and management of the programme, some of the most 
relevant measures planned from the first edition had a genuine cross-border character. 
In fact, more than 63% of resources were placed in the first axis (infrastructures), which 
comprised the project for the setting up of an experimental airline connecting the two 
islands in order to overcome the effect of the geographic break represented by the 
Straits of Boniface. Both partners launched (separately!) feasibility studies on the 
project, while the Sardinian partner also defined a measure for the introduction of an 
experimental daily flight. In fact, the Sardinians seemed to be firmly convinced that 
efficient transport connections between the islands represented a prerequisite for the 
development of closer cooperation among the partners. It is interesting to consider the 
technicalities of the complications which led, despite the perseverance of the planners, 
to the ultimate failure of the project (see table 6.5). The official justification for the 
failure of the airline project was that the estimated traffic of passengers between the 
islands did not make the investment competitive as well as the fact that, using the words 
of a functionary at the Italian ministry, “quite different amounts o f funds would be 
needed in order to set it up!” However, it is also instructive to consider the different 
reactions of the partners ahead of the emerging difficulties, revealing their different 
motivations in supporting the project.
The airline project [in INTERREG A] was blocked because o f a mistaken detail in the call for 
tender. However, the Corsicans have immediately given up! The RAS, on the contrary, will try 
to insist that the measure be inserted in INTERREG IIIB, perhaps including the air link between 
the islands within a wider circuit in the Mediterranean. (S.3.I-III)
[In the first edition] there was also an airline measure, proposed by the Sardinians, which 
failed. However from the Corsican side there was no equally strong interest: in fact Corsica did 
not consider it a necessity to create an infrastructural link with Sardinia, but was rather more 
interested in developing links with other French regions or with the European continent (and 
therefore continental Italy). Moreover, Corsica already benefits from ‘territorial continuity ’, 
that is to say cheaper flights to Marseille, Nice and Paris, to compensate for the burden of 
insularity. (F.l.I-III)
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As we shall see, a better fate lay in store for the projects planned within the second axis, 
dedicated to the enhancement of the maritime area between the two islands’ shores, 
included the setting up of an International Marine Park in the area between the Bouches 
de Boniface and the La Maddalena archipelago, and studies for its protection and 
management. Measures in the third axis, dedicated to economic exchanges, covered 
services for enterprises, professional training in sport and tourism, and common 
organization of initiatives in the handicraft or agriculture sector. The fourth and fifth 
axes covered scientific cooperation between universities (already launched in 1989) and 
research centres and the promotion of studies and activities with a cross-border 
character.
INTERREG II maintained many of the measures and experience of the first edition, 
both because of the short duration of the latter and the preparatory character of many of 
its projects. However the priority order of the axes -  and thus the distribution of the 
funds -  was changed according to what had been taught by previous experience (see 
table 6.5). The transport axis was downsized globally to nearly two thirds from the first 
edition168 and was divided into projects of more modest cross-border impact, such as the 
improvement of roads and harbour infrastructures. On the contrary, funding destined for 
the environment axis globally nearly tripled (on the Corsican side it passed from 8% to 
44%). Action taken for the creation of an International Marine Park was continued, 
applying the preliminary studies launched in the previous edition, arranging common 
structures for better surveillance and the monitoring of the quality of coastal water. 
Following a logic of internal synergy of the programme, some of the formative actions 
contemplated by the fourth axis were directly related to the realisation and maintenance 
of the Park, in prospect of the possible future employment of the participants. A 
measure on fire-fighting interventions that had not worked in the first edition because of 
difficulties in coordinating the partners, was successfully put forward again because of 
the clear added value as a cross-border action. The exchange of practices and 
experiences on the subject was activated between working groups from the two islands 
and the region of Tuscany, linked with Corsica by another INTERREG programme. A 
specific axis was dedicated to the promotion of sustainable tourism with integrated 
actions in the field of cultural and natural heritage. Different kinds of exchanges 
(economic, scientific, sport and culture) were reunited within the fourth axis, which also
168 In the case of Corsica it passed from having 59% to 5% of the region’s allocation, while in the case of 
Sardinia its share was nearly halved.
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confirmed the cooperation between the universities. A fifth axis originally planned for 
electricity grids was suppressed.169
fig. 6.5 - A critical case: the failure of the airline project
In the firs t INTERREG edition the ‘islands ’ CIP planned within the firs t axis a measure fo r  the 
establishment o f  an experimental airline connecting the islands, which arguably had the 
greatest potential in terms o f  enhancing the cross-border character o f  the programme. In fact, 
air connections between the two islands were very expensive, both in terms o f  time and money, 
as they required the passage through the respective main national hubs. In December 1993 the 
RAS engaged the planned funds (nearly €  873,000): almost 5% was spent on a preliminary 
feasibility study while the rest was meant to be a contribution fo r  the aircraft purchase to the 
company that would have granted the service. In March 1995 the RAS sent the Commission the 
approved Final Report o f  the study, stating that “preconditions exist fo r  the institution o f  an 
interregional service o f  transportation between Corsica and Sardinia, justified by an objective 
necessity o f  modernisation o f  the transport system concerning the two islands ” and also 
suggesting the possibility o f  integrating the service with internal connections. The RAS 
launched an international call fo r  tender, won by a company from  Genoa but later debarred 
because o f  delays in providing the necessary documentation fo r  the signing o f  the contract. A 
second tender was won by a company from  Olbia (SS), but the Regional Administrative 
Tribunal (TAR) suspended the adjudication after an appeal by one o f  the participating firms. In 
April 1997 the Director o f  the CRP explained to the Monitoring Committee that the low 
percentage o f  the expenses was “not attributable to deficiencies o f  this Administration, but to 
judicial obstacles. ” Consequently, he asked the Commission fo r  a deferment in payments or — 
as the second best option — the substitution o f  the measures with already completed works on a 
street connecting two villages in the north o f  Sardinia (Castelsardo-S.Teresa di Gallura). In 
May 1997 the Commission allowed the latter solution (Note CE n.97431590 o f22.05.1997).
II) 2000-2006 : INTERREG III
The ‘islands’ programme was reconfirmed within INTERREG III A (2000-2006), when 
it was merged with the cross-border programme initiated in the previous edition 
between the Northern Haute Corse department and the Tuscany province of Leghorn. 
This solution was devised by the Commission also for other cross-border programmes, 
in order to avoid the fractionalisation of interventions and promote the integration of 
wider territorial areas, following the indications expressed by the ESDP and by the 
revised SFs regulations. However, in the ‘islands’ case it also served to clamp down on 
the defensive and close character increasingly shown by the islands’ lobby, also through 
the use of the INTERREG programme (as we shall later see). The merger was 
welcomed by the Corsican partner, facilitated in the common management of the two 
programmes, but was not as much appreciated by the Sardinians.
169 “The low level of electrification in Corsica and Sardinia can mirror the difficulty in sufficiently 
supplying those island regions with electricity”, see EUROSTAT (2000), p.90. The axis originally 
planned for electricity grids was suppressed following an agreement between the Italian State and 
Sardinia on the methanisation of the island, defined within a TENs project for a pipeline from Algeria 
passing through Sardinia and Corsica (still in the process of being defined at the time of writing).
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For Corsica to administer both programmes together represented an advantage. However, the 
initiative was taken by the European Commission, which set the cross-border axis Sardinia- 
Corsica-Tuscany: now the objective o f  realising measures with a real cross-border character is 
more evident. (CAD I)
Tuscany has been added in order to allow a ‘triangulation ’ o f  planning. (Ll.I-III)
The management o f  a sole programme is more complicated, even more i f  with the region o f  
Tuscany, which has different concerns. (S.3.I-III)
With the third edition, i f  on the one hand the single programme Corsica—Sardinia—Tuscany 
seems more complicated, on the other hand, at a wider level, it increases the relevance o f  
regional and local authorities. (S.5.UI)
There was an internal querelle between the two Italian regions: the Tuscans are perseverant, 
but only participate with a small territory; they managed to have their funds allocation 
relatively increased fo r  Livorno and this altered the touchy Sardinians, participating with a 
larger area. (1.1.1-III)
Other changes brought about by the Commission in the organization of the initiative 
followed the direction taken by the wider review of the SFs’ regulation: greater 
attention for the respect of the subsidiarity principle (placing greater responsibility in 
policy management on national, regional and local actors, while leaving to the 
Commission a merely advisory role); a concentration of resources in a limited number 
of actions; the simplification of procedures to improve the efficiency of programmes; a 
better definition of the tasks assigned to the different actors to increase their 
accountability and the operationalisation of partnership; the inclusion in the MC of 
representatives of agencies for the safeguard of the environment and equal opportunity
170rights. The problem of the slow mobilisation of Community credits was improved by 
funding the programme only through the ERDF. To avoid delays created by the time 
needed to produce a decision from the Commission for each change to the programme, 
the Commission asked regions and MSs to supply its services directly with the 
Operative Programme (this move, however, initially created delays to the launching of 
programmes).
The new INTERREG regulations required the setting of a single Management 
Authority (MA), which -  as already mentioned, was identified in the CRP of the 
Sardinian region. At the request of the Commission the CIP, initially presented by the 
regions divided in two sub-programmes (one for Corsica and Sardinia, the other for 
Corsica and Tuscany), was redrafted to include only one programme for the three
170 Official Journal of the European Communities, (26.6.1999 L 161/11), article 8.
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regions.171 The single ex ante evaluation, was assigned to an association of consultants 
led by an Italian company (from Val d’Aosta) with funds from the Corsican side (ACD 
2001), while a call for tender was launched to find an external independent evaluator for 
the interim evaluation of the programme. Monitoring was thus carried out by the 
company entrusted with the technical assistance acting in cooperation with the CRP, 
and collecting every three months the data from the Payment Authorities. The process 
still experienced difficulties, mainly due to delays in the organization of the electronic 
collection of data, and the incompleteness and lack of homogeneity of the forms 
presented by the different beneficiaries, especially in the Corsican case (ESA 2004: 11-
12).
The presentation of information to the public was greatly improved: since the 
launching of the programme, the CTC prepared a brochure containing basic information 
about the different strands of the INTERREG programmes in which the region 
participated (sent to all actors reputed as potentially interested), and a more detailed 
vademecum for each of them, available on request. Common general information 
leaflets and procedural instructions for beneficiaries were prepared in the two languages 
by the MA, and were later included with the other information on the recently launched 
website,172 presenting official documents and updated information on the programme.
Initially the Commission’s requests were ‘indigestible while today they are taken fo r  granted. 
Tables on financial advancement are regularly sent from  the regions, as well as the Annual 
Report. (L I.M il)
Informal meetings are frequent, nearly once a month; email is increasingly used, especially by 
the Tuscan partner, a little less by Sassari and the CTC (referring to the III edition, n.o.a.). 
(S.4.n-III)
We have diffused information via seminars, brochures, radio and email. Now we are preparing  
a cross-border communication plan... The main actors — Chambers o f  Commerce and 
Agriculture, Universities, etc. -  do know INTERREG by now, although maybe not so much the 
general public (referring to the III edition, n.o.a.). (C.l.H-III)
Those improvements (in terms of monitoring, evaluations, transparency and access to 
information) are mainly traceable to a better definition and stricter demands of the 
Commission in those matters. As mentioned, in 2000 a unit at the DG for Regional 
Policy was dedicated exclusively to the development of evaluation techniques, criteria 
and indicators in development policies. National and regional administrations were
171 Decision C(2001) n.4016, (18.12.2001).
172 The general website about the programme (containing general information, official documents, 
examples of financed projects, updated news and materials, contact details), was launched by the 
Management Authority in February 2005 at the web address www.interreg-it-fr.net.
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increasingly required to adopt in the drafting of their planning documents a common 
vocabulary established by reference texts on different planning and evaluation 
techniques (such as the MEANS collection, or the ESDP), regularly updated with ad 
hoc documents for each initiative, and greater attention was paid to granting the 
inclusiveness of the partnership tables and improving transparency in information. 
However, increased standardisation and formalisation of the policy requirements 
endangered the operativeness of its management.
The new edition is also complicated because o f  there being too many structures: DG  
Environment has required a ‘technical cross-border group ’. Considered the financial dimension 
o f  the programme, its complications really seem too many: INTERREG is an ‘out o f  scale ’ 
programme! (S.3.I-III)
There have been many improvements in the new programme: the simplification given by uniting 
two programmes in one, the fa c t that many axes only three, and the creation o f  common 
authorities... the CTC was delegated the management o f  ERDF funds fo r  INTERREG III: the 
French State remains generally responsible and has a control o f  second degree (it controls 5%) 
(...) The State is associated with the Monitoring and Managing Committee, where it has one 
place with right to vote. However, the presidency o f  the programme is now with the CTC. 
Nevertheless the State is quite happy to be no longer involved both in IIIB and in IIIA. In fact 
INTERREG is a complex programme, it requires time without giving many funds, and the fact 
that the French system is very complicated in terms o f  norms ofpayments does not make the job  
easy! (C. 1.11-111)
A major change in the management of the programme came, as anticipated, from the 
recognition of the Corsican region as a main partner responsible for its territory: as 
auxiliary Management and Payment Authority, its services at the CTC established direct 
contacts with the CRP and the other territorial partners; at the MC the chair of the 
presidency for the French delegation was entrusted to the President of the CTC, rotating 
with his Sardinian counterpart. From 2002 those changes were confirmed at the national 
level by the reform resulting from the ‘Matignon process’ (see chapter four). It is 
carefully specified by functionaries at the prefecture that reforms in Corsica do not 
represent an exception to the rule, but are rather inserted within a wider process of 
decentralisation decided at the national level for the whole country after pressures for 
regionalisation flowing from the implementation of EU policies.
Before, the Management Authority was the prefecture. Since INTERREG III it was devolved to 
the CTC. This stems from  the S ta te’s will to transfer part o f  its responsibilities to all regions 
(not only Corsica), also follow ing their criticism o f  the State, arguing that the regionalisation o f  
the E U  programmes required a more direct role fo r  the regions and a closer link with the 
Commission: this explains why since 1999 they have been devolved the management o f  the 
programmes. The process does not stop at the regional level: the commune o f  Bastia, fo r  
instance, is the Management Authority in the URBAN initiative. (F.2. II-III)
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However, the turmoil created by this revolutionary change complicated the already 
problematic situation of the region in regard to the management of the funds. The third 
edition of the programme had received a budget of 115.5M Euros, allocated in the 
following way among the regions: 62M Euros for Sardinia, 28.5 for Corsica, and 25 for 
Tuscany. This redistribution disappointed the Sardinian partners, who -  having engaged 
with the incentives logic -  thought they should have been rewarded for the good 
spending performance recorded in the previous edition. Moreover, they feared 
complications deriving from having to coordinate their action with a third party, but 
also the daunting comparison with such a partner as Tuscany, which could rely on a 
tradition of skilful politicians, a dynamic socio-economic fabric, and well-functioning 
administrative and institutional structures. Following the new regulations, a single 
Payment Authority was set up for the programme as a whole: after at first dithering on 
the Tuscan partner, the Sardinian region was chosen, whose Planning ministry could 
start to receive into a single account all programme resources and redistribute them to 
the other auxiliary payment authorities (the province of Sassari, the province of 
Leghorn, and the CTC). The setting up of a single Payment Authority, responsible for 
the whole programme and presenting -  after reiterated demands from the Commission -  
a sole financial breakdown, avoids the disengagement of funds when only one partner 
registers delays in payments within the set deadlines. This was particularly relevant 
after the introduction of the ‘n+2’ rule in the new Structural Funds regulations, for 
which funds are lost if they are not spent within two years from engagement. The 
consideration of a single financial plan allowed the programme as a whole to meet the 
deadline of December 2004, despite the Corsican region’s difficulties in spending.173 
The establishment of a single financial management system for the whole programme 
has strengthened the ability of the partners to operate as a sole actor but at the same time 
it has hidden the enduring difficulties of Corsica. The fact that the Commission 
officially receives only a global figure of the programme’s spending rates does not lead 
its services to further investigate the causes of the persistently slow progress of the 
programme in the case of the Corsican partner (INTERACT 2005: 66,71).
Concerning the planning process, although the new CIP for INTERREG III 
presented a sole programme for the three regions, most of the measures continued the 
projects initiated in the previous editions with the respective regional partners.
173 In 2004, the capacity for engaging the funds for INTERREG III was even higher in Corsica (60%, 
while 50% for Tuscany and 46% for the RAS) but its spending capacity rate was only 6% (23% for 
Tuscany and 14% for the RAS). See ESA, Service of Independent Evaluation of the CIP INTERREG 
IILA Italy-France: ‘islands’, Sardinia-Corsica-Tuscany (2000-2006), Semi-annual Evaluation Report 
(Jan-June 2004), November 2004, p. 14, p.33.
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There is significant resistance to the idea o f  introducing a sole programme with the same 
strategy, and only one Management and Payment Authority, especially from  the two Italian 
regions. The actual programme is clearly the assemblage o f  two single programmes. (E.5.II-III)
Nevertheless, the overall strategy of the programme was improved, becoming more 
coherent and focussed. The division of axes was simplified and their goals were 
identified in three common objectives, defining more clearly the cross-border strategy: 
to get near (networks and services: actions to improve the supply of air and sea 
connections and cruise and harbour services, and to tackle problems with water and 
energy supplies); to develop (environment, tourism and sustainable economic 
development, measures for the evaluation of the International Maritime Park and 
protected areas, the promotion of fire-fighting and anti-pollution interventions, the 
development of the SME, technological exchanges, and quality tourism); to confront 
(cross-border exchanges between universities, sporting centres, economic actors, 
administrations). Once more, the initial distribution of funds which gave priority to the 
infrastructure axis was revised in favour of the environmental one (ESA 2004: 17-19).
Because the programme (to be closed in December 2008) was still ongoing at the 
closing of the field research (February 2005), it is not here possible to assess the success 
of its different measures. What seemed to be confirmed by the partners as the most 
successful result of cross-border cooperation are the actions related to the setting of the 
International Maritime Park between the shores of the two islands.
fig. 6.6 -The successful case of the International Marine Park 
at (La Maddalena-Bouches de Boniface’
The project o f  instituting an International Marine Park (IMP) fo r  the protection o f  the area 
between the extreme southern part o f  Corsica and the La Maddalena archipelago in North-East 
Sardinia (which became National Reserves in 1999 and 1996 respectively), foresaw  the setting 
up o f  a common Corso-Sardinian coordination team fo r  the gradual application o f 
homogeneous norms o f  protection, management and evaluation o f  the area. However, the 
project represented one o f  the first cases o f  International Parks in Europe, and thus could not 
rely on well-established legislation. INTERREG I  allowed the launch o f  a firs t coordination 
phase among the partners: at the end o f  1992 in Aosta (I), the presidents o f  Corsica and 
Sardinia, the representatives o f  the French and Italian state and their Environment Ministries 
form ally declared their willingness to engage in common action fo r  the protection o f  the area, 
signing an agreement defining the necessary conditions fo r  the creation o f  the IMP. In January 
1993 the ‘Boniface protocol ’ was defined fo r  the land and marine conservation o f  the natural 
environments o f  the IM P and in November a coordinated French—Italian monitoring service fo r  
sea traffic in the area was set up. In the following years small steps were taken in defining the 
juridical framework relative to the IMP. However -  without waiting fo r  the juridical procedure 
to run its course — cooperation continued at an informal level through intense coordinated 
actions between the partners within the subsequent editions o f  the INTERREG programme. 
Measures included common studies on monitoring and intervention in the areas, the 
development o f  a common database and coordination units fo r  the monitoring o f  the area and 
provision fo r  their equipment (boats, scuba diving gear, photo and video devices, etc.).
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What is the ending? Main policy outcomes of the ‘islands’ programme
In chapter two I identified four main dimensions to contrast the shift proposed by EU 
Regional Policy from the ‘national model’ prevalently defining regional policies in the 
post-war decades. Notably, EU Regional Policy introduces innovations in four main 
dimensions of territorial development: the definition and the organization of power and 
territory, the objectives of regional development and the best means to realize them.
I will now return to these dimensions considering for each of them whether 
INTERREG (seen as an emblematic case of EU Regional Policy) has influenced the 
interaction of the regional actors involved in its management. Have the regional partners 
learned to act according to the logic proposed by the ‘EU model’ or do they still 
continue to define their behaviour and strategies in terms of the nationalised pattern? 
Does the response adopted by the Sardinian and the Corsican regions differ in some 
relevant respect?
a) pyramidal government vs. multilevel governance
The territorial partnership proposed by INTERREG programme responds to what in 
section I has been defined as an ‘extended version’ of multilevel governance, made of 
territorial polycentric networks based on subsidiarity and cooperation also extended 
horizontally at the subnational level. However, as seen in section I, the national model 
assigned the two regions the role of peripheral areas embedded in a pyramidal pattern of 
relations only linked with the centre. This explains why relations between the two island 
regions were almost nonexistent and why the level of communication and cooperation 
at the launching of the programme appeared quite discouraging.
The two islands do not talk to each other. (E.2.1-II)
In general, the past culture o f  the two peoples in dialogue is missing... unfortunately the will o f  
a fe w  able individuals (such as this or that elected Sardinian or Corsican politician) did not 
manage to break through this situation o f  lack o f  cooperation. (E .l .1-11)
Changes in the organization of centre-periphery relations among the partners were 
visibly mirrored in the evolution of the Monitoring Committees (MCs), gathering the 
main actors involved in the management of the programme to watch over the correct use 
of the resources transferred by the EU and improving the undertaking of operative 
decisions.
In the first editions, in the MC meetings the Corso-French delegation outweighed 
the Sardo-Italian one numerically and representatively. For the former, there were the
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Prefect, the DATAR representative, the general secretary of the SGAC and some of its 
functionaries (to represent the French state), the Presidents of the CTC executive and 
assembly, the General Director of the CTC Services, the functionaries following 
INTERREG, the President of the Chambre regionale d\Agriculture (for the region), and 
for the Southern Corsica department the President of the Council, the General director 
of the departmental services, the Presidents of the Chambre de Commerce and of the 
Chambre des Metiers. In contrast, the Italo-Sardinian delegation consisted of regional 
functionaries with an almost exclusively technical role: one or two functionaries from 
the delegated ministries representing the Italian state, and for the RAS a delegate of the 
President of the executive (the director of the CRP and -  only very occasionally -  the 
Planning ministry), one or two functionaries from the CRP and a few other 
representatives of the Sassari province (usually a delegate of the president and some 
functionaries from the INTERREG office).
The Prefect was opening the business o f  the Monitoring Committee, presenting the greetings 
and introducing the programme. (S.l.I-II)
In Italy the issue o f  devolution is solved, while in France administrative devolution still does not 
work and this explains why at the Monitoring Committee the delegation has such a great 
number o f  people. (1.1.I-III)
[The Corsicans] are eager to participate in INTERREG, while in Sardinia it is considered a 
minor intervention, in financial terms: they arrive at the Monitoring Committees ‘en masse 
President Baggioni always in attendance... Conversely, the Sardinians at the Committees are 
few  and rarely accompanied by provincial or regional ministries. (S.2.I-II)
We were going to the Monitoring Committee meetings in numbers o f  eight to ten people. The 
same was more or less true fo r  the Corsicans, although they were bringing authorities at the 
highest level (such as the Prefect or the President o f  the region). Conversely, from  Sardinia 
there were no high-ranking functionaries. Perhaps the highest rank was mine [ that o f  regional 
minister, n.o.a.] but it was more o f  an exception: generally not even the provincial minister was 
showing up, since he was a politician, while I  was a technical [a University professor in 
Economics, n.o.a). (S.l.I-II)
The composition of the French delegation was very formal, also in the restricted version 
of the MC, which saw the participation of two authoritative personalities such as the 
President of the Regional Executive, Jean Baggioni. and the Prefect, Claude Erignac, 
whose assassination in 1998 gave the Italian partners a tragic example of the level of 
brutality reached by the autonomist movements in Corsica (see chapter 4), partly 
explaining the tensions between partners on the French side. Given those premises, even 
the starting point of the ‘islands’ programme could have been worse, as illustrated by an 
example referred to by the functionaries at the Italian ministries.
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The overall judgment [over cooperation in the ‘islands’ programme] is positive: at the 
Monitoring Committees everything happens with consensus; the general environment is 
friendly. In Italy we have experienced much harder cases and problems o f  communication, such 
as those o f  the INTERREG with the Austrians, now improved thanks to the mediation ofBolzano  
[autonomous bilingual province in the Italian region o f  Trentino-Alto Adige, n.o.a]. (1.1.I-III)
A t the first Monitoring Committees the Italians from  Alto-Adige were seated next to the 
Austrians at the table o f  delegations! (I.2.I-D)
As seen, through the evolution of the policy, the CTC was increasingly involved in the 
management of the programme until it became both Management and Payment 
Authority for its territory in the third edition of the programme. However, this evident 
shift towards a model of multilevel governance, also extended to interregional 
cooperation, did not amount to an unconsciousness of the previous situation. Tension 
among the French and the Corsicans could clearly not be completely brushed off and 
many of the comments from the functionaries reveal the persistence among the actors of 
the ‘win-lose’ interpretation of devolution, long maintained within the ‘national model’. 
On the French side, the acceptance of devolution was obtained through compensative 
devices minimizing its breadth (such as the ‘sour grapes’ argument used in saying that, 
after all, the French state was no longer interested in that kind of power, or showing its 
fundamentally unchanged role in contrast with that of the Italian one). On the Corsican 
side, the logic is often that of ‘tit for tat’, thus using their new areas of competences to 
informally exclude from decision-making processes those that had previously excluded 
them.
The Italian State is retiring!174 In the case o f  the French State, the Prefecture is still responsible 
today fo r  INTERREG, ju st as fo r  other E U  funds. Only, while before it managed the 
programmes, now it will devolve the management to the CTC, although also accompanying it. 
In fact, the dossiers are instructed and agreed together in co-participation between CTC and 
SGAC, which each month take part in the COREPA. With the software Presage ’, we [at the 
Prefecture] can track all the financial data: now the CTC is allowed access, i f  only fo r  those 
concerned with it... There have been new laws in Corsica since January 2002. Decentralisation 
was already active in France with the prefects ' system, and it is now transferred to the CTC. 
(F.1.I-III)
The financial monitoring is still managed by the Europe Unit at the SGAC. We have been 
allowed limited access to the software P resage', used by the French prefectures. However, we 
fin d  it has technical problems and we are working on alternative software, maybe more similar 
to that used in Italy... For the Prefecture, although they have the right to vote as one member, 
they do not want to have any more responsibility fo r  this edition o f  INTERREG, and therefore 
they do not participate in the technical committees. Thus, often we do not even invite them... 
(C.4.III)
174 ML ’Etat italien est en retraite!”. The expression is used here with sarcasm by the Prefecture 
functionary, drawing on the double meaning of the French term ‘retraite’ meaning both ‘retirement’ and 
‘retreat’.
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b) assisted develovment vs. proactive planning
As seen in the previous section, development policies implemented in the regions 
according to the ‘national model’ were characterised by strategies defined at the central 
level and implemented in the regions through bureaucratic management. The ‘European 
model’ proposed by EU Regional Policy, conversely, referred to regional and local 
authorities as actors responsible for their territory, involved in cooperative partnerships 
with the national and EU levels in the management of the policy. In addition, 
INTERREG asked regions belonging to different MSs to develop a common territorial 
strategy disengaged from a national logic and redefined within the wider European 
setting.
I have already shown how the introduction of a recognition for the region in the 
role of planner and coordinator over the matters concerning its territory represented a 
revolutionary institutional change in the case of Corsica. According to most of the 
actors involved in the INTERREG ‘islands’, in the first editions of the programme the 
omnipresence of the state representatives frustrated initiative from the CTC. Even 
assuming that this might have served technical efficiency, because of the recognised 
preparation of French administrators, it certainly undermined the ‘bottom-up’ character 
of the cooperation. This situation gradually changed through the implementation of the 
policy: the Corsican region was increasingly involved in the management of the policy 
until it was recognised as the main management and payment authority for its territory 
for the third edition of INTERREG. This process' of ongoing change during the 
implementation of the policy, anticipating the outcome of the national decentralisation 
law effective since January 2002, clearly created delays and inefficiencies relative to the 
programme outcome. The transfer of management and payment procedures from the 
Prefecture to the CTC, whose staff is still limited in terms of numbers and experience 
and whose resources and infrastructures heavily rely on those of the decentralised state 
services, was ongoing during the programme.
In the Sardinian case regional autonomy had been enacted since the Constitution; 
however, the regional apparatus had been structured in quite a centralistic way. Since 
the first editions of the INTERREG programme the Sardinian region favoured the 
suggested devolution of power to the provinces, even in this case anticipating later 
reform at the national level, and not without impediments delaying the normal course of 
the programme.
The devolution o f  authority to the province o f  Sassari was already given by the Sardinian region 
since the INTERREG I. (1.3.2002)
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Because o f  the lack o f  legal references within national law, we could only partly delegate to the 
provinces... The risk with delegating [the funds management] to the provinces is, however, that 
ofgreater clientelism (even more when the provinces delegate to the communes). (S.l.I-II)175
[In Sardinia the l]ack o f  coordination among the different territorial authorities (region, 
provinces, communes) is detrimental to the implementation o f  the policies, in that it creates 
delays or non-compliance... the CRP has had problems in coordinating communes and 
provinces but also the action o f  different regional agencies. (E.3.II)
The risk of favouring clientelism derives from the consideration of devolution processes 
according to the old ‘win-lose’ logic for the distribution of power among territorial 
actors; this also explains why the regional level was not legitimised by other local 
authorities in its role of strategic planning, but only as a conveyor of funds to be 
distributed among them later. In the logic of multilevel governance, conversely, the 
‘higher levels’ do not disappear, but rather change their role from one of main decision­
maker or distributor of funds to that of strategic coordinator of planning; clearly, also 
this new role needs to be recognised by territorial actors at lower levels in order to be 
effective.
As seen in section II, regional policies launched in the island regions by their 
respective states were based on an exchange between the consensus of the backward 
periphery and central resources for development planning. This fact discouraged the 
formation of an entrepreneurial spirit at the local level, while consolidating inefficient 
networks of parasitism between centre and periphery. Since the early 1990s central 
governments’ indulgence in front of the deterioration of political life in the regions 
(characterised by chronic instability of the executives, clientelistic relations in power 
sharing, inefficient spending of public funds) was increasingly denounced within
17Anational debates. The development model of EU Regional Policy offered a totally 
alternative role to regional and local actors, entrusted with the responsibility of 
contributing proactively to define and carry out sustainable developmental strategies, 
turning the fate of their territories from the previous paths of dependency. Change,
175 The devolution of powers from the region to the provinces suggested by the programme did not have 
previous legal references in Italy. It took some time before the RAS could devise the necessary 
adjustments to legally sort out the delegations to the province of Sassari. As proudly noticed by the 
regional functionaries, this move anticipated the later national Law 142/90 (Italian Parliament, 1990) on 
local autonomies, providing that provinces and communes contribute to the definition of the objective of 
socio-economic planning and the management of financial resources for their territories, in the terms 
defined by regional law and regulations.
176 Ritaine (1998), p.74. The laxness of the French state vis a vis Corsica, in terms of economic benefits 
and fiscal allowances given to the island, has been increasingly questioned by a series o f reports 
published in the 1990s. In the same period in Italy the Northern League gave voice in the political arena 
to the secessionist ambitions of an industrious North towards a parasitic South, fed its money by the 
central government.
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however, was not automatic, given the rootedness of the ‘logic of subsidies’ in the 
regions. In Sardinia, for instance, the identification with the Mezzogiomo intended as a 
peripheral area doomed to backwardness and to be redressed by state subsidies, led 
many regional politicians to feel a kind of ‘entitlement’ to the Objective one status 
within EU Regional Policy. When first interviewed on INTERREG, functionaries in the 
Sardinian region lamented the imbalance in the policy between the poverty of the 
resources on the one hand and the demanding planning requirements on the other. 
However, when in recent years it became clear that the region would have exited Obj.l 
in the subsequent planning period, INTERREG and the insularity argument were used 
to redefine a regional development strategy independently from national directives. One 
of the main claims of the Sardinian government since the late 1990s has been that of 
‘territorial continuity’, asking the state for special fares to reach mainland Italy, often 
citing the Corsican case as an example. Similarly, open dispute of the regional 
government with national ‘top-down’ instructions over the island’s development has 
become increasingly frequent.
[Corsicans] share the idea o f  the 'Etat Providence* [the providence (or welfare) state], though 
they often asked to remove the SGAC (the prefectural services fo r  the Region, n.o.a.). (E. 1.1-11)
The Sardinian reality is very different from  that o f  Southern Italy: culturally, I  mean, but also 
socially... (think, fo r  instance, o f  its comparatively low crime rates). What is shared with other 
Southern Italian regions is the lack o f  activism and effectiveness o f  the political class, used to 
the assistentialistic (i.e. subsidized, n.o.a.) culture fo r  which, having obtained the funds (and 
having declared this to the public opinion) they d o n ’t care anymore about them. While the 
regional presidents or ministries o f  Tuscany, Abruzzo, Umbria, fo r  much less funds get directly 
involved in meetings and dialogues, nobody turns up from  the Sardinian region (once the funds  
are obtained)... They are used to an ‘assistentialistic log ic’ in territorial planning and thus 
have difficulties reasoning in terms o f  strategic planning. There is a need to adopt a more 
liberistic approach to the economy, also in light o f  the limits o f  the region in terms o f  the size o f  
the population and the market. (E.3.II)
In opposition to the old statalist and dirigiste planning, one should understand the 
Commission’s logic, fo r  which, in order to have the resources, he has to demonstrate strategic- 
planning qualities ( ‘progettualita )  related to specific targets, rather than wait to receive the 
funds to later spread them throughout the territory. (S.2.I-II)
A crucial step towards the more transparent and effective planning and management of 
regional development funds was the ‘administrative revolution’ introduced in 1988 by 
the rules and regulation of the reformed EU Regional Policy. Inspired by ‘New Public 
Management’ models, the SFs’ reform introduced, within the bureaucratic traditions of 
different MSs, shared European administrative practices. Those practices focussed on 
the definition of different tools to improve the planning cycle, aiming to constantly 
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the policies. I have already shown how these
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innovations, introduced in the regional administrations of the islands through 
mainstream EU Regional Policy, were gradually adopted also in the management of the 
INTERREG programme. However, this learning process was limited in both regions by 
administrative difficulties linked to their national systems.
Another difficulty at the administrative level had been the fa c t that the rule that the regional 
section o f  the Courts o f  Account [in Sardinia] should examine each norm before approval was 
interpreted literally. This implies severe delays and bureaucratic rigmarole. (E.3.II)
The Corsicans have had difficulties in spending due to a complicated financial management and 
disbursement procedure. In Italy these procedures have recently notably improved. (1.1.I-III)
Corsicans do not use the international call fo r  tender, as required by E U  regulations. This is 
probably a habit due to the fa c t that they are not many, so it works that they directly assign to 
the works to be realised to private partners. This looks quite discretional and so, given that in 
the third edition o f  the programme we are the Management Authority, we asked them to sign a 
declaration stating that they operate in agreement with E U  regulations. In this way, in the event 
o f  non-observance, responsibility would be their own. (S. 3.I-III)
As fo r  associations and private partners, in Italy they use the call fo r  tender, which creates long 
delays, while in France usually the administration independently chooses the partner whose 
profile better suits the requirements. (C. 1.11-111)
c) exogenous vs. endogenous growth models
A third dimension of the policy shift consisted in the casting away of the exogenous 
growth theories that had been privileged by the ‘national model’, prescribing sectoral 
actions concentrating on the creation of industrial poles for the take-off of backward 
economies. Conversely, the ‘EU model’ opted for endogenous growth models 
integrating actions to enhance socio-economic development following a sustainable 
approach. In addition, INTERREG asked the two regions to define a common strategy 
building on the ex ante evaluation of the main strengths and weaknesses of the cross- 
border area. Also in this case the range of change proposed to the regions was quite 
extensive.
I have already noted how in the first editions of the programme evaluations were 
not considered as a relevant part of the planning process, and how the definition of 
actions was generally carried out by the regions autonomously and coordinated only in a 
second stage. However, cooperation gradually improved and taught the partners that 
cross-border partnerships were a feasible option, especially in fields such as tourism, 
environment and culture. In the measures with greater added value (as with those for the 
setting of the International Marine Park) the ‘win-lose’ logic of the ‘national model’ 
accompanying the first edition is gradually substituted by a shared interest in 
cooperation and the setting in of interregional working groups (see table 6.6). Thus
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gradually increased acquaintance among the partners allowed the resolution of a typical 
‘tragedy of commons’ dilemma, through the placement in the area of governance 
structures (Ostrom 1990).
There is a delay in all those measures which are new. (E.3.II)
In the firs t edition o f  the INTERREG between the islands, interventions were directed to one’s 
own territory, especially in the French case. In fa c t the measure fo r  the establishment o f  the 
M arine Park and thus the agreement to diminish the transit o f  ships fly ing  the French or Italian 
fla g  in the Bouches o f  Boniface strait, has a high environmental impact, given the type o f  boats 
which used to pass through there (the so-called ‘tramp ships ’)  and the frequent tempests which 
increase the risks o f  a disaster. However, the traffic in the Bouches was mainly Italian, while 
Lebanese ships directed to Marseille continue to transit! (I.2.I-II)
(...) with the only exception o f  the Marine Park, which has received common interest from  the 
two parts. As fo r  the rest, there is reciprocal indifference to the others ’problem. (E. 1.1-11)
(...) the greatest success was the International Marine Park. (F.l .I-III)
In the firs t edition o f  INTERREG cooperation was only a hypothesis. The choice o f  the partners 
was fo r  separate planning. Only gradually, through notable improvements, INTERREG became 
a reality with the third edition. (1.1.1-111)
Following the success of the IMP, over the three editions the ‘environment’ axis 
gradually increased from 8% to more than one third of the whole budget (see table 6.5). 
However, the relevance of the environmental vocation of the islands also turns out to be 
a brake for those measures aiming to make infrastructural interventions that seek to 
boost the integration of the insular system. In fact, if too often or rigidly employed, the 
‘environmental brake’ may hamper the advancement of economic development on the 
islands; as bitterly commented ‘off the record’ by a policy advisor: ‘‘The little darlings; 
they talk about environment so that one does not catch up with them!”. The harmonious 
triangulation of objectives proposed by the ESDP is indeed difficult for the partners to 
realise in practice, as shown by the following example on the failed measure for the 
enhancement of what represents the main entrance from Sardinia to the Corsican shores, 
the Port of Boniface.
One o f  the most relevant measures o f  the programme, which referred to building a new access 
to the Port o f  Bonifacio, was very controversial and needed preliminary studies to assess its 
impact (...) The measure was presented again in the second edition, but it was blocked fo r  
environmental reasons. Thus, it was substituted with measures fo r  road upkeep and 
improvements (...) So the greatest failure was the Port o f  Bonifacio measure, showing the 
difficulty o f  linking economic development with environmental concerns (...) (F.l.I-III)
The greater difficulties linked with the planning and realisation of measures of common 
interest led the partners to adopt, for most of the other minor interventions, a more
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practical method coordinating individual regional strategies, which only indirectly 
contributed to interregional development.
We have already had several meetings o f  the new single Management Committee fo r  
INTERREG III. However, o f  the proposals made only a fe w  have a cross-border character and 
those having it more are more difficult to coordinate, and therefore take longer to pass. Those 
that pass more easily only have an indirect effect, in that they facilitate communication and 
cooperation among the islands through the development o f  each region. (S.3.I-IQ)
Culture and sports were among the privileged fields for exchanges and cooperation: 
satisfactory results were obtained by the launching of a regional radio programme 
conducted in the Italian and Corsican languages called ‘Medi ter radio’, the jazz festival 
on a ship sailing the Boniface Mouths, or scientific cooperation among research centres. 
All those actions unquestionably improve and strengthen mutual knowledge and 
relationships between islanders. However, their impact appears to be limited because of 
the peripheral role of the islands, which cannot stand comparison with regional realities 
inserted in more dynamic territorial networks, as we shall better see in the discussion of 
the fourth innovation (remaining with the examples of the academic exchanges within 
the ‘islands’ INTERREG, researchers from both the regions would better benefit from 
insertion within a network with innovative research centres with fully equipped research 
labs and libraries).
d) centre-peripherv development vs. socio-economic and territorial cohesion 
A fourth dimension of the change proposed by the ‘European model’ consisted in 
directing Regional Policy to the achievement of greater socio-economic and territorial 
cohesion of the EU. The latter dimension -  recognising the relevance of location in 
development processes -  was particularly emphasised by INTERREG, trying to 
integrate development planning among territorial areas traditionally peripheral within 
their respective national setting. As already noted, since the beginning it became 
apparent that, despite the fact that the policy was originally aimed at integrating 
bordering regions’ economies into the European market, it was not easy to quantify its 
impact from the economic point of view (FERE 1996: 19-20). In fact, it was rather the 
Structural Funds which should have realised the objective of socio-economic cohesion, 
while INTERREG should have further strengthened its territorial dimension.
However, in the ‘islands’ case, as seen, cooperation appeared to be problematic in 
measures of cross-border or interregional character. One of the main obstacles to the 
development of a thicker territorial cooperation is identified by the actors in the 15 km
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of maritime border. In the first editions, although MC should have met at least twice a 
year, the time-consuming and expensive connections between the islands -  especially 
during the winter season -  compelled the partners to cancel or to reduce the length of 
their encounters, or the number of participants.
The lack o f  traditions in communication is worsened by the difficult connections among the 
islands, fo r  which whoever wants to go from  Sardinia to Corsica has first to pass through 
Rome, then Nice, and eventually arrive in Ajaccio. This clearly also has negative implications 
fo r  the monitoring committees o f  the INTERREG programme. (E.l .1-11)
The maritime border makes transfers more difficult: the pace o f  contacts is slackened by the fa c t  
that the costs, both in terms o f  time and money, are higher [ than fo r  transfers in other border 
areas, n.o.a.]. (C.l.I-III)
The longer time required for the transfers also made it difficult to schedule the MC, 
especially for the French side which, in the first edition, had to agree a date suitable for 
all the highest national and regional authorities in Corsica.
We had one Monitoring Committee p er  year (...) because each time the proposed date didn't 
suit either the Sardinians or -  especially— the Corsicans. (E.2.I-II)
Official evaluations of the INTERREG initiative requested by the Commission lament 
the fact that in most programmes nearly half of the funds were spent in the axes 
concerning infrastructures for communication, and energy supplies for measures that 
were cross-border only in the loosest sense of being located near the frontier (FERE 
1996: 16). However, in the ‘islands’ case, as seen, this was mainly the consequence of 
the difficulties ingrained in the weaknesses of the area in terms of market and 
infrastructure endowments.
The diffusion of ICTs, also through the use of INTERREG funds, has partly 
improved communication among the regions (from video-conferencing, to email 
exchange and common services and information through the programme’s website).
In the INTERREG I  and I I  there has been no use o f  email, therefore we used to send floppy  
disks: today the exchange o f  information is much easier! (F.l .I-III)
A further obstacle to interregional communication, largely underestimated at the launch 
of the programme, was constituted by the language barrier. Until today in fact, the 
working language mostly used in the ‘islands’ programme was Italian. However, despite 
similarities with the Corsican dialect, Italian is not fluently spoken by all Corsicans
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(especially among new generations) and certainly not by mother tongue French partners,
177finding themselves in a relatively disadvantaged position in terms of communication.
A difficulty specific to the PIC Corsica-Sardinia is the problem o f  internal bilinguism (the 
presence o f  two different and minoritarian languages), absent in most successful cases o f  
INTERREG (such as that between the UK and Ireland, or the Netherlands and Belgium...). 
(E.4.II-III)
An obstacle was presented by the fa c t that the functionary responsible fo r  state services does 
not speak Italian. (C .1.2000)
The problem was probably underestimated because of this nostalgic view of the 
‘Mediterranean soul’ uniting the islands.178 In the last edition this issue was raised by 
the functionary following the programme at the Commission who, being half-French 
and half-Sardinian, could better appreciate communicative problems and therefore 
suggest a translation system for the MC as a necessary step for the deepening of 
cooperation.
Improvements in communication, however, did not solve the partners’ difficulties 
in terms of devising measures with a real impact on the integration of the territories, 
both among them and the rest of the European territory. The reasons behind this 
weakness of the insular partnership are mainly attributed by regional actors to the 
common disadvantages of their territories. The size of the territories involved in cross- 
border cooperation was a first obstacle, surmounted, as said, with a flexible 
interpretation of the eligibility areas. In fact the eligibility of NUTS III only regions 
(provinces or departments) -  which may well be the proper planning size for populated 
border areas in the continental core of the EU -  caused implementation problems on the 
islands (especially in Corsica), related to their low population density and economic 
weakness; it was sometimes difficult for the Sardinian partners to find a Corsican 
equivalent to cooperate in a common action. When interviewed, both the regional 
partners seemed to share the conviction that -  precisely because of their similar 
handicaps -  the islands would have better benefited from the insertion in a more
1771 have experienced this language problem myself in the interviews with the Corsican partners. In fact, 
the strong similarities between the Corsican dialect and the Italian language often led the interviewees to 
switch our conversation from the official French to a curious Corso-Italian mix, which clearly made the 
conversation much more informal and friendly but was often difficult for me to decipher, especially when 
speaking of technical issues (and at that point it was clearly embarrassing to ask the interviewee to switch 
back to French because his or her Italian was incomprehensible!).
178 In this regard, I remember the passionate intervention during one of the seminars organized at the 
University of Corte (under INTERREG measures for academic cooperation) of an old Corsican from the 
public audience, protesting that -  at a conference on cooperation between the islands -  people were not 
speaking their common language (the dialects of the North of Sardinia and of Southern Corsica share 
many similarities), but that of the ‘invaders’ (French, Italians and even Americans!).
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dynamic network rather than from a cooperation ‘among the poor’. The same reason 
explains the preference of local actors on the islands for applying for the IIB-IIIC 
INTERREG programme in the Western-Mediterranean (‘Medocc’) area.
These considerations [over the limitations o f  the ‘islands' programme] lead to the question: 
what is the real interest o f  these regions in cooperating with one another? This explains why 
regional and local actors [in Sardinia] prefer the strand INTERREG Medocc, which allows a 
wider choice o f  partners. (S.4.II-III)
For Sardinia, Corsica is not relevant. In Corsica there is a stronger desire to open up to other 
countries, but it is obstructed by strong private interests. (E. 1.1-11)
[There are more economic measures in the INTERREG Corsica-Tuscany] also because the 
relations between the regions were already existent, while the one between Corsica and 
Sardinia were all yet to be set up. Moreover the North o f  Corsica is a more economic province, 
and this explains the exchanges between Bastia and Livorno, while Ajaccio is the administrative 
city o f  the region. (F .l .I-III)
[In Corsica] INTERREG adds up to the Obj. 1, LEADER, and other development programmes. 
However, EU  funds need a counterpart: the capacity o f  accomplishers ( ‘maitre d ’ouvrage). 
However, [on the island] there are few  local enterprises, and the continental ones do not fin d  it 
convenient to establish themselves in Corsica; the economic web is very little developed, but the 
artificial rise o f  the GDP  pro capite in a region with a very weak number o f  inhabitants hides 
this problem without solving it, without bringing economic development. For similar reasons, 
this explains why the D O M  had to be considered not only within the Obj. 1, but also under the 
Cohesion Funds and other specific programmes. (F.2.I-II)
The structural weakness of the regions seems to be specifically related to their insular 
condition, representing a source of permanent disadvantage for their development. The 
consideration of ‘insularity’ as a handicap to regional development was supported, 
within the debate on EU Regional Policy, by the Economic and Social Committee, the 
European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, and -  in a more cautious way -  by 
the Commission, all agreeing that island regions should have benefited from special 
interventions allowing them to compete on equal grounds with other European
1 70regions. Both Sardinia and especially Corsica had participated in the action of 
regional lobbies claiming that the insularity handicap should have been taken into 
account by EU Regional Policy, also using the INTERREG partnership in this aim. This 
was related to the fact that, as seen when discussing social networks, “a group that has 
learned to work effectively together in one task can take on other similar tasks at a cost 
in time and effort that is far less than bringing an entirely new group together who must 
learn everything from scratch” (Ostrom and Ahn 2001: 14). As shown by a thematic
179 Parliament (1997), p.249; SEC (1998), p 32. In its proposals for the reform of the Structural Funds for 
the 2000-2006 edition the Economic and Social Committee went a step further in the demands for 
extending the criteria establishing eligibility proposing (without success) a de facto inclusion of islands 
among Objective 1 regions.
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evaluation of the partnership principle ordered by the Commission “[t]he partnership 
principle has had a particular innovative effect on programmes concerned with cross- 
border cooperation where formal partnership has accelerated the development of (the 
ultimately more important) informal partnerships and norms of consultation and 
coordination” (Tavistock 1999: 72). However, as pointed out in the first chapter, social 
capital developed within cooperative social networks can be directed both to 
individualistic or collective goals, and used in more virtuous or vicious ways. In this last 
paragraph concluding our story on the ‘islands’ programme, I will consider how the 
INTERREG logic taught the regions to use their insular networks within the European 
polity in a more inclusive and cooperative way.
Redefining insular claims through the INTERREG logic
The direct reference to insularity in the denomination of their INTERREG ‘islands’ 
programme facilitated Corsica and Sardinia in also using it as a platform to express the 
claims of European island regions. The recognition of insularity as a handicap to 
territorial development to be taken into account by European regional and structural
|  QA
policies was officially recognised by the EU with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), 
after intense lobbying carried out by several European regional associations, which also 
saw the participation of Corsica and Sardinia. The action of those associations was 
particularly successful during the 1980s, within the ‘Europe of the regions’ climate, in 
cultivating relations with the Commission, the Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee, and later with the Committee of the Regions. Corsican 
representatives -  eager to cut loose from national tutelage -  were particularly active in 
organizing the islands’ commissions within the most influential lobbies, such as the
180 Article 158: In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall develop 
and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In particular, the 
Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and 
the backwardness of the least favoured regions or islands, including rural areas. Declaration n.30 on 
island regions: The Conference recognises that island regions suffer from structural handicaps linked to 
their island status, the permanence of which impairs their economic and social development. The 
Conference accordingly acknowledges that Community legislation must take account of these handicaps 
and that specific measures may be taken, where justified, in favour of these regions in order to integrate 
them better into the internal market on fair conditions. Article 154: 1.- To help achieve the objectives 
referred to in articles 14 and 158 and to enable citizens of the Union, economic operators and regional and 
local communities to derive full benefit from the setting up of an area without internal frontiers, the 
Community shall contribute to the establishment and development of trans-European networks in the 
areas of transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures. 2.- Within the framework of a system 
of open and competitive markets, action by the Community shall aim at promoting the interconnection 
and interoperability of national networks as well as access to such networks. It shall take account in 
particular of the need to link island, landlocked and peripheral regions with the central regions of the 
Community.
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Council of Europe or the Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions. In 1995 
the presidents of the executives of Corsica, Sardinia and the Balearic Islands (Spain) 
signed a constitutive agreement linking their regions in a project of institutional 
cooperation and lobby, called IMEDOC (an acronym for Islands of the Western- 
Mediterranean). The primary objective of the lobby, presented in Barcelona for the 
conference launching the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and in Brussels the following 
year, was to include measures specifically designed for island regions in the 2000-06 
edition of EU regional policy.
The initiative was mainly taken by the Corsican region, whose active participation 
in the different lobbies, however, revealed a quite individualistic approach, contrary to 
the logic of interregional cooperation of the ‘EU model’. We have already noted how, in 
the first two editions, the INTERREG programme with Sardinia was characterised by 
the choice of the island regions to have a parallel policy management. The same 
instrumental approach to the IMEDOC partnership was evident in the lack of common 
organizational structures, besides a Directive Committee composed by the presidents of 
the regions and their staff, meeting each year. Also, the representation offices of the 
regions in Brussels were opened separately (in 1995 for Sardinia and a year later for 
Corsica) and rarely shared contacts or information (as confirmed during my visits in 
Brussels), although there were already other examples of interregional offices of regions 
cooperating under INTERREG (as that between the Alto Adige and the Tyrol regions) 
(Olivesi 1999: 760).
This ‘competitive approach’ to lobbying noticed in the Corsican region was in fact 
very ‘French’ in style, and had been already successfully adopted by the national
1 S')government in the case of the overseas territories. Similarly, in autumn 2000, within 
the ‘Matignon process’, launched to promote a dialogue between the French 
government and Corsican representative to enhance wider devolution and peace on the 
island, Prime Minister Jospin sent a letter to the President of the European Commission
181 Conferences of European Island Regions, held within the framework of the Council of Europe, were 
organized in Sardinia (1980), the Canary Islands (1981) and in the Azores (1984). Within the CRPM 
Corsica and Sardinia participate in the Islands Commission (created in 1980) and the Inter-Mediterranean 
Commission (founded ten years later).
182 The French Departements d ’Outre Mer (DOM), the Canary Islands (FR), Madeira and Azores (P), all 
islands or groups of islands with the only exception of French Guyana, were recognised as ‘outermost 
regions’ (often referred to as RUP, after the French acronym for Regions Ultra-Peripheriques), i.e. 
regions belonging to the EU but not geographically located in the European Continent, suffering from a 
combination of factors hampering their development, such as “remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult 
topography and climate, economic dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of 
which severely restrain their development” (Treaty of Amsterdam, art.299, ex art.227). Since the reform 
of the SFs the RUP have been eligible for Objective 1 (benefiting from specific adaptations in their 
administration), a continuation of fiscal facilities, and of EU initiatives to compensate for peripherality 
and insularity, later merged within a specific strand of the INTERREG III edition.
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Romano Prodi asking him to set up a study group to consider the disadvantaged 
conditions of Corsica. After this letter, an Interministerial Committee for Corsica was 
set up by the Commission. The expectations raised on the Corsican side by this action 
are traceable in the interview with one functionary at the CTC:
[The action o f  IMEDOC is needed because] we are still fa r  from  integration: our physical 
handicaps are o f  permanent character, ju s t like in the case o f  (...) archipelagos, mountains, 
where there are high unemployment and low population rates. The action o f  our president, 
Baggioni, has found  an attentive interlocutor in Commissioner Bamier, and we are trying to 
also link to other groups o f  regions with similar problems (...) We can also fin d  references in 
the White Book on Governance (when it talks about the tri-lateral contracts between State, EU, 
and regions) or in the Memorandum on Corsica and in the 2nd Cohesion Report. (C.l.I-III)
However, complaints from the Sardinian government and other island regions led the 
Commission to disband the Committee for Corsica and to launch instead (in December 
of the same year) a study of all European island regions whose publication -  delayed 
until spring 2003 -  should have provided a starting point for a wider reflection on 
possible EU strategies for island regions in future regional policy (Planistat 2003). 
Meanwhile the Corsican lobby concentrated on the proposal to insert a specific stream 
for islands in the INTERREG III within the transnational strand in the Western- 
Mediterranean (Medocc) area, in which both Corsica and Sardinia had participated in 
the II-C edition. Also in this case, the Commission refused the proposal on the grounds 
that the islands needed to be integrated and not further isolated from other regions.
With the Corsicans we have had some difficulties because o f  their insistence on a specific strand 
in the new edition o f  INTERREG III-Westem-Mediterranean dedicated to insularity, without 
understanding the logic o f  the programme. The fa c t is that they still tend to consider the E U  
funds with a competitive approach, and that is why they insist on specific measures on 
insularity: however the problem o f  accessibility has to be inserted within a larger perspective 
than that on insularity (I.3.II-III)183
Corsicans have mobilized and also used INTERREG to recognise their insularity status, while 
Sardinians haven’t. (E.5.II-III)
The relatively low interest shown by the Sardinian region in the insularity issue had 
mainly to do with the fact that, besides the lower levels of activism of the Italian actors 
within the process of European integration, the ‘Sardinian question’ had been 
incorporated within the wider Mezzogiomo one (see chapter five). Despite the fact that 
islands constitute nearly 17% of the Italian territory (Sicily and Sardinia are the largest
183 The functionary interviewed at the Italian Ministry for Transports and Communication was one of the 
members of the Transnational Unit for the Management of the Western-Mediterranean area in the 
INTERREG IIC-IIIB.
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islands in the Mediterranean) the Italian government almost ignored the insularity issue, 
and the work done on the subject by insular lobbies as well as the Italian representatives 
at the European Parliament and the CoR. Still in 2001, in the Memorandum presented in 
June to define its priorities for the 2007-13 edition of EU Regional policy, the Italian 
government made no reference to insularity, included in the draft proposal of the 
Commission among possible themes to be considered by MSs for regional assistance. 
After the complaints of the regions Sicily and Sardinia, a second version of the 
Memorandum was provided in December 2002, eventually including an article on the 
need to take into account the theme of insularity in cohesion policy.
The cooperative character of lobbying on insularity was shown instead by the 
Committee of Regions and the Island Commission within the European Parliament, 
urging the Council and Commission to adopt practical measures in agreement with the 
above mentioned articles on insularity.184 It is also thanks to their action that the case of 
island regions was gradually inserted at the Commission within the reflections 
undertaken at the DG REGIO on territorial cohesion. In fact, the principle by which 
people should not be disadvantaged according to wherever they happen to live or work 
in the Union was particularly pertinent to the arguments developed to elucidate the 
handicap of insularity. In the Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, 
launching the debate over the future of cohesion policy after 2007, mountains and 
islands were included under the label of ‘geo-morphological areas’ whose nature is 
difficult to reveal with only the socio-economic criteria utilised for EU regions to 
qualify for SFs (Commission 2001: 34). In its Conclusion and Recommendations, the 
Report quotes, among the priorities to secure the objective of socio-economic cohesion, 
“areas with severe geographical natural handicaps”, including within the category 
outermost regions, islands, mountain regions, peripheral regions and regions with low 
population density (Commission 2002: 3).
Meanwhile, in Corsica and Sardinia networks among European island regions 
continued to spread, although they increasingly declined in a more inclusive way with
19^reference to the wider Mediterranean setting. In 2004 IMEDOC -  under the 
presidency of the region Sicily, which had entered four years before -  was extended to 
Crete and opened to all other Mediterranean islands, “in the prospect of the constitution
184 European Parliament (1997), p.249, (1998); Committee of the Regions (2002). An important role 
within the Island Commission of the European Parliament was played by the Sardinian deputy Mario 
Segni.
185 In 2000 the INSULEUR network was created, reuniting the chambers of commerce and industry of 
Mediterranean island regions; a year later the Islands Committee was created within the ArcLatin 
partnership and the MODEM network among mountain areas of the Mediterranean island regions of 
Europe.
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of a Euroregion of the Islands of the Mediterranean”, and changed its acronym to 
EURIMED (IMEDOC 2004). This cooperative approach to interregional networks, 
diffused by the Commission through INTERREG programmes, seemed to trickle into 
the logic of action of the Corsican region and its partners.
Also, islands have to root in the European market, where they are not different from  the other 
regions. Moreover, within the INTERREG programme the two island regions have more weight 
than the province o f  Pisa or Grosseto, and the insular problem has been recognised also fo r  the 
case o f  the Tuscany archipelago. Also, what was experienced with the INTERREG III B, where 
the Commission has not recognised a specific strand to the islands, has to teach us something. 
The prefect o f  the PACA region (who coordinates the French regions fo r  the programme, n.o.a.) 
has talked in this regard about an ‘identity withdrawal’ ( ‘repli identitaire) and both the 
Commission and the French state want to avoid that... (C.l .I-III)
Conclusion
In this section I have considered the story of the implementation, in the regions of 
Corsica and Sardinia, of an innovative initiative of EU Regional Policy considering 
bordering regions as a sole European actor managing the integrated development of its 
territory. For this reason, INTERREG represented a particularly coherent application of 
what I have defined as the ‘European model’, organizing power and territory according 
to the principles of MLG and territorial cohesion.
Monitoring is a fundamental means of testing the efficiency and effectiveness of a 
policy; however, in the case of INTERREG it would have been important that the 
monitoring of physical progress could address not only the socio-economic impact, but 
also the extent to which programmes have contributed to the achievement of the ‘softer’ 
objectives of INTERREG (INTERACT 2005: 66), such as the promotion of a culture of 
dialogue and cooperation, processes of capacity building through the exchange of 
experiences between regional administrations, etc. My analysis of the implementation 
of the INTERREG ‘islands’ programme over almost fifteen years since its launch in 
1990 shows a gradual but constant process of adoption, by the regional partners 
administering the programme, of the main innovations it suggested. This progress partly 
grew ‘naturally’ from reiterated cooperation and increasing acquaintance among the 
partners and with the programme, but received a decisive drive from the more 
‘constructivist’ approach adopted by the Commission in a second phase of the policy’s 
implementation (traceable from the last years of the second edition). In the first years of 
INTERREG II the strategy adopted by the two regions seemed to draw close to a type 
of ‘adaptation’ response (typifying a non-maximizing behaviour trying to innovate as
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little as necessary in order to accept the formal adoption of changes), reducing to a 
minimum extent internal changes and introducing them in an incremental and gradual 
way. However, in the last years of the second edition, and even more noticeably since 
the launching of INTERREG III, the situation shifted towards a ‘learning’ type of 
response, while regional partners extended the use of the logic promoted by the 
programme beyond its direct scope (as in the definition of regional claims on 
insularity).
However, the analysis has also shown that in its implementation the programme 
was constrained by a range of mediating factors, usually not adequately captured by 
standard evaluations, and whose resolution seem beyond the means of INTERREG. One 
of the main obstacles derived from the strength of the ‘national model’ in structuring 
territorial and power relations according to a centralized hierarchical logic (particularly 
strong in the case of France), although in the most recent years its definition has notably 
changed towards greater levels of regionalization and decentralisation. At a wider level 
one of the main brakes to territorial cooperation in the ‘islands’ programme seems to 
reside precisely in the unresolved difficulties linked to the condition of insularity shared 
by Corsica and Sardinia (isolation from ‘core areas’, higher costs of transports, 
weakness of the economy, peripherality of markets, limited supplies, depopulation, 
etc.). Rather than a happy ending, an appropriate conclusion to the story of the 
INTERREG ‘islands’ programme would sound like “to be continued...”.
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fig. 6.7 -  Italy-France ‘islands’ programme:
the evolution of planning
INTERREG IA INTERREG IIA INTERREG HIA
1. Transports and 
communications (59%) 
development of port assets; 
study on the internal and external 
transports’ system in the area; 
setting of an experimental airline 
{cancelled and substituted with 
road infrastructures)
1. Transports and 
communications (36%) 
development of road and port 
infrastructures and 
communication services
1. Networks and services 
(52.5%)
realisation and improvement of 
networks, services and 
infrastructures for water and 
energy supplies, and 
communication
2. Enhancement of the 
maritime area (8.5%)
establishment of an International 
Maritime Park and 
rationalisation of tourism in area
2. Environment (23%) 
establishment of the International 
Maritime Park; environmental 
monitoring of the quality of 
coastal waters; coordination of 
fire-fighting interventions
2. Environment, tourism and 
sustainable economic 
development (35%) 
protection and enhancement of the 
environment; sustainable 
development and promotion of 
tourism in the cross-border area
3. Economic exchanges (10%)
business services; professional 
formation in sports and tourism; 
study on the economic impact of 
cross-border exchanges
3. Tourism and culture (21%)
development of port assets for 
tourism and enhancement of the 
sea basin; definition of itineraries 
for ‘cultural tourism’
4. Scientific cooperation (10%)
scientific exchanges and 
academic cooperation; 
agronomic research
4. Cross-border exchanges 
(19%)
creation of a centre for Corso- 
Sardinian exchanges; socio­
cultural and educational 
exchanges; economic exchanges; 
scientific exchanges and 
academic cooperation
3. Cross-border exchanges 
(10.5%)
socio-cultural and educational 
exchanges; scientific exchanges 
and academic cooperation; 
institutional cooperation
5. Cross-border exchanges 
(10%)
creation of a centre for Corso- 
Sardinian exchanges; 
development of common 
databases; scientific exchanges 
and academic cooperation
5. Electricity grids (cancelled)
6. Monitoring and technical 
assistance (1.5%)
6. Monitoring and technical 
assistance (1%)
4. Monitoring and technical 
assistance (2%)
[source: our elaboration from the analysis of primary sources]
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fig. 6.8 -  Italy-France ‘islands’ programme:
the evolution of financial management
INTERREG I A: France-Italy: ‘Islands’
I (1991-1993)
Total budget: 40M Euro *
II (1994-1999)
Total budget: 74.5M Euro *
HI (2000-2006)
Total budget: 115.5M Euro * 
(25M Euros for Tuscany)
CORSICA
(15.5M Euro)
SARDINIA
(24.5M Euro)
CORSICA
(16.5M Euro)
SARDINIA
(58M Euro)
CORSICA:
(28.5M Euro)
SARDINIA:
(62M Euro)
A x e s P l a n n e d S p e n t P l a n n e d S p e n t P l a n n e d S p e n t P l a n n e d S p e n t P l a n n e d S p e n t * * P l a n n e d S p e n t * *
1 52% 73% 66% 97% 1% 97% 36% 96% 33% 11% 20% 39%
2 7% 89% 10% 96% 56% 45% 23% 99% 45% 13% 58% 24%
3 11% 87 9% 63% 24% 49% 21% 141
%
14% 24% 14% 16%
4 13% 74% 7% 96% 15% 100
%
19% 99% 8% 26% 8% 7%
5 14% 93% 6% 63% - - - - - - - -
6 2% 28% 1% 83% 5% 98% 1% 99% - - - -
Tot 100% 73% 100% 92% 100% 57% 100% 107
%
100% 15% 100% 25%
* The percentages are relative to the last modulation of the programmes available.
** The percentage of funds spent in the third edition refers to the situation declared on date 23.12.04. The 
final deadline for acceptability of spending of the programme is set for 31.12.08.
fig. 6.9 -  Italy-France ‘islands’ programme: 
the evolution of partnership structures
INTERREG IA 
(national model)
INTERREG IIA 
(transitional phase)
INTERREG IIIA 
(European model)
Management
Authorities
Two separated MA: the 
Sardinian region and the 
French decentralised 
planning services in 
Corsica (SGAC).
Two separated MA: the 
RAS and the SGAC, but 
increasingly direct 
involvement of the CTC.
A single MA for the 
programme (the RAS), 
flanked by auxiliary MA 
(the CTC and the 
Tuscan region).
Payment Authorities
Separated financial 
authorities: the RAS and 
the SGAC.
Separated financial 
authorities: the RAS and 
the SGAC (direct 
management of the IIC by 
the CTC).
A single PA for the 
programme (the RAS) 
flanked by auxiliary PA 
(the Province of Sassari; 
the CTC; the province 
of Leghorn).
Monitoring
Committees
More relevance on the 
vertical (institutional) 
dimension of partnership; 
national tutelle (on the 
French side).
Increased involvement of 
the socio-economic 
partners; increased 
participation of the 
regional (Corsica) and 
local (Sardinia) levels.
Also representatives of 
the environmental and 
equal opportunities 
rights; regional 
presidents as chairs of 
the MC.
[source: our elaboration from the analysis of primary sources]
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CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 7 - The role o f  regionalisation within the process o f  EU  
integration: conclusive reflections starting from the ‘islands’ case
In introducing this thesis I related its object of study to the wide debate on the 
emergence of post-national institutional frameworks for the organization of 
contemporary Western societies. The focus on the organization of territorial and power 
relations as the main dimensions of structural change to be analysed was justified by the 
fact that territory and power are social constructs constantly present in the organization 
of societies, although differently institutionalized for each historical formation. The 
thesis has considered the definition and diffusion by the EU, since the end of the 1980s, 
of a model of governance based on cooperative relations among the different actors 
involved in the process of EU integration. Through the implementation of EU Regional 
Policy, it was required that this model be adopted by regional actors in different socio- 
institutional contexts and often accustomed to ‘ centre-periphery ’ structures typically 
distinguishing the organization of modem nation states. This was the case of the regions 
considered in the thesis, which share a past of backwardness and dependency on their 
respective central governments, as reflected in the analysis of regional policies launched 
for their territorial development.
In this conclusive chapter I will recall the main assumptions that allowed me to 
frame the theoretical puzzle that was presented by the research and summarize the main 
findings of its empirical analysis. Having considered in what ways they relate to each 
other, I will gauge in what ways this thesis has contributed to the theoretical debates 
considered and acknowledge as well the questions it leaves open that face scholars 
interested in further pursuing these topics.
Main theoretical debates and empirical questions considered
At a wider theoretical level, the issue of path dependency and institutional change in 
backward regions has been considered from the angle offered by historical 
institutionalism (HI). As argued in section I, this position recognises the fact that 
‘history matters’ in processes of institutional change and thus that it is not sufficient to 
promote ‘top-down’ reforms or policies to change institutions which are both context- 
bound and path dependent. Consequently, our methodology has led us to preface our
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empirical section, gauging regional reaction to the ‘EU model’ proposed by 
INTERREG (section III), with a historical analysis of the policies based on previous 
institutional settings (section II). The historical analysis was very relevant to the 
research, in that it has allowed a better understanding of both the obstacles hampering 
innovation and the significance of registered change in the realisation of the EU policy 
in the regions, as in the case of the troubled relationship between regional actors and 
state institutions in Corsica, or the clientelistic logic grounding the distribution 
development funds in Sardinia, as in the rest of the Mezzogiomo.
According to the HI approach, however, acknowledging the relevance of history in 
institutional life does not necessarily lead researchers to adopt deterministic accounts of 
social causation but, on the contrary, leads them to search in its evolution for those 
moments of substantial change allowing individual actors to orient their strategies 
according to a different logic of collective action, legitimised as more appropriate to the 
changed conditions of society. In fact, through the analysis of the evolution of regional 
policies conducted in Corsica and Sardinia from the end of WW2 by their respective 
states, we have also noticed the emergence of policy proposals based on ways of 
considering territorial development and decision-making procedures similar to those 
later supported by the reformed Regional Policy of the EU. However, they did not 
respond to the normative and organizational logic of the prevailing ‘national paradigm’ 
shaping industrial policy, political and administrative life, territorial and social relations 
according to a centralised and hierarchical regulative structure.
In the last decades the ‘national paradigm’ has been challenged by several 
processes, streaming under the label of globalization, showing an increased 
interconnectedness of economic, social and political processes beyond the national 
level, challenging the exclusiveness of state regulative powers, and asking for an 
internal reorganization of its institutions in order to meet the requirements and face the 
challenges of the new era. The evolution of EU integration is set within this picture of 
transformation of the nation-state system, and thus the theoretical debate within 
European studies has initially sought to interpret the process as either a sign of its 
demise or its resilience. The adoption of an institutionalist perspective to study 
European integration joins a recent contribution to the debate, known under the label of 
‘Europeanisation studies’, considering European integration as proceeding not only by 
stage of development following intergovernmental agreements, but also gradually 
through the implementation of policies defining rules, procedures, and ideas influencing 
the practice of the actors involved in the process. The HI perspective considers
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Europeanisation as bidirectional and multidimensional: in fact it includes within the 
concept both the processes through which organizational fields are framed at the EU 
level and those through which they are transferred to social contexts traditionally 
regulating their political, economic, and cultural spheres according to the national 
model. Therefore in the empirical section of the thesis, following the story of the 
‘islands’ INTERREG programme, while the main focus of the research was on the 
response given by regional actors in Corsica and Sardinia to the model proposed by the 
policy, another concern was to consider how the Community Initiative was gradually 
framed and refined in order to gain more effectiveness and coherence. Departing from 
most research on Europeanisation and SFs implementation, our analysis has considered 
the specificity of regional action focussing on Corsica and Sardinia as distinctive 
territorial actors (and not as agents of their respective MSs).
A third debate specifically considered in the theoretical section is that concerning 
the role of social networks in promoting cooperative behaviour among the actors, and 
thus on the mechanisms allowing the production of social capital resources facilitating 
collective action. Also in this case we have refused deterministic approaches 
considering social capital as a mere result of ‘shadow of past’ mechanisms (as in the 
case of civic traditions), and allowed for the possibility of enhancing its creation 
through the establishment of specific social frames used as mechanisms of coordination 
of individual actors’ beliefs and shedding a ‘shadow of the future’ over their interaction. 
Thus our hypothesis was that INTERREG, interpreted as a public policy designed to 
promote partnership among actors asked to implement an innovative approach to 
territorial development, could offer a long-term perspective showing the advantages of 
cooperation through the direct involvement in policy networks of regional actors 
sharing a past history of backwardness, isolation, dependency and peripherality.
The key findings: contribution to the debates and open questions
a) path dependency and cooperative culture: building interregional cooperation in 
the shadow o f the past
Evaluations launched by the European Commission on Community Initiative 
INTERREG show that in the first edition and in the early years of the following one, the 
programme was overall successful in more dynamic areas with previous traditions of 
cooperation, while results were much more limited in those areas lacking experience in
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1RA •terms of economic exchanges and cooperative practices. On the basis of this 
evidence, the Commission’s Second Report on economic and social cohesion sketched a 
picture distinguishing three levels of cross-border cooperation taking place in 
INTERREG programmes:
1. at its most basic, cross-border cooperation involves the enhancement o f physical links, 
whether in the form of roads, rail, sea ports or airports (...) but a lack of real involvement by 
local and regional authorities was noted in the evaluations.
2. more intensive cooperation is evident in the development o f networks and partnership 
between organizations and institutions situated relatively close to each other, but which, since 
they are separated by a border, focus on other parts o f their region or country instead.
3. countries which have a long history of cooperation and INTERREG has built on this by 
forging even stronger links in certain areas o f regional policy.
(Commission 2001a: 143)
The Report continues to relate the three types of cooperation to the territorial location 
where the programmes were implemented, noticing that levels of cooperation increase 
when one moves from Southern to Northern regions. The first type of cooperation, in 
fact, refers to Mediterranean countries, “which often lack experience of cooperation”; 
the second to cooperation between France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany (the 
EU’s ‘core’); the third to the Scandinavian countries, which share a longstanding and 
diffused tradition of cooperative practices (Commission 2001a: 143). As argued in the 
discussion of the social capital debate, these observations could be interpreted according 
to a culturalist view explaining present cooperation among regional and local actors in 
territorial development with reference to ‘shadow of the past’ mechanisms. This could 
indirectly lead to the argument that territories that do not share previous experience in 
terms of exchanges, trading, and the proactive engagement of local actors are not 
worthy strategies of territorial development building on those factors. Moreover, in its 
reports and informative leaflets the European Commission tends to emphasise those 
‘success stories’ matching what it has codified as ‘best practices’, without sufficiently 
dealing with critical cases or appreciating slow improvements in the case of difficult 
starting conditions.
As seen in section III, part of the problems encountered by territorial actors 
involved in the first edition of INTERREG was related to several shortcomings of the 
initiative, progressively solved or improved in the following editions: the contradiction 
between the real means of the initiative and its declared aims, the short time lapse 
available for the actors to learn its logic, the great number of CIs contemporaneously
186 FERE (1996), LRDP (2003). Both evaluations were commissioned by the DG REGIO of the European 
Commission.
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launched covering the specificity of its action, the vagueness of regulations relating to 
rules on evaluation and information, the limited assistance offered by Commission’s 
services. This explains why several of the flaws that we have noticed in the case of the 
‘islands’ programme (such as the dispersion of the small amount of funds in many 
actions, the lack of quantified objectives, the little attention in selection procedures, the 
substitution of failed measures with pre-existing projects with little cross-border 
impact), were faced by most of the other INTERREG programmes in the first edition 
(FERE 1996: 18, 19). Clearly, these problems were more easily overcome by regions 
boasting stronger institutional, economic, and infrastructural assets, or even vaunting 
traditions of cross-border exchanges; however, they represented a greater and perhaps 
crucial drawback for traditionally backward regions suffering from isolation and 
peripherality and used to relying on state aid for their development.
Nevertheless, the ‘constructivist’ approach to territorial development here adopted 
leads us to consider the role played by INTERREG as particularly important also in 
those latter regions that, as in the ‘islands’ programme, presented themselves as a ‘least 
likely case’ of interregional cooperation. In fact, despite its limitations, the first edition 
established the “reliability of the idea of cross-border cooperation”: “INTERREG I has 
clarified, in all borders, the stakes and obstacles of cross-border cooperation”, creating 
expectations and aspirations among backward and peripheral areas about their future 
(FERE 1996: 20, 21) and thus represented a point of departure unfolding a new path at 
their horizon.
b) institutional change takes time: building interregional cooperation in the 
shadow o f the future
Also in the case of the INTERREG ‘islands’ programme, similarly to that of other 
Southern regions, official evaluations concluded that the outcomes of the Corso- 
Sardinian programme were ‘limited’ (LRDP 2003: 25, 26). However, as argued from 
the theoretical perspective adopted, the picture changes when regional response to 
institutional change is analysed a longer time-frame: on the one hand, in light of its 
distance from the prevailing paradigm organizing the socio-institutional context of the 
two regions (as seen in section II); on the other hand following the story of the three 
editions of the INTERREG ‘islands’ programme, looking not only for success stories 
but also explaining failures. In fact, it is important to be able to learn not just from 
policy success but also from policy failure, and thus to confront outcomes with an
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analysis of the contextual obstacles of the actors managing and implementing the 
policy.
From this longer time-frame adopted by the analysis, it has been possible to 
appreciate the gradual but constant shift of the two regions towards the adoption of the 
‘European model’ proposed by the policy. Until the first years of INTERREG II the 
strategy adopted by the two regions in implementing the programme seemed to draw 
close to a type of ‘adaptation response’, trying to reduce internal changes to the 
minimum extent possible in order to meet the formal requirements of the programme. 
There were actually efforts to launch initiatives aiming at the new goal of interregional 
cooperation (notably with the failed initiative of the airline); however, they followed 
separate paths in the planning and management of the regional administrations, who 
continued to follow the logic of their respective ‘national model’. This was also because 
of the strong limitations imposed on an autonomous action of the Corsican partner in 
the policy by the gatekeeping role played by state services on the island.
However, since the end of the INTERREG II edition, and even more noticeably 
since the launching of INTERREG III, we could register a shift of regional 
administrations towards the rules and values prescribed by the policy, both in the 
vocabulary but also in the logic of action adopted. This shift towards a ‘learning type of 
response’ was not without reserves, neither was it always consistent; however, as seen, 
it marked a sharp departure from the ‘national model’. Crucial in leading the regions to 
learn the logic proposed by the ‘EU model’, besides the incentives to cooperation 
already offered by the first INTERREG edition, have been: the high credit o f  trust 
offered by the Commission to the regions, fully legitimised as the main referent for the 
development of their territories in the programme (also in the Corsican case); the time 
factor, that is, the reiteration of the policy through several editions offering regional 
partners a medium-long time perspective, allowing them to seize the benefits of 
interregional cooperation; the choice of the Commission to use framing integration -  
that is, a process of implementation of the ‘EU model’ proposed by INTERREG 
proceeding through flexible mechanisms, able to adapt to the specific features of the 
institutional contexts; the insistence of the Commission on the use of network structures 
for the common management and planning of the policy process leading the regional 
partners to consider the development of the cross-border area as a collective endeavour.
The idea of realising the ‘area-based’ approach proposed by INTERREG through a 
common management and planning among the regions involved had been suggested by 
the Commission since the first launch of INTERREG. Consequently, within the cross-
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border programmes vaunting traditions of territorial exchanges, interregional 
partnerships were organized since the first edition according to formal or informal 
network structures (FERE 1996: 20). Conversely, in those regions lacking these 
traditions, the setting of common structures received a decisive drive from the more 
‘constructivist’ approach to institutional building adopted by the Commission in a 
second phase of the policy’s implementation, traceable from the last years of the second 
edition. In fact, once it became officially recognised that the main feature of CIs was 
that of bringing ‘institutional rather than economic added value’, the Commission 
started to focus on the mechanism stimulating the achievement of those ‘softer’ 
outcomes of cooperation. Thus, it defined more demanding requirements on the 
teamwork of the cross-border partnership: from the common planning of integrated 
strategies to updated financial monitoring and evaluation of the programme as a whole.
From this view, we can conclude that our case confirms the hypothesis that 
cooperative behaviour does not only derive from ‘shadow of the past’ mechanisms, but 
can also be enhanced from the establishment of specific social frames used as 
mechanisms of coordination of individual actors’ beliefs and casting a ‘shadow of the 
future’ over their interaction. In making use of this kind of frames to promote 
cooperation among backward regional actors belonging to different nation states, 
INTERREG has empowered them to discern new prospects, turning from their past of 
dependency and peripherality. A further hypothesis suggested by this evidence, which 
would deserve further investigation, is that the prevalence of the individualistic 
component of socio-cultural traditions in the islands and its relation with the persistence 
of paths of dependency and backwardness, was nurtured by attributes of the ‘national 
model’ grounding previous regional policies in the regions.
c) the role o fEU  Regional Policy within the process o f European integration
The conclusion of the previous paragraph also leads us to a reflection on the role of EU 
Regional Policy. Given its increased relevance in the share of the EU’s budget since the 
1988 reform of the Structural Funds, greater attention was paid to assessing the 
outcomes of Regional Policy in terms of meeting the cohesion objective, both to justify 
the proper use of citizens’ resources and improve its effectiveness. However, also 
depending on the methodology used, interpretations of the contribution of the policy 
vary broadly both with reference to the cohesion objective and to the wider process of 
European integration. On the one side there are those authors arguing that unbalances 
among regions and MSs of the EU are still growing, exacerbated both by enlargements
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and a process of integration further favouring regions in the EU core (‘divergence 
thesis’), and that EU Regional Policy is ‘paying ofF disadvantaged and peripheral 
regions (Fagerberg e Verspagen 1996; Martin 2000; Boldrin and Canova 2001; 
Ederveen et al. 2002). On the opposite side, those that claim that regional economies in 
the EU are -  slowly or quickly -  catching up (‘convergence thesis’) but, because 
cumulative effects within an imperfect functioning of market can produce divergence, 
EU Regional Policy plays an important role in promoting the catching up of 
disadvantaged regions (Bradley et al. 1995; Mauro and Spilimbergo 2001; Viesti and 
Prota 2004; Leonardi 2005).
It is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis to contribute directly to this complex 
issue, mainly based on the measurement of convergence through the analysis of the 
evolution in time of the main socio-economic indicators. However, the thesis indirectly 
adds to the debate further elements of reflection on the role of EU Regional Policy 
within the process of EU integration considering its contribution to the 
institutionalisation of the ‘EU model’. In fact, our analysis of INTERREG confirms the 
way in which EU Regional Policy, since its 1988 reform, has promoted in the regions 
throughout its territory common rules, regulations, means and values, despite their 
broad variations in socio-economic conditions and institutional settings. In enhancing 
processes of institutional and capacity building and diffusing a culture of cooperation 
extended to different territorial levels, EU Regional Policy reinforces the visibility of 
the subnational layer where it was weaker or nonexistent and legitimises its role as 
decision-maker, responsible for its territorial development. More importantly, this 
legitimisation is redefined according to an institutional pattern of multilevel governance, 
allowing for a new articulation of centre-periphery relations in cooperative -  rather than 
mutually antagonistic -  terms.
As shown in the second section in the case of Corsica and Sardinia, within the 
‘national model’, regional policies were mostly based on state-led, ‘top-down’, sectoral 
interventions revealing central mistrust and pessimism over the potential of the socio­
cultural and institutional resources of the regions that, even when formally authorised 
were practically denied policy-making capabilities as politically autonomous actors. The 
unfruitful struggle and debate between the central governments and the island regions 
over regional autonomy was essentially played out by both sides as a ‘zero sum’ game -  
for which gaining autonomy for the latter only meant a loss of sovereignty for the 
former -  or was otherwise resolved through an increase in the disbursement of state 
funds to the regions. Conversely, the European regionalisation allows territorial actors
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to redefine their identities in an inclusive way rather than according to a defensive 
localism attempting “to do without the state” (Bagnasco 2003: 120), or even to go 
against it: the reorganization of the regional and local levels is rather declined as an 
attempt to redefine spatial reorganizations adaptive to new conditions in the 
globalization era. From this view, regional and local authorities are recognised as 
crucial actors bringing added value to the definition of coordinated developmental 
processes, seen as a collective endeavour within the wider undertaking of EU 
integration.
In the case of INTERREG, the pattern of multilevel governance was further 
extended following a transnational approach to the EU’s territorial development. This 
initiative was particularly relevant for those regions that -  as in our case study -  for 
reasons often linked to their specific geo-morphological conditions or ethnic origins, 
owned a story of backward development and peripherality within their national context. 
In fact, the consideration of a ‘denationalised’ organization of space and power offers 
peripheral regions the possibility to review the location of their territories, inserting 
them within the global context through efficient economic synergies. However, our 
analysis of the ‘islands’ INTERREG has shown how, with reference to this point, the 
potentials of the programme were severely limited by a range of contextual factors, 
usually not taken into consideration by evaluations. Only recently, reports on 
INTERREG have started to acknowledge the need to more fully take into consideration 
the different contextual factors characterising the programmes, such as the level of 
openness of borders, the infrastructural supply and the socio-economic conditions of the 
regions, their possibilities in terms of additional funding sources from the private sector, 
besides their institutional status in terms of self-government (INTERACT 2005: 127, 
134). Thus, although INTERREG proved to be effective in contributing to the 
promotion of ‘softer factors’ enhancing developmental processes also in backward 
regions, successfully involved in cooperative processes of institutional and capacity 
building, its contribution to the objective of territorial cohesion was limited in the 
‘islands’ case by obstacles of a more structural nature. Those obstacles (such as the 
weakness of the market and the infrastructural endowment in the regions, worsened by 
the insularity status and the peripherality of the Western-Mediterranean area vis a vis 
continental Europe) would in fact need a wider EU strategy promoting a balanced 
spatial development of its territory as a whole, in order to be effectively tackled.
The relevance of the action carried out by INTERREG was recognised by the 
Commission with the introduction of territorial cooperation as one of the three priorities
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of the new EU Regional Policy (2007-13), although the one with the poorest 
endowment fund. However, without a wider coordination of all EU policies according 
to a spatial sustainable development strategy it is likely that there will continue to be 
limitations to the effectiveness of EU Regional Policy in terms of enhancing territorial 
cohesion in the European territory, and thus to meeting one of the main declared 
objectives of the process of European integration.
d) from European integration to Europeanisation and return
A final set of reflections I want to make refers to the contribution of the thesis to the 
debate on Europeanisation. Through its emphasis on cooperation and territorial 
integration in areas defined beyond the limits of national borders, INTERREG has 
strengthened the role of regions in patterns of multilevel governance, orienting their 
action towards the achievement of a harmonious development of the EU territory as a 
whole. A first point is that this consideration confirms, within the debate on European 
studies, the relevance of EU policies based on multilevel governance as a means of 
institutional change and further European integration. The flexibility of structures of 
multilevel governance allows for a reduction in time and coordination constraints 
needed by the traditional inter-governmental processes:
Constitutional reforms in response to EU treaty revisions are few and far between. But many 
actors that operate in national and subnational institutions are exposed to European governing 
concepts and quite a few of them are engaged in Community procedures. They may constitute a 
far more effective transmission belt for institutional development than parliaments and 
government enacting institutional revisions.
(Kohler-Koch 2002: 6)
However, the relevance of adopting MLG structures, as argued, does not only refer to 
their organizational effectiveness, but also to their correspondence with an ideal of 
participatory and deliberative democracy. From this view the greater regionalisation 
promoted though MLG structures can be considered as a partial response to the issue of 
democratic deficit in the EU, in that by granting regional and local representatives a 
greater involvement in the decisional processes affecting their territories it contributes 
to bringing Europe nearer to the life of its citizens.
Today, as said, the organization of territory and power proposed by INTERREG 
represents one of the three main objectives of EU Regional Policy, as well as one of the 
tenets inspiring the new Neighbouring and Partnership Policy; however fifteen years 
ago it would have been difficult to formalise its role within a Regional Policy still 
mainly managed through national channels. Like other CIs, INTERREG was thought of
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as an experimental action, whose effectiveness and validity of objectives had to be 
tested and revised in due course. Thus my second point refers to the fact that the 
reforming role played by those looser mechanisms of framing integration within the 
process of European integration does not have to be underestimated. In fact they 
respond to the need of the EU to prepare the ground for innovative ‘post-national’ 
policies that, to be mainstreamed, need greater support in order to overcome the 
resistance of the actors to revise the old national logic legitimised in the social context 
within which they are embedded, or greater flexibility to accommodate the variety of 
different starting conditions. The role of these mechanisms becomes particularly 
important in the case of a process of European integration where policies have to be 
defined, coordinated and implemented throughout an ‘ever-enlarging’ European 
territory. In the third section we have seen how regional politicians in Corsica used 
INTERREG as a platform to strengthen their position and visibility both at home and at 
European level. Gradually the CTC -  initially attached to the prefectural services -- was 
increasingly involved in the direct management of the programme, becoming by the 3rd 
edition the only management and payment authority on the French side. These changes 
within INTERREG anticipated the reform of Corsican laws on decentralisation, 
effective since January 2002, as well as provisions for the management of SFs in other 
French regions.187
At its launch, INTERREG did not have a clearly focussed strategy and its aims and 
methods were gradually refined by the Commission, mainly through two different 
paths: on the one hand, debates were launched among working groups at different 
territorial levels reflecting on the limits of EU Regional Policy in achieving cohesion 
and defining innovative solutions to overcome them; on the other hand, possible 
solutions were tested on the ground, through the direct involvement of regional actors 
and their contribution in suggesting adjustments to make policies more effective and 
devising best practices emerging from policy implementation. Our analysis could 
consider this double direction in the process of institutional change between policy 
implementation and regional demands because of its refusal of simple models of 
causation in explaining processes of institutional change. Thus a third point that can be 
strengthened by the findings is that Europeanisation is a complex process made o f a 
multiplicity o f coevolving factors, although it can clearly be ‘decomposed’ in its parts or
187 Initially the prefects acted as the management and payment authority of Structural Funds. Practical 
difficulties in the implementation process later led the government to grant a partial delegated 
management role to the regions (acting under the prefect’s supervision), and experimented in 2003 with a 
direct transfer of responsibilities in management to the Alsace region, see CoR (2004), p.331.
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directions for analytical purposes. We have seen, for instance, how the lobbying of the 
island regions for the recognition of their territorial handicaps had contributed to the 
launching of the programme by the Commission. The implementation of the 
programme, however, gradually changed the approach of both sides to the issue: on the 
one side, the regions learned to define their territorial identity and claims in an inclusive 
way, rather than according to a individualistic logic led by defensive localism; on the 
other side, the revised strategy of the islands’ lobby brought the Commission to 
formally recognise the disadvantages of regions having specific territorial features (such 
as islands or mountain areas) in developmental processes.
Conclusion
In this thesis I have analysed the impact of the institutional change promoted since the 
1990s by INTERREG, an innovative EU regional policy based on cross-border policy 
networks, in two regional administrations lacking traditions of cooperation and sharing 
a model of development dependent on their respective central governments. Despite the 
fact that the focus of our research was on the in-depth analysis of change in the case of 
two island regions, I believe that its findings -  as shown in this final chapter -  may offer 
material of reflection for wider debates at theoretical and empirical levels involved in 
the complex research field of Europeanisation.
Our hypothesis, holding that cooperative behaviour can be enhanced by the setting 
of specific structures of network governance, was fundamentally supported by the 
findings. Although the ‘islands’ programme presented itself as a ‘least likely’ case to 
test the success of INTERREG, the use of cooperative networks for the common 
administration of the policy has set in motion interactive learning processes leading the 
actors to conform with a model distributing authority and policy-making across multiple 
levels of government extending beyond national borders.
Several factors emerge as having played a major contribution in persuading 
regional actors to shift from the previous institutional setting to the new ‘EU model’: 
the credit of trust given to regional actors by the European Commission, gradually 
empowering them to take responsibility over developmental strategies for their territory 
through processes of capacity and institutional building; the longer time-frame 
perspective of the regional partnership, since the programme was continued for three 
subsequent editions; the use of flexible mechanisms of integration, allowing for gradual 
adaptation of the different institutional contexts to the proposed ‘EU model’.
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However, the potentials of interregional cross-border cooperation in terms of 
enhancing the objective of territorial cohesion appears severely limited by the persistent 
peripherality of the island regions, as well as their wider territorial setting (the Western- 
Mediterranean) both at the national level and within an enlarged EU. This limitation 
seems to suggest that in order to achieve further cohesion of the EU territory, Regional 
Policy should be coordinated with other EU policies having a relevant impact on 
territory by a wide-ranging European spatial and sustainable development strategy.
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Annexes
fig.a.l - The island regions of Corsica and Sardinia: 
a view from the past
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fig.a.2 - The island regions of Corsica and Sardinia:
a view from space
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fig.a.3 - The island regions of Corsica and Sardinia:
a view from Europe (GDP per head)
fig.a.4 - The island regions of Corsica and Sardinia:
a view from Europe (employment rates)
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fig.a.5 - The island regions of Corsica and Sardinia:
a view from Europe (unemployment rates)
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fig.a.6 -  The island regions of Corsica and Sardinia: a view from INTERREG 
(IIIA: th e ‘islands’ programme; IIIB: the Western-Mediterranean programme)
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fig.a.7 - The island regions of Corsica and Sardinia:
a view from Europe (distance from the centroid)
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List o f interviews
People who have directly managed the ‘islands’ programme 
(in-depth interviews followed up from winter 2000 to summer 2005):
European Commission (DG REGIO. Brussels):
Claudio CARUSO, Fausta CORD A, Roberto DANEO, Frederique LORENZI, Mario GARILLI 
SEREGNI, Filippo TURLI;
Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti (Office for EU programmes and initiatives. Rome): 
Clara COLLARILE, Francesco GAETA, Claudio GRAMACCIONI;
Regione Autonoma della Sardegna
Centro Regionale di Programmazione. Cagliari:
Salvatore DESOGUS, Antonio SASSU, Elisabetta SCHIRRU, Franco VENTRONI;
Province of Sassari (INTERREG Office. Sassarik 
Marco Dario CHERCHi;
Prefecture de Corse (Secretariat General pour les affaires de Corse-SGAC. Ajaccio):
Jean Marie OLIVIER, Jean Camille PIETRI, Letizia SALINI, Monia SANNA;
Collectivity Territoriale Corse (CTCL (Decentralised Cooperation Unit. Ajaccio):
Carine BALLI, Norbert PANCRAZI, Dominique PIAZZA D’OLMO, Monia SANNA; Evelyn 
STROMBONL
Other people involved in the implementation of INTERREG programmes on the islands 
(brief interviews linked to specific aspects of the initiative):
Olga Luisa ANGHELAKIS (EC, DG REGIO); Bruno ASILI (RAS, CRP); Cristina CASULA 
(RAS; EU unit); Bianca BIANCO (RAS, EU office in Brussels); Nicola CORRIA (Province of 
Nuoro); Fabio CROCCOLO (Min. Infrastrutture e Trasporti, MEDOCC unit); Maria Assunta 
DESSI (University of Cagliari); Michela FARINA (RAS, EU unit); Paolo FOIS (University of 
Sassari); Thierry GARCIA (University of Corte); Catherine ISTRIA (CTC, EU office in 
Brussels); Alexandre KAMAROTOS (Joint Technical Secretariat in Rome, MEDOCC); Mario 
LEONI (RAS, EU unit); Andrea MAIRATE (EC, DG REGIO); Romano MAMBREMI (Director 
of ‘Insuleur’, Cagliari); Gavino PISCHEDDA (RAS, CRP); Graziella PISU (RAS, CRP); 
Michel ROMBALDI (CTC, CESC); Paolo SAU (RAS, Ministry for local authorities).
N.B. Translations o f  the interviews from  French or Italian into English are author’s.
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